Nova Law Review 37, #2 by ,
Nova Law Review
Volume 37, Issue 2 2013 Article 1
Nova Law Review 37, #2
Nova Law Review∗
∗
Copyright c©2013 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
NOVA LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 37   SPRING 2013           NUMBER 2 
 
 
EXECUTIVE BOARD 
 
RAUL VALERO 
Editor-in-Chief 
 
    JENNA SOBELMAN  
            Executive Editor 
RACHEL BAUSCH 
 Lead Articles Editor 
 
ABIGAIL BROWN 
Managing Technical Editor 
 
 
ARTICLES EDITORS 
 
ANA ALVAREZ 
NATHALIE BIGIO 
NICOLE CASTANO 
REBECCA CAYSIDO 
ASHLEY FERNALD 
GRANT LEVINE 
 
 
ASSOCIATE EDITORS 
 
CITRA REGISTE 
Assistant Technical Editor 
RICHARD CONFORTI 
 Goodwin Editor 
LINDSAY ERVIN 
Assistant Lead Articles Editor 
   MATTHEW BARRY 
Subscriptions Editor 
 
 
FACULTY ADVISORS 
 
HEATHER BAXTER 
ELENA MARTY-NELSON 
1
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
SENIOR STAFF MEMBERS
MELISSA APONTE-MARTINI
MELANIE BATDORF
DARLENE BARRON
JONATHAN CHAMBERS
TASHA DE MIGUEL
GERARDO FERNANDEZ-DAVILA
CHELSEA HAIR
CHRISTINA LEHM
CAROLINE LEWIS
MICHEAL LOTTO
RYAN MOSHER
KATHERINE NEWCOMER
ZACHARY PHILLIPS
ANDREW OSTREGA
JONATHAN PICARD
EVAN SHERES   
JEFFREY WIDELITZ
CHRIS WIESMAN
JESSICA LYNN WILLIAMS
JANE WOODFIELD
JUNIOR STAFF MEMBERS
JILL ABERBACH
STEPHANIA BERTONI
RICHARD BODEK
MAEGAN BRIDWELL
SARI CANAVAN
JENNIFER CHUNN
NICOLE COUMOU
DANIEL DRAZEN
GRETEL ECHARTE
ARIEL ENISMAN
KELLI FENERAN
LINDA FRESNEDA
JORDAN GREENBERG
COLBY GROSSMAN
JARED GUBERMAN
LYDIA HARLEY
MATTHEW HORTON
EVAN KOHN
HARRY LEONARD
MELANIE LESSARD
DANIEL LEWIN
BRITTNEY LITTLE
JAY LONDON
ELIZABETH LUTZ
RYAN MCGLYNN
JOSEPH MORGESE
ROBERT NEWMAN
MICHELLE NICHOLS
ELI POLLACK
JONATHAN RICHMAN
MELISSA ROJAS
VANESSA SEBLANO
KELLY SELIG
MANUEL SERRA-JOVENICH
NATASHA SHAIKH
CARI SHAPIRO
DAVID SHOLL
STRATTON SMILEY
JULIA STRUGILL
CAROLINE TABASH
HERBERT UZZI
EMMI VAINIO
KIMBERLY WALD
JEREMY WILLIAMS
PATRICK ZALMAN
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/1
 NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
Athornia Steele, B.A., J.D., Dean of the Law School 
Elena Betty Langan, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, Academic Affairs & Professor 
Catherine Arcabascio, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, International Programs and Professor of Law 
Timothy Arcaro, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean for AAMPLE and Online Programs & Professor 
Linda F. Harrison, J.D., Associate Dean, Critical Skills Program, & Associate Professor of Law 
Janet Mosseri, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean for Student Affairs 
Joshua Metz, B.S., B.A., CPA, Director of Administrative Operations 
Lynn Acosta, B.A., M.S., Assistant Dean of Student Services 
Olympia R. Duhart, B.A., J.D., Director of First-Year Lawyering Skills & Values Program & Professor 
Beth Hall, B.A., M.S., Assistant Dean for Admissions 
Jennifer McIntyre, B.S., M.S., Assistant Dean for Online Programs 
Nancy Sanguigni, B.S., M.B.A., Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs 
Jennifer Jarema, Director of Communications, Publications, and Special Events 
Robert Levine, B.S., J.D., Assistant Dean for Career Development 
Marilyn Eisler, B.A., J.D., Alumni Director 
Meg Chandelle, B.S., M.B.A., J.D., Director of Advanced Lawyering Skills and Values and Adjunct 
Professor 
Sharon Booth, B.A., J.D., Director of Public Interest Programs and Disability Services 
Frank A. Orlando, B.S., J.D., Director of the Center for the Study of Youth Policy and Adjunct Professor 
Carol Yecies, B.A., J.D., M.I.S. Associate Director of Information Services and Administration and 
Adjunct Professor 
Frank Novak, B.A., J.D., Associate Director of Network Services 
Mary Paige Smith, B.A., M.L.S., Associate Director of Technical Services 
Denise Corin, B.S., J.D., Associate Director of Career Development 
Veronica Kiszkiel, B.A., Assistant Director of Student Services 
Anneke Greenaway, B.S., M.S., Assistant Director of Admissions 
Farrah Duperval, B.S., J.D., Associate Director of Career Development 
David B. Cohen, B.A., Assistant Director for International Programs 
Natalia Enfort, B.S., Graduation and Record Advisor 
James Allen, B.S., J.D., Evening Reference Librarian 
Angie Stramiello, B.A., M.L.S., Reference Librarian 
Robert Hudson, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Acting Head of Information Services and Adjunct Professor 
Margaret Kribble, B.A., M.L.S., Emerging Technologies and Reference and Instructional Services 
Librarian 
Rebecca Rich, A.B., J.D., M.S., Senior Associate Director, Law Library and Technology Center 
Jason Rosenberg, B.A., M.B.A., Information Systems Administrator 
Ray Andrade, B.A., M.I.S., Legal Education Technologist & Web 
Donna Struthers, B.A., M.L.S., Assistant Head of Technical Services—Cataloging and Database 
Management 
Mitchell L. Silverman, M.S., J.D., Outreach and Emerging Technologies Librarian 
Stephanie Hess, B.A., M.L.S., Assistant Head of Technical Services—Acquisitions and Serials 
Stephan Sobchak, A.A., Assistant Head of Computer Services 
Richard Corbyons, Building Operations Manager 
Eric Young, Assistant Dean, Law Library & Technology Center and Associate Professor of Law 
Nicole Rodriguez, Assistant to the Office of Administration 
Bernadette Carnegie-Baugh, B.S., Administrative Director, Critical Skills Program 
Jo Eterno, Executive Assistant to the Dean 
Stephany Herdandez-Brown, Assistant to Joshua Metz, Director of Finance & Administration 
 
 
3
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
FACULTY 
John B. Anderson, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Distinguished Visiting Professor 
Catherine Arcabascio, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, International Programs & Professor
Timothy Arcaro, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean for AAMPLE and Online Programs & Professor 
Heather Baxter, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor 
Brion Blackwelder, B.S., J.D., Director of Children & Families Clinic & Associate Professor 
Randolph Braccialarghe, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Barbara J. Britzke, B.A., M.A.T., J.D., LL.M., Critical Skills Instructor 
Ronald Benton Brown, B.S.M.E., J.D., LL.M., Professor
Johnny C. Burris, B.G.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Marilyn Cane, B.A., J.D., Professor
Timothy A. Canova, B.A., J.D., Professor
Kathy Cerminara, B.S., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor 
Phyllis G. Coleman, B.S., M.Ed., J.D., Professor  
Leslie Larkin Cooney, B.S., J.D., Professor 
Jane Ellen Cross, B.A., J.D., Director of Caribbean Law Program & Associate Professor 
Debra Moss Curtis, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Michael J. Dale, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Mark Dobson, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Douglas Lee Donoho, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Olympia R. Duhart, B.A., J.D., Director of First-Year Lawyering Skills & Values Program & Professor 
Lynn A. Epstein, B.S., J.D., Professor 
Michael Flynn, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Amanda M. Foster, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor
Pearl Goldman, B.C.L., M. Phil., LL.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Coleen Grady, B.S., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Robert Gregg, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor, Critical Skills Instructor 
Joseph M. Grohman, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor 
Richard Grosso, B.S., J.D., Director, Environment & Land Use Law Clinic & Professor 
Joseph Harbaugh, B.S., LL.B,, LL.M, Dean Emeritus & Professor 
Linda Harrison, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, Critical Skills Program, & Associate Professor 
Joseph Hnylka, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor 
Areto Imoukhuede, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor 
Robert M. Jarvis, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Judith Karp, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Professor 
Shahabudeen Khan, J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Ishaq Kundawala, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor 
P. Camille Lamar, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor 
Elena Langan, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean, Academic Affairs & Professor 
James Levy, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor 
Kenneth Lewis, M.S., J.D., B.Sc, Assistant Professor 
Donna Litman, A.B., J.D., Professor 
Elena Marty-Nelson, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor
Michael R. Masinter, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Jani E. Maurer, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Howard Messing, A.B., J.D., Professor Emeritus 
Joel A. Mintz, B.A., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor 
Heddy Muransky, B.A., M.Ed., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Roma Perez, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor 
Patricia Propheter, B.A., M.A., J.D., Critical Skills Instructor 
Rodney Rawls, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Critical Skills Instructor 
Gail Richmond, A.B., M.B.A., J.D., Professor 
Michael L. Richmond, A.B., M.S.L.S., J.D., Professor 
Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, B.B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Professor 
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/1
Bruce S. Rogow, B.B.A., J.D., Professor 
Marc Rohr, B.A., J.D., Professor 
Raul Ruiz, Critical Skills Instructor
John Sanchez, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Florence Bih Shu-Acquaye, LL.B., LL.M., J.S.M., J.S.D., Professor 
Charlene Smith, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Michele Struffolino, B.A., M.Ed., J.D., Assistant Professor 
Fran L. Tetunic, B.A., J.D., Director, Alternative Dispute Resolution Clinic & Professor 
Kathryn Webber, Assistant Professor of Law
James D. Wilets, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor 
Tania Williams, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Skills Instructor 
Steven Wisotsky, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor 
Eric Young, Assistant Dean, Law Library & Technology Center and Associate Professor of Law
5
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
ADJUNCT FACULTY 
Antoinette Appel, Adjunct Professor
Scott Atherton, Adjunct Professor, M.S.Emp.L. Program
Ross Baer, Adjunct Professor 
Steve Ballinger, Adjunct Professor, M.S.H.L. Program
Roshawn Banks, Adjunct Professor 
Courtney Bannan, Adjunct Professor 
Noah Bender, Adjunct Professor
Gabrielle Bozza, Adjunct Professor 
Mark Bromley, Adjunct Professor 
Dale Bruschi, Adjunct Professor 
Bob Campbell, Adjunct Professor, M.S.H.L. Program
Lydia Cannizzo, Adjunct Professor, M.S.E.D.L. Program and M.S.Emp.L. Program
George Cavros, Adjunct Professor
Meg Chandelle, Director of Advanced Lawyering Skills & Values & Adjunct Professor 
Michele Chang, Adjunct Professor, M.S.H.L. Program
Judith Chorlog, Adjunct Professor 
Howard Citron, Adjunct Professor 
Steven Collard, Adjunct Professor 
Jude Cooper, Adjunct Professor
Denise Crane, Adjunct Professor
Christopher Crane, Adjunct Professor 
Charles Curtis, Adjunct Professor 
Rachel Devant, Adjunct Professor 
Morton Diamond, Adjunct Professor 
Robert Diaz, Adjunct Professor 
Ken Direktor, Adjunct Professor 
Ian Dolan, Adjunct Professor
Susan Dubow, Adjunct Professor 
Michael Elikins, Adjunct Professor
Rebecca Feinberg, Adjunct Professor 
Jane Fishman, Adjunct Professor 
Luis Font, Adjunct Professor
Rex Ford, Adjunct Professor 
Nicole Foster, Adjunct Professor
John Frusciante, Adjunct Professor 
Myrna Galligano, Adjunct Professor 
Jason Glusman, Adjunct Professor
Stuart Gold, Adjunct Professor 
Adam Goldberg, Adjunct Professor 
Evan Goldenberg, Adjunct Professor 
Evan Goldman, Adjunct Professor
Anthony Gonzales, Adjunct Professor 
Arthur Green, Adjunct Professor, M.S.E.D.L. Program
Robert Grosz, Adjunct Professor 
Jami Gursky, Adjunct Professor
Tonja Haddad, Adjunct Professor 
Ross Hartog, Adjunct Professor  
Robert Hartsell, Adjunct Professor 
Margaret Hesford, Adjunct Professor 
Barbara Heyer, Adjunct Professor 
Douglas Hoffman, Adjunct Professor  
Alfred Horowitz, Adjunct Professor 
Julie Hough, Adjunct Professor 
Robert Hartsell, Adjunct Professor 
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/1
Barbara Heyer, Adjunct Professor
Douglas Hoffman, Adjunct Professor 
Alfred Horowitz, Adjunct Professor 
Julie Hough, Adjunct Professor 
Jacqueline Howe, Adjunct Professor
Cynthia Imperato, Adjunct Professor 
William Isenberg, Adjunct Professor 
Yasmin G. Jacob, Adjunct Professor, M.S.Emp.L. Program
Judith Jarvis, Adjunct Professor 
Nick Jovanovich, Adjunct Professor 
Norman Kaplan, Adjunct Professor 
Neil Karadbil, Adjunct Professor 
Jason Katz, Adjunct Professor 
Daniel Kaufman, Adjunct Professor 
Sue Ellen Kenny, Adjunct Professor 
Ira Kurzban, Adjunct Professor 
Warren Kwavnick, Adjunct Professor 
Barbara Landau, Adjunct Professor
Steven Leigh, Adjunct Professor, M.S.H.L. Program, M.S.Emp.L. and M.S.E.D.L. Program
Allan Lerner, Adjunct Professor 
Robert Levine, Assistant Dean, Career Services & Adjunct Professor
James Lewis, Adjunct Professor 
Rochelle Marcus, Adjunct Professor 
Lisa McNelis, Adjunct Professor 
Catherine Michael, Adjunct Professor, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Elena Minicucci, Adjunct Professor 
Seema Mohaptra Reddy, Adjunct Professor, M.S.H.L. Program 
Kenneth Morgan Jr., Adjunct Professor 
Alberto Moris, Assistant Professor 
Gerald Morris, Adjunct Professor and M.S.H.L. Program 
Charles Morton, Adjunct Professor 
Spencer Multack, Adjunct Professor 
John Napolitano, Adjunct Professor 
Matthew Nelles, Adjunct Professor 
William Nortman, Adjunct Professor 
Marc Nurik, Adjunct Professor 
William Owens, Adjunct Professor
Byron Petersen, Adjunct Professor 
Laura Pincus, Adjunct Professor, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Gary Poliakoff, Adjunct Professor 
Ari Abraham Porth, Adjunct Professor 
Vanessa Prieto, Adjunct Professor
Israel Reyes, Adjunct Professor 
Rachel Ricci, Adjunct Professor 
Becka Rich, Adjunct Professor 
Hasan Rizvi, Adjunct Professor 
Michael Rocque, Adjunct Professor 
Jose Rodriguez-Dod, Adjunct Professor 
Denise Rolland, Adjunct Professor, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Alison Rosenberg, Adjunct Professor 
James Saunders, Adjunct Professor 
Philip Schlissel, Adjunct Professor 
Carl Schoeppl, Adjunct Professor 
Adam Schulman, Adjunct Professor 
Robert Schwartz, Adjunct Professor 
Frank Scutch, Adjunct Professor 
7
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
Matthew Seamon, Adjunct Professor
Neal Shniderman, Adjunct Professor 
Jodi Siegel, Adjunct Professor, M.S.E.D.L. Program 
Mitchell Silverman, Adjunct Professor
Samuel Smargon, Adjunct Professor 
Scott Smiley, Adjunct Professor 
Mindy Solomon, Adjunct Professor 
Richard Stone, Adjunct Professor 
Frank Terzo, Adjunct Professor 
Debbie Thaler, Adjunct Professor, M.S.H.L. Program 
Damian Thomas, Adjunct Professor 
Ellen Tilles, Adjunct Professor 
Emilie Tracey, Adjunct Professor 
Craig Trocino, Adjunct Professor 
Rhonda Wallach, Adjunct Professor 
Lee Weintraub, Adjunct Professor 
Jason Weiss, Adjunct Professor 
H. Dohn Williams Jr., Adjunct Professor 
Camille Worsnop, Adjunct Professor 
Carol Yecies, Associate Director of Information and Administration & Adjunct Professor 
Bruce Zimet, Adjunct Professor 
Nanci Zimet, Adjunct Professor
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
NON-DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT
It is the policy of Nova Law Review to support equality of opportunity. No person 
shall be denied membership in Nova Law Review or participation in any of its activities on 
the basis of race, color, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, sexual orientation, age, or 
disability.
PERMISSION
Nova Law Review hereby grants permission to nonproﬁt organizations to repro-
duce and distribute the contents of its journal, in whole or in part, for educational purposes, 
including distribution to students, provided that the copies are distributed at or below cost 
and identify the author, Nova Law Review, the volume, the number of the ﬁrst page of the 
article, the year of publication, and proper notice is afﬁxed to each copy—unless, the sepa-
rate copyright notice of an author appears on the article. All other rights reserved. All 
other inquiries for permission, including for articles with the separate copyright notice of 
an author, should be sent to the attention of the Editor-in-Chief.
MANUSCRIPTS
Nova Law Review invites submissions of unsolicited manuscripts. Articles sub-
mitted to Nova Law Review should conform to the guidelines set forth in The Bluebook: A 
Uniform System of Citation (19th ed. 2010). Articles may be submitted via mail, or e-mail, 
however, the articles must be available in Microsoft Word. E-mail submissions may be sent 
to lawreview@nsu.law.nova.edu. All articles are recycled after consideration. Nova Law 
Review does not assume responsibility for the return of any materials.
SUBSCRIPTIONS
The Nova Law Review is published three times per year by students of the Shepard 
Broad Law Center. The current annual subscription rate is $35.00. Single issues are avail-
able for $12.00. Canadian subscribers should add $5.00 for postage fees. Foreign subscrib-
ers should add $20.00 for postage fees. Subscriptions are automatically renewed unless 
notiﬁcation to the contrary is received by Nova Law Review.
Please notify Nova Law Review of any changes of address at least 30 days before 
the date of the issue from which the change is to take effect. The postal service will not for-
ward your copies unless extra postage is provided by the subscriber. Duplicate copies will 
not be sent free of charge. Subscribers should report nonreceipt of copies within 6 months 
of the expected mailing date.
Please address any correspondence to:
Nova Law Review
Shepard Broad Law Center
3305 College Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314
Phone: (954) 262-6196
Fax: (954) 262-3845
9
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 37 SPRING 2013 NUMBER 2
Articles and Surveys
Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: 
Balancing Bullies’ Free Speech Rights
Against the Rights of Victims to Be Let Alone
When Regulating Off Campus K-12
Student Cyber-speech ............................................................. Lisa Smith-Butler 243
“Dog Days in the Law Library”:
Philosophical, Financial, and Administrative
Issues Raised by Faculty Summer
Grant Programs .........................................................................Robert M. Jarvis
...............................................................................................Phyllis Coleman 309
2012 Survey of Juvenile Law..................................................... Michael J. Dale 333
Cultivating the “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights”
Throughout the Nation: What Others Can Learn
from the Garden State .......................................................... Joseph M. Morgese 351
President Barack Obama’s & The Department
of Homeland Security’s Temporary Relief
for Qualiﬁed Undocumented Individuals
in the Absence of Congressional Action
for Permanent Relief ...............................................................Stephania Bertoni 379
Reconsidering a Federal Assault Weapons Ban
in the Wake of the Aurora, Oak Creek, and
Portland Shootings: Is it Constitutional in
the Post-Heller Era?...........................................................................Brian Roth 405
11
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/1
WALKING THE REGULATORY TIGHTROPE: BALANCING 
BULLIES’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF 
VICTIMS TO BE LET ALONE WHEN REGULATING OFF 
CAMPUS K-12 STUDENT CYBER-SPEECH
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 243
II. FIRST AMENDMENT: STUDENT CYBERSPEECH.................................. 254
A. First Amendment:  What Does It Mean?................................... 254
B. Morse Quartet .......................................................................... 255
C. Circuit Courts:  Split or Reconcilable? .................................... 259
D. District Courts:  More Confusion? ........................................... 278
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS......... 290
IV. STATE ANTI-BULLYING LAWS ........................................................... 294
V. ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 297
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 307
LISA SMITH-BUTLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jared and Delilah—two high school students at James Island County 
High—dated for months, claiming each other as “soul mates.”  A new stu-
dent, Perry, then arrived at school, and Delilah broke up with Jared to pursue 
a relationship with Perry.  After the breakup, Jared hated Delilah and thought 
the worst of her.  While working from home on his laptop, Jared posted 
comments to his Facebook page, stating that Delilah was a lying, cheating 
whore who was HIV positive.  Other derogatory comments followed.  
Classmates shared Jared’s post.  Many of the school’s students and some of 
the school’s personnel read the comments while at home.  A national news 
reporter related to one of the school’s teachers saw the post, picked up the 
story, and began publishing a series of articles on teen cyberbullying.  The 
school was in an uproar.  Students sided with either Jared or Delilah.  No one 
stayed neutral.  Delilah and her parents went to school to complain to the 
principal.  They alleged that Jared’s behavior constituted harassment of Deli-
lah because of her sex.  Delilah and her parents insisted that the school pun-
ish Jared. 
While the above is a hypothetical, it is a scenario that schools and 
school administrations are facing across the country.  This is speech that 
takes place off-campus and after school hours yet it impacts the school.  Can 
the principal address the issue and punish Jared for this speech?  Should the 
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principal tell Delilah and her parents that their options are limited to suing 
Jared for libel?  Can the school lose its funding from the Department of Edu-
cation for failing to enforce anti-harassment policies?  Is there liability to 
which the school will be subjected at the state level for failing to adequately 
address cyberbullying?  These are conflicts that American school personnel 
now face on a frequent basis.  How do school officials handle and resolve the 
conflicting rights of students, their parents, and teachers regarding free 
speech with the right to be let alone and be free from bullying and cyberbul-
lying? 
This article will examine whether public school officials can regulate 
and punish off-campus student cyberspeech when this speech makes its way 
onto the school’s campus.  It will review recent federal district and circuit 
court decisions from the past decade that interpret and apply the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ student speech analysis.1  It will examine the in-
teraction of this analysis with the First Amendment,2 the Department of Edu-
cation’s Office for Civil Rights’ laws and the Department of Education’s 
interpretation of harassment that applies to schools,3 and state legislatures’ 
attempts to limit and cope with cyberbullying in the public school setting.4
While bullying has been an issue with which schools and students have 
coped for decades, if not centuries, cyberbullying is a recent phenomenon.5
How is cyberbullying defined,6 and how does it differ from bullying? 
 * Lisa Smith-Butler is the Associate Dean for Information Resources and Associate 
Professor of Law at the Charleston School of Law where she teaches Children and the Law.  
She would like to thank her research assistants, Brianna Hewitt, Annie Andrews, and Cassan-
dra Hutchens for their research assistance with this article and her assistant, Carrie Cranford.  
She would also like to thank colleagues, present and former, as well as the librarians at the 
Charleston School of Law, for reviewing the article and offering suggestions. 
 1. See discussion infra Part II.B–C. 
 2. See discussion infra Part II. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III.  The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
enforces civil rights laws for programs that receive federal funding from the Department of 
Education.  OCR: Know Your Rights, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
ocr/know.html (last modified April 5, 2012).  Because of this, the Department of Education 
interacts frequently with school administrators for elementary and secondary schools, voca-
tional schools, colleges and universities, proprietary schools, state education agencies, librar-
ies, and museums.  See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (2006); see also OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra.
The Office of Civil Rights enforces the statutes prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of 
race, color, and national origin, sex, [and] disability.”  OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra; see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 2000d. 
 4. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Robin M. Kowalski, Teasing and Bullying, in THE DARK SIDE OF INTERPERSONAL 
COMMUNICATION 169, 169 (Brian H. Spitzberg & William R. Cupach eds., 2d ed. 2007); R.
CHACE RAMEY, STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH AND EXPRESSION RIGHTS: ARMBANDS TO 
BONG HITS 139 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2011). 
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Several decisions from lower courts provide examples that demonstrate 
courts’ definitions of cyberbullying.  In the last few years, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits heard 
arguments and then published decisions involving off-campus student cyber-
speech.7  A review of each decision provides examples of what the courts 
and legislatures consider to constitute cyberbullying or threats.  While the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits have hand-
ed down two decisions each on the topic,8 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits each issued only one opinion.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered 
two cases involving off-campus student cyberspeech.10  Both decisions in-
volved speech that was critical of school officials.11  In one case, a middle 
school student created an instant message icon on his home computer that 
showed a “pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots 
representing spattered blood.  Beneath the drawing appeared the words ‘Kill 
Mr. VanderMolen.’”12  Four years later, the court confronted a similar case in 
which a student disagreed with a school’s decision to refuse to allow students 
to use a certain facility on a particular date for Jamfest.13  The school gave 
the students the option to hold Jamfest in another location or reschedule the 
 6. The Oxford English Dictionary defines cyberbully as “cyberbully, n[oun], (a) an 
experienced user of computers who intimidates new users (nonce-use); (b) a person who en-
gages in cyberbullying.”  Cyber-bully, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/250879?redirectedFrom=cyber-bully#eid212385813 (subscription required) (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2012) (copy on file with Nova Law Review).  “The anonymity afforded by cyberbul-
lying suggests that cyberbullies are, in all likelihood, not the same individuals as the school-
yard bullies.”  Kowalski, supra note 5, at 190. 
 7. See Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 642 F.3d 334, 340, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); Lay-
shock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir.), 
vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. 
Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder II), 593 
F.3d 286, 295, 308 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch. (Kowalski I), 652 F.3d 565, 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1095 (2012); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 
767 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 8. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344; J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08; Layshock 
II, 593 F.3d at 263; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 9. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 764, 767; Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574. 
 10. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344–48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 11. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344–48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 12. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (footnote omitted). 
 13. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 339. 
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event.14  Students objected.15  One student, Avery Doninger, created a blog at 
home on her parents’ computer, urging students, their parents, and concerned 
citizens to call the “douchebags” at the school office to complain.16  In both 
of these decisions, the school’s punishment of the students’ speech was al-
lowed to stand.17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also dealt with 
cases that involved the use of the internet to criticize school officials.18  The 
court confronted two cases in its 2009 term.19  One case arose from the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania,20 while the other case came out of the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.21  Both cases involved similar facts yet two differ-
ent panels appeared to reach opposite results.22  In one case, a high school 
senior created a parody profile of his high school principal while at home on 
his MySpace account, referring to the principal as a “big steroid freak,” “big 
whore,” and “big fag” along with other “big” insults.23  He then shared the 
profile parody with other friends from school.24  While the court was sympa-
thetic to the principal’s distress, it concluded that the school’s punishment 
had violated the student’s free speech rights.25  On the same day, a different 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also handed 
down a decision, arising from the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, involving another high school parody of a school 
 14. Id.
 15. Id.
 16. Id. at 334, 340–41. 
 17. Id. at 351, 358; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40. 
 18. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 19. Id. at 286; Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249, 251 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g 
granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 20. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder I), No. 3:07cv585, 
2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F. 
3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 21. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock I), 496 F. Supp. 2d 
587, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) aff’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub 
nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 22. Paul Easton, Comment, Splitting the Difference:  Layshock and J.S. Chart a Separate 
Path on Student Speech Rights, 53 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 17, 17 (2012), 
http://bclawreview.org/files/2012/02/02_easton.pdf.  Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 
at 307–08, with Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 264. 
 23. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53. 
 24. Id. at 253. 
 25. Id. at 264. 
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principal.26  In this particular case, a student created an online profile of her 
high school principal, describing his interests as:  “detention.  being a tight 
ass.  riding the fraintrain.  spending time with my child (who looks like a 
gorilla).  baseball.my golden pen. [sic]  fucking in my office.  hitting on stu-
dents and their parents.”27  This decision upheld the school’s punishment of 
the student.28
While both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and 
Third Circuits heard cases involving student criticism of school officials, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard and published an 
opinion in a case involving student-on-student internet speech.29  The deci-
sion arose in West Virginia and involved a female student who created a web 
page that was allegedly about another classmate.30  The website labeled the 
female student a “whore” and stated that “Shay [h]as [h]erpes.”31  The stu-
dent, Kara Kowalski, was suspended and then she sued, alleging a violation 
of her free speech.32  The court concluded that the school did not violate her 
free speech rights when it punished her.33
Lastly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
viewed, de novo, a decision for summary judgment from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. 
Hannibal Public School District No. 60.34 D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. differs from 
the Snyder v. Phelps,35 Kowalski v. Berkeley County School (Kowalski I),36
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock III),37
Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II),38 and Wisniewski v. Board of Education39
 26. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 286, 290–91; J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 
3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en 
banc, 650 F. 3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 27. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 291 (footnote omitted). 
 28. Id. at 307–08. 
 29. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); see also Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 334, 339–40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 
(2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 286, 291; Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 249, 252; 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 34–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 30. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567. 
 31. Id. at 568. 
 32. Id. at 567, 569–70. 
 33. Id. at 577. 
 34. 647 F.3d 754–55, 757 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 35. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 36. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
 37. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. 
Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 38. 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 39. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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decisions, because D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved threats against other stu-
dents, made by D.J.M. to another classmate, via his home computer.40  A 
concerned classmate shared the threatening emails, which included threats to 
“get[] a gun and shoot[] other students,” with the principal who then con-
tacted the police.41  After D.J.M. was released from juvenile detention, he 
was suspended for ten days by the school; shortly thereafter, he was sus-
pended for the remainder of the semester.42  D.J.M. and his parents then sued 
the school, arguing that his First Amendment speech rights had been violated 
as he contended that his threats did not constitute “true threats.”43  The 
Eighth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Hannibal School 
District.44
All of the above cases describe factual backgrounds from circuit court 
decisions that involved off-campus student cyberspeech, which ultimately 
found its way on campus.45  Students used their home computers, working on 
their own time rather than school time, to create web pages that were aimed 
at officials or classmates to protest or complain about school-related person-
nel, classmates, or events.46  Although these web pages were created off-
campus without school equipment, the schools punished—typically either 
with suspension or expulsion—the speech and the students.47  These punish-
ments were then appealed by parents, arguing such school conduct violated 
the students’ First Amendment rights.48
This type of speech has existed for years in school settings.49  Principals 
disciplined.50  Students grumbled.51  Students insulted each other.  Because 
the speech was not easily or readily publicized, it went unnoticed and was 
 40. Compare D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756–
57 (8th Cir. 2011), with Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213, Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567, Layshock III,
650 F.3d at 207–08, Doninger II, 642 F.2d at 339, and Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
 41. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 756.
 42. Id. at 757. 
 43. Id. at 759–60; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 767. 
 45. See Martha McCarthy, Student Electronic Expression:  Unanswered Questions Per-
sist, 277 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4–9 (2012). 
 46. Id.
 47. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–37 (2d Cir. 2007); McCarthy, supra
note 45, at 4–8. 
 48. See McCarthy, supra note 45, at 5–8. 
 49. See RAMEY, supra note 5, at 1. 
 50. Id.
 51. See id.
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ignored.52  The internet, or cyberspace, changed this.53  Principals and school 
personnel were mocked and insulted online.54  Student rivalries and bullying 
moved off the playground and online.55  What once took weeks, months, and 
sometimes years to travel through a community now buzzed through it in 
hours, if not minutes.56  What was once only local news, now often goes vi-
ral, becoming national news in just hours.57
If such behavior was ignored in the past, why are school authorities now 
eager to regulate this type of student speech?  Are schools seeking to expand 
their authority and power over students?  Or, are schools trying to reign in 
students and sort out threats, cope with the effects of student-on-student cy-
berbullying, and teach students civil discourse in addition to teaching the 
standard curriculum while also coping with the impact of No Child Left Be-
hind?  What happened? 
April 20, 199958 altered the public school landscape as thoroughly as 
September 11, 200159 changed air travel.  On April 20th, Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold opened fire at 11:19 a.m. at Columbine High School in Col-
umbine, Colorado.60  Their massacre lasted forty-nine minutes. 61  They killed 
thirteen people and wounded twenty-four.62  Their rampage ended at 12:08 
p.m. when they committed suicide,63 bringing the total number killed in the 
 52. See VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE 
BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES 1 (2011), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf; Kow-
alski, supra note 5, at 185. 
 53. See RAMEY, supra note 5, at 139. 
 54. Id. at 139, 141. 
 55. See id. at 141–42; Jocelyn Ho, Note, Bullied to Death:  Cyberbullying and Student 
Online Speech Rights, 64 FLA. L. REV. 789, 791 (2012). 
 56. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (2007). 
 57. For an example of local news rapidly becoming national news, consider the story of 
Karen Klein.  Online Campaign Winds Down for Bullied NY Woman, AP: THE BIG STORY,
July 20, 2012, 3:13 PM, http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/online-campaign-winds-down-
bullied-ny-woman.  In June of 2012, Karen Klein, a bus monitor employed by the public 
school system in Greece, New York, was recorded being bullied by students on the bus.  Id.
The video was posted online and “show[ed] Klein enduring profanity, insults, and threats from 
middle school students on a school bus.”  Id.
 58. See DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter CULLEN, COLUMBINE]. 
 59. See Garrick Blalock et al., The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the 
Demand for Air Travel, 50 J.L. & ECON. 731, 731,733 (2007). 
 60. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 4–7, 35, 46. 
 61. Id. at 83. 
 62. Id. at 4–5. 
 63. Id. at 83. 
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Columbine Massacre to fifteen.64  An investigation revealed hate-filled web 
sites created by the student killers, journal entries containing threats and 
plans, and other bizarre behaviors.65  While some of these items came to the 
attention of law enforcement before the massacre, none of it was taken seri-
ously until after the massacre.66  Recrimination, blame, lawsuits, new school 
policies, and zero tolerance resulted.67  When asked for an explanation for 
Harris’s and Klebold’s behavior, some said they had been bullied.68
Besides school violence and school shootings,69 cyberbullying and cy-
berharassment have become well-publicized problems that public schools are 
encountering.70  In Massachusetts, in January of 2010, high school freshman, 
Phoebe Prince, committed suicide after enduring on-campus bullying and 
cyberbullying that her parents allege the school’s administration knew about, 
but did nothing to stop.71  What cyberbullying was used?  Besides in-school 
taunts and insults, students also posted on Prince’s Facebook page, calling 
her a “slut” and “whore.”72  Three of the six students charged with the crimi-
nal harassment, i.e., bullying, of Prince were placed on probation in May of 
201173 while the town of South Hadley settled its suit by Prince’s parents for 
 64. See id. at 5, 83–84. 
 65. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 35, 183–84. 
 66. Id. at 84–85, 165–66, 220. 
 67. David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech:  The Effect of Diminish-
ing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT 
C.L. 199, 209–10 (2000). 
 68. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 157–58, 339. 
 69. Since April 20, 1999, there have been more than thirty public school shootings in the 
United States.  Time Line of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 70. Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for Bullying, Cyberbullying, 
and Teen Suicides After Sexting:  Are New Legal Standards Emerging in the Courts?, 37 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227, 240–41 (2011). 
 71. Kevin Cullen, A Mother’s Farewell, Forbidding Vengeance:  Phoebe Prince, Her 
Daughter, Lost, She Shares a Shattered Heart, BOS. GLOBE, May 15, 2011, at A1. 
 72. U.S. Teenagers Charged over Suicide of Irish ‘New Girl’ Targeted in ‘Relentless’ 
School Bullying Campaign, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2010, 12:03 AM), http://www. daily-
mail.co.uk/news/article-1262487/phoebe-prince-9-us-teenagers-charged-suicide-death-irish-
new-girl.html. 
 73. Erik Eckholm, 3 Ex-Students Get Probation in Bullying Linked to a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06bully.html. 
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$225,000.74  Since Prince’s death, there have been several high profile cyber-
bullying cases involving student suicides.75
With school violence and cyberbullying increasing,76 schools, school 
boards, state legislatures, and the Department of Education are attempting to 
create solutions to deal with the rise of bullying, cyberbullying, and cyber-
harassment.  According to the National School Board Association, forty-
eight states as of April 201277 have enacted some form of legislation78 that 
concerns bullying, cyberbullying, or harassment by students in the public 
school setting.79  The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
drafted and published a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on October 26, 2010, 
 74. O’Ryan Johnson, Town Paid $225G to Avoid Phoebe Prince Suit:  ACLU Forces 
South Hadley to Disclose Sum, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 28, 2011, http://bostonherald.com 
/news/regional/view/2011_1228town_paid_225g_to_avoid_prince_suit_aclu_forces_south_ha
dley_to_disclose_sum. 
 75. Ho, supra note 55, at 789.  For further commentary, as well as discussion of specific 
cases of “bullycide,” see Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented:  Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 
TEMP. L. REV. 385, 392–94 (2012). 
 76. Ho, supra note 55, at 789. 
 77. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, STATE ANTI-BULLYING STATUTES APRIL 2012 (2012), 
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Safety/Table.pdf. 
 78. ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2012); ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200–.250 (2012); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2012) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2012); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 32261, 48900, 48900.4 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-93-101 to -106 
(2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2012) (Lex-
isNexis); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); HAW. CODE R. 
§§ 8-19-2, -6 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2012); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/10-22.6, 5/27-23.7 (2012); IND. CODE §§ 20-26-5-33, 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (2012); 
IOWA CODE § 280.28 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
525.070, .080 (LexisNexis 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416.1 (2012); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 20-A, § 1001 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-424, 7-424.1 (LexisNexis 2012); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b (2012); MINN. STAT.
§§ 120B.232, 121A.0695 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11-20, -67 (2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 160.775 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267, 79-2,137 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
193-F:1 to :6 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-14, -15 to -15.3, -16, -17 (West 2012); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 801-a, 2801 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15–.18 (2012); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17-22 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis 
2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 24-100.2–.5 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.351, .353, .356, 
.359, .362, .364 (2012); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §13-1303.1-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-
21-34 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-110 to -150 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014 
to -1019 (2012); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.0342, 28.002, 37.001, 37.083 (West 2012); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, -201, -202, -301, -302, -401, -402 (LexisNexis 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-208.01, -279.6 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 570, 570c (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.300.285, 28A.600.480 (2012); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-2C-2 to -3 
(2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -315 (2012). 
 79. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. 
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concerning the same issue.80  The problem has become so pervasive and per-
sistent that the American Jewish Committee and the Religious Freedom Edu-
cation Project jointly published Harassment, Bullying, and Free Expression:  
Guidelines for Free and Safe Public Schools.81
Students, disciplined under these school policies, are suing, arguing that 
their schools have violated their First Amendment rights by imposing disci-
pline for what amounts to off-campus cyberspeech, which is protected by the 
First Amendment.82  Constitutional law scholar and dean, Erwin Chemerin-
sky,83 argues in an essay that this is all part of the “deconstitutionalization of 
education” by the Supreme Court.84  Chemerinsky concludes that the “Su-
preme Court’s overall approach has been to withdraw the courts from in-
volvement in American schools.”85  He examines the Court’s decisions in the 
areas of desegregation, school funding, and freedom of speech.86  Chemerin-
sky argues that “[u]nder current First Amendment law, the most basic princi-
ple is that the government generally cannot restrict speech based on content 
unless strict scrutiny is met.”87  Applying these principles to speech in the 
public university setting, Chemerinsky says “[a] public university simply 
cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including anti-Semitism, without run-
ning afoul of this principle.  Punishing speech because of its hateful message 
is inherently a content-based restriction on speech and would violate the First 
Amendment.”88
How are public schools handling student cyberspeech that can also be 
categorized as cyberbullying or cyberharassment?  Courts are relying on the 
 80. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Colleague 1–2 
(Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201010.html [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
 81. AM. JEWISH COMM. & RELIGIOUS FREEDOM EDUC. PROJECT, HARASSMENT, BULLYING,
AND FREE EXPRESSION: GUIDELINES FOR FREE AND SAFE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 5 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.nsba.org/schoollaw/issues/equity/harassment-bullying-and-free-
expression-guidelines-for-free-and-safe-public-schools.pdf. 
 82. Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the Cafeteria, and the Playing Field:  
Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made in a Student’s Bedroom?, 48 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 195–96 (2011). 
 83. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First 
Amendment Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 765 n.* (2009) [hereinafter Chemerin-
sky, Unpleasant Speech] (introducing Chemerinsky as “Dean and Distinguished Professor of 
Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law”). 
 84. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
111, 112 (2004). 
 85. Id.
 86. Id. at 113, 119, 124. 
 87. Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech, supra note 83, at 770. 
 88. Id.
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1969 Supreme Court decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District89 to regulate student cyberspeech in the public school 
setting.90  Despite utilizing the Tinker test, both federal district and circuit 
courts have reached a variety of different conclusions.91  Are the courts mis-
applying or misunderstanding Tinker?  Are the facts of each case determina-
tive of the outcome?  Are these decisions reconcilable or is there a circuit 
split? 
This article will examine the existing speech cases from federal district 
and circuit courts in light of the Morse quartet, a series of Supreme Court 
decisions on student speech rights.92  Part II will review the holdings of these 
decisions and explore their interaction with the First Amendment.93  Part III 
will review the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights definition 
of harassment while Part IV will examine state cyberbullying legislation.94
Part V will analyze and review the interplay of the United States Constitu-
tion, Supreme Court decisions, state legislation, the Department of Educa-
tion’s laws and interpretations thereof, and school policies with these cases, 
attempting to ascertain the appropriate analysis for student cyberspeech cas-
 89. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 90. E.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 91. A selected list of federal district court cases involving regulation of off-campus stu-
dent speech includes:  T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 
767, 771, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. 
Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367; Mardis v. Hannibal 
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1115–16 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Requa v. Kent Sch. 
Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274, 1276 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Flaherty v. Keystone 
Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. 
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 795–96 (N.D. Ohio 2002).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also dealt with 
the issue in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002).  For 
circuit court decisions on the topic, see D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 
60, 647 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), 
cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder III), 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 342 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 37 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
 92. See Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet:  Student Speech and the First 
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 380–84 (2007); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 
410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 93. See discussion infra Part II. 
 94. See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
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es.95  Part VI will conclude that there is a circuit split that requires the inter-
vention of the Supreme Court to be resolved.96
II. FIRST AMENDMENT: STUDENT CYBERSPEECH
A. First Amendment:  What Does It Mean? 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”97
Protecting speech was so important that it was enshrined in the First 
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.98  The Supreme Court has issued numerous 
opinions discussing this amendment.99  As the Court recently stated in Sny-
der v. Phelps,100 “[t]he First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.’”101  Why?  Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,102 the 
Court noted that free speech “‘is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government,’”103 while acknowledging that “‘speech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is 
entitled to special protection.’”104
How is Snyder applicable to the student cyberspeech cases?  Besides 
providing the most recent Supreme Court First Amendment analysis, Snyder,
like the school cyberspeech decisions, deals with speech that can be de-
scribed as unkind or cruel.105  The Snyder Court upheld Westboro Baptist’s 
right to picket outside an area near veterans’ funerals with signs that read 
“‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,’” “‘Fag Troops,’” “‘Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers,’” and “‘God Hates You.’”106  The Court’s majority opin-
ion concluded: 
 95. See discussion infra Part V. 
 96. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 98. Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death:  The 
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1108 (2000). 
 99. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
 100. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 101. Id. at 1215 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 102. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 103. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75). 
 104. Id. at 1215 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). 
 105. See id. at 1216–17, 1220. 
 106. Id. at 1216–17. 
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 Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and⎯as it did here—inflict great 
pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by pun-
ishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a different 
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure 
that we do not stifle public debate.  That choice requires that we 
shield Westboro . . . .107
How do we apply these principles in the public school setting?  Do stu-
dents and teachers have free speech?  What happens in public schools grades 
K–12 when teachers or principals punish students for speech made or di-
rected at personnel or the students of the school?  Is this speech protected?  
Can schools punish these student speakers even if the speakers “inflict great 
pain?”108
B. Morse Quartet 
The Supreme Court answered the question about students’ speech rights 
in the public school setting in its 1969 decision in Tinker.109 The Court fur-
ther delineated its student speech analysis with three later opinions.110
Grouped together, these four opinions are sometimes referred to as the 
“Morse quartet.”111
Tinker was the first decision of the quartet.112  It involved the now infa-
mous, non-disruptive, black armband worn by Mary Beth Tinker to her 
school to protest the Vietnam War.113  Mary Beth was suspended from school 
until she agreed to no longer wear the armband to school.114  Her parents 
sued on her behalf, arguing the school’s actions violated Mary Beth’s First 
Amendment free speech rights.115  The Tinker Court agreed with Mary Beth, 
stating “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”116 Tinker established the analysis for the punishment of student speech 
as follows: 
 107. Id. at 1220. 
 108. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 109. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 110. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 356. 
 111. See id. at 362. 
 112. Id. at 356. 
 113. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 114. Id.
 115. Id. at 504–05. 
 116. Id. at 506. 
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A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom 
hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on 
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if 
he does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.  But con-
duct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any rea-
son⎯whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.117
Between 1986 and 2007, the Court decided three more student speech 
cases, which limited the holding of Tinker.118 Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser119 allowed schools to punish lewd and offensive speech given at a 
high school assembly to a captive audience,120 while Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. Kuhlmeier121 permitted schools to exercise editorial control over 
speech for pedagogical purposes, which carried the imprimatur of the 
school.122 Morse v. Frederick123 allowed the punishment of student speech 
occurring at a school-sanctioned off-campus event that appeared to advocate 
the use of illegal drugs.124
In 1983, Matthew Fraser was suspended for three days and had his 
name removed from the list of potential graduation speakers because of a 
candidate speech he delivered to a high school assembly.125  In the speech, 
Fraser used a sexual innuendo to refer to one of the candidates running for 
school office.126  The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
both applying Tinker, held that the school violated Fraser’s First Amendment 
 117. Id. at 512–13 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 118. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see 
also Dickler, supra note 92, at 356. 
 119. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 120. Id. at 685. 
 121. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 122. Id. at 273. 
 123. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 124. Id. at 397, 410. 
 125. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. 
 126. Id.
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rights.127  The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by then Chief 
Justice Burger, reversed, framing the issue as “whether the First Amendment 
prevents a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a 
lewd speech at a school assembly.”128  Concluding such discipline was al-
lowed, the Court stated: 
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult 
public discourse. . . .  It does not follow, however, that simply be-
cause the use of an offensive form of expression may not be pro-
hibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political 
point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public 
school. . . .  [T]he constitutional rights of students in public school 
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.  As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First 
Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to 
wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”129
Fraser was followed two years later by Kuhlmeier, which involved 
school censorship of a student-edited school newspaper.130  The Court framed 
the issue as “the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control 
over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s 
journalism curriculum.”131  The high school principal deleted two articles 
from the newspaper before it went to print.132  The paper’s student editors 
sued, alleging this censorship violated their First Amendment rights.133
Again, the Court further eroded the holding in Tinker.134  Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice White stated: 
[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  
This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the 
 127. Id. at 679; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
 128. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 680; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 129. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057
(2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 130. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
675. 
 131. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262. 
 132. Id. at 263–64. 
 133. Id. at 264; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 134. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272–73 & n.5 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
27
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
258 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of 
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of 
federal judges.135
The Court last addressed student speech in 2007 with its decision in 
Morse,136 completing the series of cases that are sometimes referred to as the
Morse quartet.137 Morse involved off-campus speech at a school-sponsored 
activity.138  The Olympic Torch Relay was scheduled to pass “through Jun-
eau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah.”139  Dur-
ing the procession, the relay was scheduled to pass by Frederick’s high 
school.140  To celebrate and participate, Deborah Morse, school principal, 
allowed teachers and students to leave the school building and attend the 
relay on the city streets as a school-sponsored activity.141  As the television 
cameras rolled by, Joseph Frederick, a student, unfurled a fourteen-foot ban-
ner that proclaimed:  “‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”142  Believing the banner to 
be advocating the use of an illegal drug, marijuana, Morse demanded that 
Frederick lower the banner.143  He refused so she confiscated the banner and 
then suspended him for ten days.144  Frederick sued, alleging Morse’s behav-
ior violated his First Amendment rights.145  He argued his banner was not 
promoting illegal drug use but rather was simply nonsense, designed to catch 
the television cameras’ attention.146  The Court framed the issue as “whether 
a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech 
at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.  We hold that she may.”147  The Court then further explained its 
analysis and holding in Fraser, saying: 
 135. Id. at 262, 273 (footnote omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 208 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975), abrogated on other 
grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 
104 (1968)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 136. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007). 
 137. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 380. 
 138. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–99. 
 139. Id. at 397. 
 140. Id.
 141. Id.
 142. Id.
 143. Morse, 551 U.S. at 398. 
 144. Id.
 145. Id. at 399; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 146. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 549 U.S. 1075 (2006), and rev’d, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)). 
 147. Id. at 403; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles.  First, 
Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”  Had Fraser delivered the 
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would 
have been protected.  In school, however, Fraser’s First Amend-
ment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment.”  Second, Fraser established that 
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.  Whatever 
approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the “sub-
stantial disruption” analysis proscribed by Tinker.
. . . . 
The case, [Kuhlmeier], is nevertheless instructive because it con-
firms both principles cited above.  Kuhlmeier acknowledged that 
schools may regulate some speech “even though the government 
could not censor similar speech outside the school.”  And, like 
Fraser, it confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for 
restricting student speech.148
None of the above decisions deal with off-campus student cyberspeech; 
yet, these are the decisions that lower federal courts—both district and cir-
cuit—are relying upon to analyze whether school officials can punish off-
campus student cyberspeech.149  As the discussion below indicates, lower 
courts are applying the Morse quartet analysis with varying results.150
C. Circuit Courts:  Split or Reconcilable? 
Between 2007 and 2011, the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits published opinions that dealt with 
off-campus student cyberspeech.151  Two decisions from the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit involved student speech 
 148. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–06 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 149. See discussion infra Part II.C–D. 
 150. See discussion infra Part II.C–D. 
 151. See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th 
Cir. 2011); Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 
F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 
F.3d 334, 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 
F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).  Other circuit courts have yet to address the explicit issue of off-
campus regulation of student cyberspeech. 
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about school officials.152  The court upheld the school’s punishment of the 
student speech in both cases.153  Meanwhile, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit published two decisions, issued by two different 
panels, on February 4, 2010154 that appeared to reach different results with 
seemingly similar facts.155  A decision from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which punished a student for an in-
ternet profile parody of her high school principal, was upheld.156  However, a 
decision from the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania agreed with a student that his First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was punished for creating a profile parody of his principal 
on MySpace.157  Because this appeared to many observers to reflect a split 
within the Third Circuit, the court re-heard both cases while sitting en 
banc.158  Ultimately, the students prevailed in both cases with the court hold-
ing that school officials had violated the students’ First Amendment rights.159
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard a 
case that involved the school’s punishment of a student for offensive cyber-
speech made against another student.160  The court upheld the school’s pun-
ishment of the student.161  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit upheld the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri, agreeing with the court that D.J.M.’s instant messages 
 152. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 340; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
 153. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 357–58; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40. 
 154. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290–91 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g 
granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249, 252–54 (3d Cir.), vacated en 
banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 
2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012); Easton, supra note 22, at 17. 
 155. See Easton, supra note 22, at 17. 
 156. J.S ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08; J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 
WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 
915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 157. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 587, 591, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en 
banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex
rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 158. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); see also Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
 159. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 932, 933; see also Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 
219. 
 160. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
 161. Id. at 577. 
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threatening to get a gun and shoot classmates did constitute “true threats” 
that were not protected by the First Amendment.162
Because similar fact patterns appeared to be involved in the above cas-
es, with differing results reached, Doninger II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and 
Kowalski I were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, based 
on the argument that a circuit split existed.163  Despite the differing results, 
the Court denied certiorari for all three petitions, leaving the decisions to 
stand.164  Is there a circuit split or can these cases be reconciled?  This section 
will examine and review the decisions. 
The decisions from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit will be reviewed first.  This court has decided two cases, 
Wisniewski and Doninger II, on the subject.165  In both decisions, the court 
upheld the school’s right to punish students for off-campus student cyber-
speech that was ultimately aimed at school officials.166
In Wisniewski, a middle school student, Aaron Wisniewski, was sus-
pended from school because of an instant message he sent classmates from 
his parents’ home computer.167  The message included an instant message 
icon with “a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, 
above which were dots representing spattered blood.  Beneath the drawing 
appeared the words ‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen.’  Philip VanderMolen was Aa-
ron’s English teacher at the time.”168  While Aaron did not send the instant 
message icon or message to any school officials, he shared it with some of 
his classmates.169  One of the classmates eventually shared the icon and mes-
sage with Mr. VanderMolen who was reportedly distressed.170  Mr. Vander-
Molen then shared it with school authorities.171  The school shared it with 
“the local police [department], the Superintendent . . . , and Aaron’s par-
ents.”172  When confronted, Aaron admitted he had created the instant mes-
sage and icon—though a police investigator determined that the icon was 
 162. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 757 n.1, 
762 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 163. See discussion infra note 325. 
 164. See discussion infra note 325. 
 165. Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 166. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 340, 358; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 167. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
 168. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). 
 169. Id.
 170. Id.
 171. Id.
 172. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
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intended only as a joke.173  Once the severity of the issue was pointed out to 
him, Aaron expressed regret.174  Mr. VanderMolen asked to stop teaching 
Aaron, and this was allowed.175
In the meantime, the police department investigated and questioned Aa-
ron.176  He was referred to a psychologist for testing.177  Based on the testing 
and evaluation, the psychologist concluded the icon was intended as a joke, 
and that Aaron had no violent intent and posed no actual threat.178  The police 
investigation was concluded with no arrest being made, but there was a hear-
ing before the school superintendent.179  At the hearing, the hearing officer 
found that “[s]ubstantial and competent evidence exists that Aaron engaged 
in the act of sending a threatening message to his buddies, the subject of 
which was a teacher.”180  The hearing officer said:  “He admitted it. . . . I 
conclude Aaron did commit the act of threatening a teacher . . . creating an 
environment threatening the health, safety, and welfare of others . . . .”181
Aaron was suspended for a semester.182
Aaron sued, arguing his icon “was protected speech under the First 
Amendment.”183  The court upheld the school’s punishment of Aaron, con-
cluding that the fact that his conduct occurred off-campus did “not necessar-
ily insulate him from school discipline.”184  Instead, the court applied 
Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable risk” test to the facts and concluded that it 
was foreseeable that school authorities would learn of Aaron’s pistol icon.185
It was then foreseeable that the threatening icon would “‘materially and sub-
stantially disrupt’” the school’s work.186
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
heard arguments in Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I),187 which also involved 
student speech.188  In Doninger I, Avery Doninger was involved in a dispute 
 173. Id.
 174. See id.
 175. Id.
 176. Id.
 177. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
 178. Id.
 179. Id.
 180. Id.
 181. Id. at 36–37. 
 182. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37. 
 183. Id.
 184. Id. at 39–40 (footnote omitted). 
 185. Id. at 38–39 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)). 
 186. Id. (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 403). 
 187. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 188. See id. at 44–46. 
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with school officials about the scheduling and location of a “battle of the 
bands” known as “Jamfest.”189  Because of personnel issues, Doninger and 
the Student Council were advised that Jamfest would either have to be re-
scheduled for another date or relocated to another facility if the Council was 
determined to adhere to the named date.190  After learning of this, four mem-
bers of the Student Council met in the computer lab and accessed a parent’s 
email account.191  From this email account, the students sent out two mass 
emails to students and parents—one of which included the contact informa-
tion for Paula Schwartz, the district superintendent—advising them to con-
tact the district office and forward the email to as many people as possible to 
see that Jamfest was held as scheduled in the new auditorium.192  Unhappy 
with the decision to cancel Jamfest, Avery Doninger then posted an entry on 
her blog from her home that said: 
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office.  here is an 
email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to 
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest.  ba-
sically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of 
phone calls and emails and such.  we have so much support and we 
really appriciate [sic] it.  however, she got pissed off and decided 
to just cancel the whole thing all together [sic].193
Because of the vulgar language of the blog and the manner in which 
Avery expressed disagreement with the school’s administration, Niehoff 
decided that Avery could not run for Senior Class Secretary because 
“Avery’s conduct . . . failed to display the civility and good citizenship ex-
pected of class officers.”194  Avery’s mother sued, arguing Niehoff’s actions 
violated her daughter’s First Amendment rights.195
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed 
Doninger’s First Amendment claims, it began with Tinker, noting that “stu-
dents do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate.’”196  Yet while Tinker protected students’ 
 189. Id. at 44. 
 190. Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 191. Id.
 192. Id. at 339–40. 
 193. Id. at 340–41 (second alteration in original). 
 194. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 46. 
 195. Id. at 46–47. 
 196. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
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speech rights,197 the court concluded that these rights, in the public school 
setting, were not equal to the free speech rights of adults.198  In fact, the court 
analyzed and discussed the student speech holdings of the Supreme Court 
and concluded that “school administrators [could] prohibit student expres-
sion” when certain circumstances were met.199  Utilizing the “foreseeable 
disruption test” articulated by Tinker, the Doninger I court stated: 
 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school’s 
authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur 
on school grounds or at a school sponsored event.  We have de-
termined, however, that a student may be disciplined for expres-
sive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when 
this conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disrup-
tion within the school environment,” at least when it was similarly 
foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach cam-
pus.200
Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
handed down, via two panels, two decisions on school speech cases on Feb-
ruary 4, 2010.201  In two cases, involving seemingly similar facts, the two 
panels reached what appeared to be different results.202  Consequently, the 
Third Circuit sat, en banc, to rehear both cases.203
 197. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 198. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675, 682 (1986)). 
 199. Id. at 344 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 200. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir. 2007)). 
 201. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 307–08 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 202. Easton, supra note 22, at 18; see also Shannon P. Duffy, Do 3rd Circuit Rulings over 
Student Speech on MySpace Pages Contradict?, LAW.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www. 
law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202442025383. 
 203. Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  The Court vacated both 
earlier panel opinions.  Id. at 207; J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  Shortly after this decision was issued, Daniel J. 
Solove addressed the issue in a blog post.  See Daniel J. Solove, School Discipline for Off-
Campus Speech and the First Amendment, HUFFPOST EDUC. (June 20, 2011, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/school-discipline-free-speech_b_877203.html. 
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In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock 
II),204 the initial panel comprising Judges McKee, Smith, and Roth,205 framed 
the issue before the court as whether “a school district can punish a student 
for expressive conduct that originated outside of the classroom, when that 
conduct did not disturb the school environment and was not related to any 
school sponsored event.”206  “Justin Layshock, . . . a . . . senior at Hickory 
High School . . . in Hermitage, Pennsylvania,” posted a “‘parody profile’ of 
his [high school] principal, Eric Trosch,” on his MySpace account while at 
his grandmother’s using her computer.207  While Justin copied and pasted Mr. 
Trosch’s photograph from the school’s web site, that is the extent to which a 
school resource was used.208  Justin’s parody gave bogus “big” answers to 
questions he pretended Mr. Trosch answered.209  Justin’s parody stated:
Birthday:  too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak:  big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked:  big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills:  big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping:  big lake, not 
big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything:  big keg 
Ever been drunk:  big number of times 
Ever been called a Tease:  big whore 
Ever been Beaten up:  big fag 
Ever Shoplifted:  big bag of kmart 
Number of Drugs I have taken:  big210
Justin shared the profile with his friends at school who then shared the 
profile with many other students.211  Mr. Trosch learned about the profile 
after three other students posted similar profiles, and Mr. Trosch’s eleventh 
grade daughter showed one of them to her father.212  The court noted that the 
profile spread through the school like “wildfire” and that students accessed 
 204. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. 
v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 205. Id. at 251. 
 206. Id.
 207. Id. at 252. 
 208. Id.
 209. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252. 
 210. Id. at 252–53. 
 211. Id. at 253. 
 212. Id.
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the profile at school.213  Mr. Trosch explained he found the profile “‘degrad-
ing,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and ‘shocking.’”214  After an investiga-
tion, the school district suspended Justin for ten days, placed him in the Al-
ternative Education Program for his last semester of high school, banned him 
from all extracurricular activities, and refused to allow him to participate in 
his graduation ceremony.215  The school district concluded that Justin had 
violated Hermitage School District’s Discipline Code, finding “[d]isruption 
of the normal school process; [d]isrespect; [h]arassment of a school adminis-
trator via computer/internet with remarks that have demeaning implications; 
[g]ross misbehavior; [o]bscene, vulgar, and profane language; [c]omputer 
[p]olicy violations (use of school pictures without authorization).”216
Justin and his parents sued, arguing that the Hermitage School District 
had violated his First Amendment rights.217  The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed with Justin, granting him 
summary judgment.218  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit panel published their opinion on February 4, 2010, and affirmed the 
decision of the lower court, holding “schools may punish expressive conduct 
that occurs outside of school as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate’ 
under certain very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”219
On the same day, February 4, 2010, another panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, comprising of Circuit Judges Fisher 
and Chagares and District Judge Diamond,220 published their opinion in J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. ex rel. Snyder II).221  In 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, J.S., an eighth grader, created a MySpace profile par-
ody of her high school principle, Mr. McGonigle, with another friend, K.L., 
from their home computers.222  As with Layshock II, J.S. and K.L. copied a 
picture of Mr. McGonigle from the school’s web site and pasted it on their 
 213. Id.
 214. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 253. 
 215. Id. at 254. 
 216. Id.
 217. Id. at 254–55. 
 218. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en banc, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 219. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 249, 263. 
 220. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g grant-
ed en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  Judge Diamond, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was sitting 
on the panel by designation.  Id. at 290 & n.*. 
 221. 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 222. Id. at 290–91. 
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MySpace parody profile.223  While the profile did not identify McGonigle by 
name or location, it included his school photograph and described him as 
saying: 
HELLO CHILDREN 
yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, 
sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick 
PRINCIPAL 
I have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other 
principal’s [sic] to be just like me.  I know, I know, you’re all 
thrilled 
Another reason I came to my space is because⎯I am 
keeping an eye on you students 
(who i care for so much) 
For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school 
I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the 
beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my 
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) 
MY FRAINTRAIN 
so please, feel free to add me, message me whatever.224
J.S. and K.L. left the profile “public” on Sunday night.225  By Monday after-
noon, students at Blue Mountain Middle School had seen the profile and 
were discussing it, so J.S. made the profile “private” when she went home.226
 223. Id. at 291; see also Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252. 
 224. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 291. 
 225. Id. at 292. 
 226. Id.
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On Tuesday, a student at Blue Mountain approached McGonigle and told 
him about the profile.227  After McGonigle viewed the profile, he contacted 
the School Superintendant, Joyce Romberger, and the Director of Technol-
ogy, Susan Schneider-Morgan.228  After meeting and reviewing the profile, 
the three “concluded that it violated the School District’s Acceptable Use 
Policy (AUP) because it violated copyright laws in misappropriating McGo-
nigle’s photograph from the School District’s website without permission.”229
McGonigle then met with J.S. and K.L. and their mothers telling them 
he was suspending them for ten days and also considering legal action.230
While students could not view the profile at school because MySpace was a 
blocked site, McGonigle and other teachers testified that the profile parody 
disrupted school—students chattered about the profile in class and related 
disruptions in the hallways, requiring extra student supervision.231  After the 
suspended students returned to school, they were greeted by fellow class-
mates who had decorated their lockers and offered them written congratula-
tions for their behavior.232
J.S. and her parents sued, arguing the Blue Mountain School District 
had violated her First Amendment rights.233  The United States District Court 
for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania decided in favor of the school, 
holding that the school did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights when 
disciplining her because of the on campus impact of her “lewd and vulgar” 
speech.234  The Third Circuit’s panel affirmed the lower court’s decision.235
According to the court’s panel, Tinker’s foreseeable and material and sub-
stantial disruption test was the appropriate analysis to be applied to the 
facts.236  Certainty regarding a disruption was not required; rather the court 
indicated that the standard was the reasonable foreseeability of disruption 
that schools had to anticipate and protect students from.237  Schools were 
 227. Id.
 228. Id.
 229. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 292. 
 230. Id. at 293. 
 231. Id. at 292, 294. 
 232. Id. at 294. 
 233. Id. at 294–95. 
 234. J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 235. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08.  In this panel opinion, Judge Chagares 
concurred in part with the decision and also dissented in part.  Id. at 308 (Chagares, Cir. J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 236. See id. at 298 (majority opinion). 
 237. See id. at 298–99 (citing Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Lowery v. Euverard, 
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required to engage in a balancing analysis, balancing three rights:  The right 
of students to be free from the invasion of their rights, the right of the stu-
dents to avoid a “substantial disruption” at school, and the right of students 
to engage in protected First Amendment speech off-campus which does im-
pact on campus activities.238  Thus, the court appeared to believe that Tinker
required a balancing of the rights of others with the rights of an individual.239
As the court’s panel applied this analysis to the facts of the case, it con-
cluded that a substantial disruption was not created on campus by J.S.’s pro-
file of McGoingle.240  However, given the incendiary nature of the profile, 
i.e. indirectly suggesting that McGoingle engaged in pedophilic behavior 
with his students, the panel concluded that the school’s behavior did not vio-
late J.S.’s First Amendment rights as McGoingle’s actions forestalled the 
threat of future disruptions.241  This, the court indicated, satisfied the Tinker
test.242  The court refused to accept J.S.’s argument that off-campus speech 
could not be regulated by school authorities.243  Instead, it acknowledged the 
way that the evolving technology was blurring the boundaries between 
school and home and stated ‘“[t]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful con-
cept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.”’244
Given the similar facts of both cases, and yet the dissimilar disposi-
tions,245 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed to 
hear the cases en banc and did so in June of 2010.246  A year later, in June of 
2011, the court published both opinions.247
497 F.3d 584, 591–92, 596 (6th Cir. 2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 
(9th Cir. 2001)). 
 238. See id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); Saxe v. State Coll. Area 
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 n.11 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 239. See id. at 299 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 n.11); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680–81; Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969). 
 240. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 299. 
 241. See id. at 300–03. 
 242. See id. at 298, 300, 303; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 243. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 301. 
 244. Id. (quoting Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)). 
 245. Compare id. at 290–94, 303, with Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 252–54, 264 (3d Cir.), 
vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. 
Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 246. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied 
sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 247. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 915; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 205. 
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Layshock III affirmed and upheld the holding of the initial panel, pub-
lished in February of 2010.248  The en banc court held that the school had 
violated Justin Layshock’s First Amendment rights.249  After reviewing and 
reconciling several cases cited by the school district, including Doninger I
and Wisniewski,250 the Layshock III en banc court concluded that school offi-
cials have very limited authority, according to the application of Tinker and 
Fraser, to punish off-campus student speech.251  Quoting Thomas v. Board of 
Education,252 the court stated that “‘[o]ur willingness to defer to the school-
master’s expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure, 
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the 
schoolhouse gate.’”253  The court said that it was unnecessary to define the 
parameters of school authorities regarding off-campus student speech since 
Justin’s speech clearly did not substantially or materially disrupt the school’s 
activities.254  Without a substantial disruption, Tinker was not applicable.255
The court concluded that while Fraser allowed school authorities to disci-
pline student speech that was “lewd” or “vulgar,” this authority was limited 
to on campus lewd or vulgar speech.256  Discussing the applicability of Fra-
ser, the court stated “Fraser does not allow the School District to punish 
Justin for expressive conduct [that] occurred outside of the school con-
text.”257  This holding seems to be at odds with the court’s holding in J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. ex rel. Snyder III),258
which announced that territoriality was not the defining factor when deter-
 248. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 207. 
 249. Id. at 207, 219. 
 250. The Court distinguished the facts in Layshock III from Doninger I and Wisniewski as 
well as other cases.  Id.
 251. Id. at 216, 219 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007); Layshock I,
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599–600 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012)). 
 252. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 253. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45). 
 254. Id.
 255. Id. at 216; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969). 
 256. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 217 n.17 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 
F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 
(1986). 
 257. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 
(2007)). 
 258. Compare id. at 218–19, with J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
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mining the reach of school authorities to regulate off-campus student 
speech.259
In J.S. ex rel Snyder III, the en banc court remanded the decision to the 
district court, reversing in part and affirming in part.260  While the court con-
cluded that the school’s disciplinary policies were not facially unconstitu-
tional, as J.S. and her parents alleged,261 it reversed the holding that the 
school could punish J.S.’s speech.262  Noting that schools could suppress or 
punish student speech in certain situations, the court stated “[t]he authority of 
public school officials is not boundless.”263  The court then engaged in a dis-
cussion as to what the Supreme Court’s basic analysis was when reviewing 
student speech punishment arguments, discussing Tinker’s “substantial dis-
ruption” requirement and noting the further exceptions created by Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse.264
An examination of the court’s analysis indicated that while the court 
acknowledged that a school could suppress or punish student speech in the 
public school setting, in order to prevail in court, “school officials must 
[show] that ‘the forbidden [speech or] conduct would materially and substan-
tially interfere with the . . . appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.’”265
The court noted that schools cannot satisfy this burden if they cannot 
demonstrate more than the “‘desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasant-
ness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.’”266  When examin-
ing the implications and applications of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, the 
court concluded that if Tinker was not applicable, then there was no need to 
establish a substantial disruption and instead the Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or 
Morse exceptions applied.267  The court said that Fraser allowed schools to 
discipline school speech, categorized as lewd or vulgar, when a captive audi-
 259. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, Cir. J., concurring).
 260. Id. at 915, 936.  As with the en banc opinion published in Layshock III, this opinion 
involved a concurrence.  Id. at 936; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219.  It also included a dissent.  
J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 941. 
 261. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 936. 
 262. Id. at 933 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)). 
 263. Id. at 925–26 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
507 (1969)). 
 264. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
685; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 926–27 (citing Morse v. Fre-
derick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14 
(3d Cir. 2001)). 
 265. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 926 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
 266. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
 267. See id. at 926–27 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 213–14). 
41
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
272 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
ence was involved,268 while Kuhlmeier allowed discipline, for pedagogical 
reasons of school sponsored speech.269  If neither of those categories were 
applicable, Morse then established that speech which advocated illegal drug 
use, even if off-campus but at a school sponsored event, could also be pun-
ished.270  Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the court concluded 
that none of the exceptions articulated by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse were 
applicable.271  Thus, Tinker would be the only standard by which the school 
could punish J.S.’s speech.272  However, the court concluded that the school 
did not meet the “substantial disruption” test of Tinker, as the school had 
conceded in the district court that no substantial disruption occurred.273  Fur-
thermore, the court said that J.S.’s profile of McGonigle “was so outrageous 
that no one could [or would] have taken it seriously . . . [t]hus it was . . . not 
reasonably foreseeable” that a “substantial disruption” would occur.274  In 
this way, the court concluded that J.S. ex rel Snyder III was distinguishable 
from Doninger I and Wisnieswki.275
The Fourth Circuit also addressed this issue in July of 2011 with its de-
cision in Kowalski I.276  Kara Kowalski, then a senior at Musselman High 
School, created a MySpace page at home with her home computer, naming 
the page “‘S.A.S.H.,’” which stated, “‘No No Herpes, We don’t want no 
herpes.’”277  She invited one hundred or so of her friends to join the group 
page; of this number, approximately two-dozen were students from Mussel-
man High.278  A friend and classmate at Musselman High, Ray Parsons, 
joined the group the day the page was created.279  He then uploaded a picture 
of himself, holding his nose with a sign that said “‘Shay Has Herpes.’”280
This was a reference to another Musseleman High classmate, Shay N.281
 268. Id. at 927 (citing Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213). 
 269. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 927 (citing 
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214). 
 270. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 927 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408). 
 271. Id. at 932, 932 n.10, 933. 
 272. Id. at 931–32. 
 273. Id. at 928. 
 274. Id. at 930. 
 275. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 931 n.8; see also Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 
(2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 
(2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 276. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012). 
 277. Id. at 567. 
 278. Id.
 279. Id. at 568. 
 280. Id.
 281. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–68. 
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According to the court, Parsons “had drawn red dots on Shay N.’s face to 
simulate herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region, that read, 
‘[w]arning:  Enter at your own risk.’”282  “In the second photograph, he cap-
tioned Shay N.'s face with a sign that read, ‘portrait of a whore.’”283  Shay N. 
learned of the page later that evening.284  Her father contacted Parsons, ex-
pressing his anger.285  Parsons contacted Kowalski, who tried to take the page 
down but was not able to remove it.286
The next day, Shay N. and her parents went to Musselman High School 
where they met with Vice Principal Becky Harden.287  They filed a complaint 
of harassment with the school, and Shay then returned home, missing school 
because she was uncomfortable attending classes with students who had 
posted comments about her on Kowalski’s MySpace page.288  Ronald Ste-
phens, the school’s Principal, “contacted the central school board . . . to de-
termine whether” this was the type of behavior that should subject students 
to school discipline.289  The office responded affirmatively, so the school 
then conducted an investigation, interviewing the students involved with 
creating, posting to, and viewing the website.290  After the investigation, the 
school “concluded that Kowalski had created a ‘hate website’” that was in 
violation of the Berkeley Board of Education’s Harassment, Bullying and 
Intimidation Policy and its Student Code of Conduct.291  The harassment 
policy defined bullying as 
“[A]ny intentional gesture, or any intentional written, verbal or 
physical act that” 
1.  A reasonable person under the circumstances should 
know will have the effect of: 
a.  Harming a student or staff member; 
. . . 
 282. Id. at 568. 
 283. Id.
 284. See id. 
 285. Id.
 286. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 568. 
 287. Id.
 288. Id.
 289. Id.
 290. Id.
 291. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 568–69. 
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2.  Is sufficiently inappropriate, severe, persistent, or per-
vasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abu-
sive educational environment for a student.292
“The Student Code of Conduct [required], ‘[a]ll students . . . shall behave in 
a safe manner that promotes a school environment that is nurturing, orderly, 
safe, and conducive to learning and personal-social development.’”293  Viola-
tors of either policy were subject to various punishments—one such punish-
ment was a ten-day suspension.294  Applying the harassment and conduct 
policies to the facts, Stephens and Harden then “suspended Kowalski from 
school for 10 days and issued . . . a 90-day ‘social suspension’” from school 
extracurricular activities.295
Kowalski sued, arguing that the school had violated her First Amend-
ment free speech rights.296  She argued that the school had disciplined her for 
“‘off-campus, non-school related speech’” for which it had neither the right 
nor the authority to punish her.297  The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia disagreed,298 and Kowalski appealed its 
ruling to the Fourth Circuit.299
The Fourth Circuit defined the issue facing it as “whether Kowalski’s 
activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high school’s legitimate inter-
est in maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and edu-
cational rights of its students.”300  Concluding it did, the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision, upholding the school’s punishment of Kowalski.301
While acknowledging that “[t]here is surely a limit to the scope of a high 
school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the 
speech . . . originates outside the schoolhouse gate,”302 the court concluded 
that “the language of Tinker supports the conclusion that . . . schools have a 
‘compelling interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts the 
work and discipline of the school, including discipline for student harassment 
 292. Id. at 569 (alteration in original). 
 293. Id.
 294. Id.
 295. Id. at 568–69. 
 296. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 570. 
 297. Id. at 570–71. 
 298. See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. 3:07-CV-147 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 22, 2009), ECF No. 37. 
 299. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 570. 
 300. Id. at 571. 
 301. Id. at 574 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969); Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 
334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)). 
 302. Id. at 573. 
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and bullying.”303  The court stated that while the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States had not yet dealt with a case in which one student targeted another 
student for verbal abuse, it felt certain that Tinker would permit discipline for 
such speech as it “‘disrupts classwork,’ creates ‘substantial disorder,’ or ‘col-
lid[es] with’ or ‘inva[des]’ ‘the rights of others.’”304  According to the court, 
the fact that the student speech involved occurred off-campus was not deter-
minative of the ability of school administrators to impose discipline.305  Ra-
ther, the court stressed that Tinker permitted the school’s discipline because 
Tinker allowed schools to intervene where student speech “materially and 
substantially” interfered with school work and invaded the rights of others 
“to be let alone.”306  Since Kowalski’s speech targeted a classmate, the court 
proclaimed that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech would im-
pact students while at school and create substantial disruption.307
The last circuit court decision involved school discipline of a student for 
off-campus speech that was eventually held to constitute a true threat.308
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit.309  This case differs from Wisniewski, Doninger I, Lay-
shock II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and Kowalaski in that it involved behavior by 
a student that did appear to constitute a true threat of physical violence 
against other students.310  While the other five decisions involved off-campus 
student speech directed at school personnel or students whose behavior was 
disliked, D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved behavior that was perceived to consti-
tute an actual threat to the physical well-being of school personnel and stu-
dents.311
 303. Id. at 572 (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 304. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 571–72 (alteration in original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
513). 
 305. Id. at 574. 
 306. Id. at 573–74 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 513). 
 307. Id. at 574. 
 308. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 309. Id. at 755. 
 310. Compare id. at 756–59, with Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–68, and J.S. ex rel. Snyder 
III, 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), and
Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 252–53 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-
4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Moun-
tain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), and Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 44–
46 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
499 (2011), and Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 311. Compare D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 756–59, with Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–
68, and J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 920, and Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53, and 
Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 44, and Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
45
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
276 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved a decision in which a student, D.J.M., was 
chatting via instant message with another classmate, C.M.312  During the 
chat, D.J.M. told C.M. that he was going to get a gun and kill certain class-
mates.313  He named specific students that he would “get rid of.”314  Named 
individuals included “a particular boy along with his older brother and some 
individual members of groups he did not like, namely ‘midget[s],’ ‘fags,’ and 
‘negro bitches.’”315  Concerned, C.M. contacted a school administrator, for-
warding D.J.M’s emails.316  This resulted in D.J.M. being arrested by the 
police and detained in the psychiatric ward of the Lakeland Regional Hospi-
tal for a month.317  After his release from the hospital, D.J.M. attempted to 
return to school, but he was initially suspended for ten days for making true 
threats.318  After numerous parents expressed concern and demanded action, 
a school board hearing resulted in the suspension of D.J.M. for the remainder 
of the school year.319
While D.J.M. argued that the school suspension violated his First 
Amendment free speech rights, the school disputed this, arguing that 
D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat, which violated the school’s conduct 
policy and was not protected by the First Amendment.320  The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that “the evidence 
before the [c]ourt is that school was substantially disrupted because of Plain-
tiff’s threats.  Under the Tinker test, Defendants could punish Plaintiff for his 
disruptive statements without violating his First Amendment rights.”321  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower 
court’s decision, concluding that “[t]rue threats are not protected under the 
First Amendment . . . [H]ere [the school] was given enough information that 
it reasonably feared D.J.M. had access to a handgun and was thinking about 
shooting specific classmates at the high school.”322
Three of the above decisions, Doninger II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and 
Kowalski I, were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States during 
 312. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 757. 
 313. Id. at 758. 
 314. Id.
 315. Id. (alteration in original). 
 316. Id. at 759. 
 317. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 759. 
 318. Id.
 319. Id.
 320. Id. at 759–60. 
 321. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 
2010). 
 322. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 764. 
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the 2011–2012 term.323  Despite what appears to be confusion, or what some 
would term a circuit split,324 the Court denied certiorari in all three cases.325
 323. See generally Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 324. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 1; see also Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, A Need 
to Sharpen the Contours of Off-Campus Student Speech, 273 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 36 (2011). 
 325. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder (J.S. ex rel. Snyder IV), 132 S. Ct. 
1097, 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch. (Kowalski II), 132 S. Ct. 1095, 1095 
(2012); Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger III), 132 S. Ct. 499, 499 (2011). In her petition to the 
Supreme Court for certiorari, Avery Doninger, citing Layshock I and J.S. ex rel. Snyder III,
among other cases, argued that the “divergent holdings [among the Second and Third Circuits] 
represent[ed] an actual concrete split . . . which this Court should resolve sooner rather than 
later.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, 16, Doninger v. Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011) 
(No. 11-113).  Meanwhile, Niehoff, in the Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, argued that 
Doninger’s behavior satisfied the Tinker standard of “substantial disruption” and denied that a 
conflict between the circuits existed.  Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 20–22, Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011) (No. 11-113).  Blue Mountain School District also filed a 
petition, requesting certiorari.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. 
v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502).  Citing both the en banc and panel 
decisions of the Third Circuit, Blue Mountain argued there was not only a circuit split, but 
also a deepening split within the Third Circuit.  Id. at 1, 14.  The school also argued that lower 
district courts were split on the issue as to whether Tinker’s standard applied to student speech 
that originated off-campus.  Id. at 15.  Interestingly enough, J.S./Snyder’s respondent’s Brief 
in Opposition argued, as did the school’s brief in Doninger III, that there was no split among 
the courts as they applied Tinker to off-campus student speech.  See Brief in Opposition at 2, 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502).  Kow-
alski too petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, arguing, as did the 
Blue Mountain School District, that there was a split among the courts as to whether Tinker
applied to off-campus speech not directed at the school.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–
3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461).  She also requested 
that the Court clarify the meaning of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test.  See id.  Berkeley 
School District responded, arguing—as did the student J.S. in J.S. ex rel. Snyder—that there 
was no circuit court split and that the Fourth Circuit had applied the First Amendment analysis 
as intended.  Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, 30, Kowalski v. Berke-
ley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461).  The Marion B. Brechner First Amend-
ment Project, the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute, and the Rutherford Institute all 
filed amicus curiae briefs to support Kowalski, urging the Court to hear the case and clarify 
the analysis.  See Motion for Leave to File Brief in Support of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari 
and Brief of Amicus Curiae Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at 1–2, Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461); Motion for Leave to File Brief as 
Amici Curiae and Brief for the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 
11-461); Motion of the Rutherford Institute for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief and 
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 2, 14, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. 
Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461).  The Court denied certiorari in all three cases.  J.S. ex rel. Sny-
der IV, 132 S. Ct. at 1097; Kowalski II, 132 S. Ct. at 1095; Doninger III, 132 S. Ct. at 499. 
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D. District Courts:  More Confusion? 
If the decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits appear confusing and inconsistent,326
an examination of nine decisions rendered by various United States District 
Courts across the country from 2002 to 2011 and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reveals more inconsistency.  This section will review eight cases de-
cided by United States District Courts, in reverse chronological order, as well 
as a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that involved school 
discipline of what originated as off-campus student cyberspeech. 
Most recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana issued an opinion in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community 
School Corporation.327  In T.V. ex rel. B.V., several teenage girls at Churu-
busco High School, who played on the school’s volleyball team, held slum-
ber parties.328  At these parties, T.V. and other girls posed for various pictures 
that the court described as “raunchy.”329
The girls posted pictures of themselves on Facebook, MySpace, and 
Photo Bucket licking “phallic-shaped rainbow colored lollipops,” holding 
trident-shaped objects from their crotches, putting them in their buttocks, and 
kneeling beside one another “as if engaging in anal sex.”330  The pictures 
came to the attention of other classmates who also played on the volleyball 
team.331  Some classmates disapproved and then showed the web pages to 
their parents.332  Some parents then contacted the school to complain about 
T.V. and M.K. being allowed to play on the volleyball team.333  After review-
ing the school’s extracurricular policy, which required that students “‘dem-
onstrate good conduct at school and outside of school,’”334 the school sus-
pended T.V. and M.K. from participating in extracurricular activities, i.e. 
playing on the volleyball team, for part of the school year.335  While the girls 
argued that the school was violating their First Amendment rights, the school 
stated, “‘[t]he basis for the suspension was the determination that the photo-
 326. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 327. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 328. Id. at 771. 
 329. Id.
 330. Id. at 772. 
 331. See id.
 332. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
 333. Id. at 772–73. 
 334. Id. at 773 (“‘If you act in a manner in school or out of school that brings discredit or 
dishonor upon yourself or your school, you may be removed from extracurricular activi-
ties.’”).
 335. Id. at 773–74. 
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graphs were inappropriate, and that by posing for them and posting them on 
the internet, the students were reflecting discredit upon the school.’”336  Ac-
knowledging that “the speech in this case doesn’t exactly call to mind high-
minded civic discourse about current events,”337 the court agreed with T.V. 
that her First Amendment rights had been violated.338  After concluding that 
T.V.’s photographs were indeed speech protected by the First Amendment,339
the court then rejected the school’s argument that the photographs were ob-
scene and constituted child pornography.340  Having concluded that the 
speech was protected, the court then applied Fraser and Tinker to determine 
whether T.V.’s posting of photographs on Facebook could be punished by 
school officials.341  Since the speech was off-campus, the court concluded 
that Fraser was not applicable.342  Concluding that Tinker was the appropri-
ate standard to be applied, the court noted that Tinker’s “substantial disrup-
tion” test was not met.343  The court stated that “no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the photos of T.V. and M.K. posted on the internet caused a 
substantial disruption to school activities, or that there was a reasonably fore-
seeable chance of future substantial disruption” since only a few parents had 
complained.344  The court noted that “substantial disruption” required “‘more 
than the ordinary personality conflicts among’” school children.345
In 2010, three student cyberspeech cases, Evans v. Bayer,346 J.C. ex rel. 
R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District,347 and Mardis v. Hannibal Pub-
lic School District No. 60,348 involved school punishment of students for off-
campus cyberspeech.349  Stretching from coast to coast and including the 
 336. Id. at 774. 
 337. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 771. 
 338. Id. at 790. 
 339. Id. at 776. 
 340. Id. at 778. 
 341. Id. at 779–80; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 685 
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 342. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). 
 343. Id. at 783–84 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514). 
 344. Id. at 784. 
 345. See id. (quoting J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 
1094, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2010)). 
 346. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 347. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 348. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010).  Mardis was appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where an opinion was issued.  D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. 
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011).  For a discussion of the 
case and the opinion of the Eighth Circuit, see infra, notes 381–91. 
 349. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
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heartland, the decisions ranged in geography, from the Southern District of 
Florida to the Central District of California, with a stop in Missouri to dem-
onstrate student cyberspeech was an issue across America rather than just an 
urban bi-coastal problem.350
The Evans decision involved Katherine Evans, a high school senior at 
Pembroke Pines Charter School, who created a Facebook page and named it 
“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”351  She invited stu-
dents “to express your feelings of hatred” about Ms. Phelps at the site.352
While “[t]he page included Ms. Phelps’ photograph,” it “did not contain 
threats of violence.”353  Students posted to the site, in support of Ms. Phelps 
while dismissing Evans’ comments.354  Two days later, Evans removed the 
post, but the posting still came to Peter Bayer’s attention.355  Bayer, the high 
school principal, reviewed the post and concluded that Evans had violated 
the school policy regarding “‘Bullying/Cyberbullying/Harassment towards a 
staff member’ and ‘Disruptive behavior.’”356  Because of this, he suspended 
Evans for three days and removed her from her advanced placement clas-
ses.357
Evans sued, arguing she was punished by the school for exercising her 
First Amendment speech rights.358  The court framed the issued as “whether 
the fact that Plaintiff’s speech was arguably aimed at a particular audience at 
the school is enough by itself to label the speech on-campus speech.”359
Analyzing the facts under Tinker and applying the Morse quartet’s holdings, 
the court found that Evans’s First Amendment rights had been violated, con-
cluding, “Evans’s speech falls under the wide umbrella of protected speech.  
It was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published off-
campus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, vulgar, 
threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”360
 350. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1094; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1365; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; see also Bullying Statistics 2010, BULLYING STAT.,
http://www.bullyingstatistics.org/content/bullying-statistics-2010.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2013). 
 351. Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. 
 352. Id.
 353. Id.
 354. Id.
 355. Id.
 356. Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. 
 357. Id.
 358. Id. at 1368. 
 359. Id. at 1371. 
 360. Id. at 1374; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
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J.C. ex rel. R.C. involved student on student misbehavior.361  In J.C. ex 
rel. R.C., J.C. and several of her classmates went to a restaurant after school 
ended.362  While there, they discussed and made comments about class-
mates.363  A classmate, C.C., who was not present at the restaurant, was 
called a “‘slut,’” “‘spoiled,’” and “‘the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in 
my whole life.’”364  While this conversation ensued, J.C. recorded it with her 
video camera.365  After she went home, she then uploaded the four and a half 
minute video rant against C.C. and posted it on YouTube.366  She invited five 
to ten students from Beverly Hills High to view it.367  J.C. also contacted 
C.C. directly, telling her to view it.368  C.C. viewed it, was upset, and took 
her mother in to complain to the principal the next day.369  The students who 
viewed the video did so from their homes with home computers since access 
to YouTube was blocked at school.370  The school investigated and consulted 
“the [local] Director of Pupil Personnel for the District.”371  The director in-
dicated that the student could be suspended; the school then suspended J.C. 
for two days.372
J.C. sued the school district, arguing the school “violated her First 
Amendment rights.”373  The school district disagreed, arguing J.C.’s conduct 
caused a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.374  The court re-
viewed and examined Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, concluding 
that Tinker’s analysis governed.375  The court rejected J.C.’s “geography-
based argument,” holding that “Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-
campus student speech.”376  In its analysis, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of the “substantial disruption” test in determining whether schools 
could regulate off-campus student speech.377  Applying Tinker to the facts of 
 361. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 362. Id.
 363. Id.
 364. Id.
 365. Id.
 366. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. 
 367. Id.
 368. Id.
 369. Id.
 370. See id. at 1099. 
 371. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. 
 372. Id.
 373. Id. at 1097, 1100. 
 374. See id. at 1119. 
 375. Id. at 1103, 1109–10. 
 376. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–08. 
 377. Id. at 1104, 1107–08. 
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the case, the court concluded that J.C.’s conduct was “too de minimis . . . to 
constitute a substantial disruption.”378  Rather Tinker’s “substantial disrup-
tion” required “something more than the ordinary personality conflicts 
among middle school students that may leave one student feeling hurt or 
insecure.”379  Thus, the school could not punish J.C.’s speech since it failed 
to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.380
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later 
weighed in and upheld the lower court’s decision in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M.,381
this section will offer a brief discussion of the decision in the case from the 
lower court.  Mardis came out of Missouri.382  It involved an off-campus 
student instant message exchange between D.J.M. and a classmate, Carly 
Moore.383  During the chat, D.J.M. told Moore “that he was going to get a 
gun and kill certain classmates.”384  Moore was truly concerned so she con-
tacted a school administrator.385  The police then arrested D.J.M. and de-
tained him in the psychiatric ward at Lakeland Regional Hospital.386  Once 
released, D.J.M. was initially suspended for ten days for making threats.387
The superintendent then extended his suspension for the remainder of the 
school year.388
Angry, D.J.M. sued the school district, arguing that his instant messages 
did not constitute “true threats,” and thus the school’s suspension violated his 
First Amendment free speech.389  The school disputed this, arguing that 
D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat, which was not protected by the 
First Amendment.390  The court agreed with the school district.391
In 2007, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington dealt with off-campus student cyberspeech in Requa v. Kent 
School District No. 415.392  Gregory Requa was a high school junior at Ken-
 378. Id. at 1117. 
 379. Id. at 1119. 
 380. Id. at 1122. 
 381. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 767 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 382. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1114 (E.D. Mo. 
2010). 
 383. Id. at 1115. 
 384. Id.
 385. Id. at 1122. 
 386. Id. at 1115. 
 387. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16. 
 388. Id. at 1116. 
 389. Id. at 1119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 390. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 391. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. 
 392. 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
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tridge High School when he allegedly “surreptitiously” recorded his high 
school teacher in her classroom.393  While standing behind Ms. M., Requa 
made faces, put up rabbit ears, “and ma[de] pelvic thrusts in her general di-
rection.”394  He filmed the teacher’s buttocks and referred to them as “boo-
ty.”395  He then edited the recording, adding commentary about the teacher’s 
hygiene.396  He uploaded and posted the recording to YouTube, where it lan-
guished until a local Seattle news station did a story about high school stu-
dents who posted videos to YouTube that were critical of teachers.397  During 
the development of this story, the reporter “contacted the Kentridge admini-
stration for comment.”398  The news station then included Requa’s YouTube 
clip in its broadcast to the Seattle area.399
The school then conducted an investigation to satisfy its administrative 
policies and determine which student, either Requa or S.W., had made the 
recordings.400  Requa denied that he had been involved in the “filming, edit-
ing or posting [of] the video,” but four unnamed students disputed this.401
The school then suspended Requa for forty days, indicating his suspension 
resulted from the filming of Ms. M. in class.402  The school’s handbook pro-
hibited “sexual harassment” and the school concluded that the pelvic thrusts 
and shots of Ms. M’s buttocks constituted sexual harassment.403  After a 
school hearing and an appeal to the Board of Directors, the punishment was 
upheld.404
Requa sued, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and argu-
ing that he had a right to criticize his teacher.405  The school district again 
affirmed its defense, which was that Requa was punished for his behavior in 
class, i.e., “secretly filming the teacher,” rather than his internet posting.406
The court established that Tinker’s “substantial disruption” was the applica-
ble test to determine whether Requa’s in-class behavior was protected 
 393. Id. at 1274. 
 394. Id.
 395. Id.
 396. Id.
 397. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. 
 398. Id.
 399. Id.
 400. Id.
 401. Id.
 402. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–76. 
 403. Id.
 404. Id.
 405. See id. at 1273, 1276, 1279. 
 406. Id. at 1277. 
53
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
284 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
speech.407  Examining Requa’s behavior, which consisted of standing behind 
a teacher in class and filming her while “making ‘rabbit ears’ and pelvic 
thrusts,” the court concluded that Requa’s behavior satisfied Tinker’s “sub-
stantial disruption” test.408  Thus, his speech was unlikely to be “protected 
speech” within the meaning of Tinker.409  Ultimately the school prevailed, as 
the court noted that Requa’s “admitted free speech activities outside the 
classroom—posting a link to the YouTube video on the internet—are pro-
tected speech and the school district agrees that he may not be disciplined for 
[his] out-of-school expression of his viewpoint.”410  This is an example of the 
existing confusion about the application of Tinker to off-campus student cy-
berspeech.  While the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California says that Tinker is applicable to off-campus student speech that 
arrives on campus,411 the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Washington indicates that Tinker is not applicable to off-campus student 
speech.412
In 2003, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania confronted an off-campus student cyberspeech issue in Flaher-
ty v. Keystone Oaks School District.413  “Jack Flaherty, Jr. posted three mes-
sages from . . . home and one from school” to a public message board dis-
cussing, in juvenile terms, his school’s volleyball team.414  Once the school 
coaches learned of the postings, Flaherty was disciplined based on a policy 
that defined harassment as “any ongoing pattern of abuse, whether physical 
or verbal.”415  Flaherty sued, arguing the school policies used to punish his 
off-campus conduct and speech were overreaching and “unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague [so] that they fail to limit a school official’s authority to 
discipline.”416  Examining the school’s policy in light of the mandates of 
Tinker, the court concluded that the discipline policy was both overbroad and 
 407. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
 408. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 409. Id. at 1279 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 410. Id. at 1283. 
 411. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1094, 
1105, 1107–08 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 412. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1272, 1283. 
 413. 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 414. Id. at 700. 
 415. Id. at 700, 701 & n.3. 
 416. Id. at 701, 705. 
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vague in its definition and application.417  The court announced that the pol-
icy failed to follow Tinker’s mandate and limit the authority of the school to 
discipline student expression except in cases of “substantial disruption.”418
Instead, the court stated that the discipline policy “could be interpreted to 
prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.”419  Thus, the court granted 
Flaherty’s motion for summary judgment.420
In 2002, two federal district court cases involved student cyberspeech, 
as did a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.421 Coy ex rel. Coy v. 
Board of Education422 involved a middle school student named Jon Coy.423
While at home, using his own computer, Coy created a website, posting “pic-
tures and biographical information” about himself and some of his school 
friends.424  The site also contained a section named “losers” and included 
pictures of classmates with derogatory sentences under the photos.425  Spe-
cifically, “[t]he ‘losers’ section contained the pictures of three boys who at-
tended the North Canton Middle School. . . .  Most objectionable was a sen-
tence describing one boy as being sexually aroused by his mother.”426  Mid-
dle school students learned of the website and eventually reported it to the 
math teacher, who reported it to the principal, Mr. Stanley.427  Nothing was 
done until Coy accessed the website from the school’s computer lab.428  After 
that, Stanley suspended Coy for four days for violating the school’s student 
conduct code and internet policy.429 The school found that Coy violated the 
following portion of the student conduct code:  “‘Inappropriate Action or 
Behavior:  Any action or behavior judged by school officials to be inappro-
priate and not specifically mentioned in other sections shall be in violation of 
the Student Conduct Code.’”430
 417. Id. at 704, 705; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969). 
 418. Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 704; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 419. Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 706. 
 420. Id.
 421. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002); 
Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794–95 (N.D. Ohio 2002); J.S. ex rel.
H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002). 
 422. 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 423. Id. at 794. 
 424. Id. at 795. 
 425. Id.
 426. Id.
 427. Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795. 
 428. Id. at 795–96. 
 429. Id. at 796. 
 430. Id. 
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Coy and his parents sued.431  Coy argued that the school disciplined 
him, not for viewing the website at school, but rather for the content of the 
website, which was created off-campus and thus constituted protected speech 
under Tinker.432  The school disputed this, saying that it punished Coy be-
cause he violated school policy.433  Discussing both Tinker’s and Fraser’s
requirements, the court refused to grant the school summary judgment, indi-
cating that it must demonstrate a substantial disruption in order to discipline 
Coy’s speech.434
In November of 2002, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan also dealt with a student cyberspeech issue in Mahaffey 
ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich.435  Joshua Mahaffey, a high school student, cre-
ated a website with another student and named it ‘“Satan’s web page.’”436
The site stated “‘[s]tab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw 
them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before 
everything goes black, spit on their face.  Killing people is wrong don’t do It 
[sic]. unless [sic] Im [sic] there to watch.’”437
A parent of another student at the school learned of the web site and re-
ported it to the police.438  The police investigated and were told that com-
puters at the high school “‘may have been used to create the website.’”439
The police then notified the school.440  The school then began an investiga-
tion, and Mahaffey indicated that he created the website “‘for laughs’” and 
because he was “bored.”441  The school’s investigation centered upon Ma-
haffey’s conduct that was alleged to violate the school’s code of conduct.442
After the investigation, the principal, Carol Baldwin, recommended expul-
sion because Mahaffey’s behavior violated the school’s Conduct Policy 
which prohibited “‘[b]ehavior [d]angerous to [the] [s]elf and [o]thers.’”443
 431. Id. at 794. 
 432. Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 794, 797 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 433. Id. at 794, 796. 
 434. Id. at 799–801. 
 435. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 779, 781–82 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 436. Id. at 781. 
 437. Id. at 782. 
 438. Id.
 439. Id.
 440. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 782. 
 441. Id. at 781. 
 442. Id. at 782. 
 443. Id.  The school advised Mahaffey that “‘based upon the admitted and alleged viola-
tion of Categories 5-Behavior Dangerous to Self and Others, 23-Internet Violations and 24-
Intimidation and Threats of the Waterford School District Code of Conduct’” he was being 
expelled.  Id.
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The school then recommended expulsion but offered to provide a hearing.444
Mahaffey sued, arguing that the school’s conduct violated his First Amend-
ment rights.445  The court, applying the Tinker analysis, agreed with Ma-
haffey.446  When analyzing and applying Tinker, the court concluded that 
Mahaffey’s activity had to have occurred on or with school property in order 
for the school to have taken action.447  In addition to the geography require-
ment, the Tinker test would require that Mahaffey’s behavior must then have 
created a substantial disruption to the work of the school.448  Only after estab-
lishing this could the school discipline Mahaffey for his speech.449  Applying 
Tinker to the facts at hand, the court announced that the school produced no 
evidence that Mahaffey used school equipment to make his website nor had 
it established that Mahaffey communicated its existence to others at the 
school.450  It stated: 
[R]egulation of Plaintiff’s speech on the website without any proof 
of disruption to the school or on campus activity in the creation of 
the website was a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.  
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment shall be 
granted on his free speech and free expression claims.451
The last case to be discussed in this section involved a decision handed 
down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area School District452 in 2002.453  J.S., an eighth grade student, created a 
website on his home computer, from home, and titled it “Teacher Sux.”454  It 
made derogatory comments about the school’s algebra teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, 
and the school principal.455  On the website, J.S. posted a question that asked 
“‘Why Should She Die?’”456  Beneath the heading, J.S. then requested “‘$20 
to help pay for the hitman.’”457  In addition to other comments and diagrams, 
 444. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 782–83. 
 445. Id. at 781. 
 446. See id. at 784, 786. 
 447. See id. at 783–84.  
 448. Id. at 784 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969)). 
 449. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 784. 
 450. Id. at 786. 
 451. Id.
 452. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 453. Id. at 847. 
 454. Id. at 850–51. 
 455. Id. at 851. 
 456. Id.
 457. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 851. 
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the final page of the website showed a “drawing of Mrs. Fulmer with her 
head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.”458  Students, faculty, and 
administrators at the school viewed the website.459  Mrs. Fulmer testified that 
the website frightened her, and that she was afraid “someone would try to 
kill her.”460  She went on medical leave which meant that three substitute 
teachers had to finish teaching her class, creating a substantial disruption in 
the educational process.461
While the school knew of the website before the school year ended in 
May, it did not take action until July.462  In July, the school notified J.S. and 
his parents that he would be suspended for three days.463  Why was he being 
suspended?  The school said “that J.S. violated School District policy [with 
a] threat to a teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and disrespect to 
a teacher and principal, each resulting in actual harm to the health, safety, 
and welfare of the school community.”464  The school district conducted a 
hearing and then suspended J.S. for ten days.465  Shortly thereafter, it ex-
pelled J.S.466
J.S. then appealed the district’s decision.467  The Court of Common 
Pleas affirmed the school’s discipline and the Commonwealth Court upheld 
their decision.468  J.S. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.469
While J.S. argued that the school’s behavior violated his First Amendment 
rights, the school disagreed, saying that J.S.’s speech was not entitled to First 
Amendment protection since it constituted a true threat.470  As the court ana-
lyzed the facts, it agreed with J.S. that his speech did not constitute a true 
threat since the school failed to take action for several months after learning 
about the website.471  Thus, the court concluded that the Tinker analysis was 
appropriate.472  As the court understood Tinker, it believed that it must first 
determine whether the speech occurred on-campus as it appeared to believe 
 458. Id.
 459. Id. at 851–52. 
 460. Id. at 852. 
 461. Id.
 462. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850, 852. 
 463. Id. at 852. 
 464. Id.
 465. Id.
 466. Id. at 853. 
 467. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 853. 
 468. Id. at 869. 
 469. Id. at 847, 853. 
 470. Id. at 855–56. 
 471. Id. at 860. 
 472. See J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 867–68. 
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that Tinker was inapplicable to off-campus student speech.473  Determining 
that J.S. had accessed the website while at school from school computers, the 
court concluded that the nexus between off-campus speech and on-campus 
access was satisfied.474  Lastly, the court had to determine whether J.S.’s 
speech created a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.475  Given the 
nature of the statements made on the website, the court announced that the 
uproar generated by students, parents, and school staff because of the website 
did indeed result in a substantial disruption in the work of the school.476  Ap-
plying the Tinker analysis, the court announced that the school did not vio-
late J.S.’s First Amendment rights, stating “we find that the School District’s 
disciplinary action[s] taken against J.S. did not violate his First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech.”477
As the above facts and holdings demonstrate, courts are interpreting and 
applying the Tinker analysis in various ways that do not seem to be consis-
tent.478  Some courts indicate that Tinker applies to both on and off-campus 
student speech while others courts conclude that it applies only to on-campus 
speech.479  Facts that establish a “substantial disruption” vary from district to 
district.480  Sometimes the geographic location of the speech is determinative, 
while at other times courts consider the nexus between the off-campus 
speech and the on-campus impact when deciding if Tinker is applicable.481  If 
the lack of clarity from the cases is not sufficient, the article will next con-
sider the impact of the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’ 
laws and interpretations regarding harassment as well as state legislation that 
 473. Id. at 864. 
 474. Id. at 865.
 475. Id. at 868–69. 
 476. Id. at 869. 
 477. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 478. See, e.g., Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 479. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
 480. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 481. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865.  The K–
12 student speech and school discipline cases continue to arise and head into court.  See, e.g.,
Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567.  Three appellate briefs involving schools and student speech cited 
to Tinker.  Brief of Appellees at 13–22, C.H. ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, No. 12–1445 (4th 
Cir. Aug. 17, 2012); Brief of Appellants at 21, Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 12–
60264 (5th Cir. June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants, Bell]; Brief of Appellees at 21–
33, Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 11–17127 (9th Cir. May 7, 2012) [hereinafter 
Brief of Appellees, Wynar].  Another case involving school discipline and student speech was 
decided on September 6, 2012.  R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 
12–588, 2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012). 
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mandates school boards provide “safe” schools.482  Both the Department of 
Education and several state legislatures not only ask, but require, public 
schools to enact and enforce certain policies that involve schools with off-
campus student cyberspeech.483  Are these regulations and legislation, at both 
the state and federal levels, constitutional, given the various interpretations 
of the Supreme Court decisions about off-campus student cyberspeech? 
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
If interpreting and applying the legal analysis required by the Morse
quartet is confusing,484 add more confusion to the analysis when the anti-
harassment provisions, monitored by the Department of Education’s Office 
for Civil Rights, are thrown into the mixture.485  In 2010, the Department of 
Education drafted a DCL486 that lauded efforts by school boards to deal with 
the harmful effects of bullying.487  However, the letter warned schools not to 
forget that some behaviors, labeled as bullying, actually constituted peer 
harassment on the basis of “race, color, national origin, sex, and disabil-
ity.”488  Understanding the distinction between what constitutes bullying and 
what constitutes harassment is crucial because the Department of Educa-
tion’s Office for Civil Rights concerns itself with the imposition of liability 
for peer harassment that is “based on race, color, national origin, sex or dis-
ability.”489  The Department of Education reminded schools of their legal 
obligations regarding the enforcement of civil rights statutes by the Depart-
 482. See discussion infra Part III.  The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
enforces civil rights laws for programs that receive federal funding from the Department of 
Education.  OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3; see also 20 U.S.C. § 3413(a) (2006).  
Because of this, the Department of Education interacts with school administrators for elemen-
tary and secondary schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities, proprietary schools, 
state education agencies, libraries, and museums.  OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3.  
The Office for Civil Rights enforces the statutes “prohibit[ing] discrimination on the basis of 
race, color [or] national origin, sex, [and] disability.”  Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 12131(2). 
 483. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2012); OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3. 
 484. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 380–81. 
 485. OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3. 
 486. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1.  This letter is occasionally referred to as 
the DCL in other texts.  Letter from Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sch. Bds. 
Ass’n, to Charlie Rose, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1 (Dec. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Ne-
grón Letter], available at http://www.nsba.org/schoollaw/issues/nsba-letter-to-ed-12-07-
10.pdf. 
 487. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1. 
 488. Id. at 1–2. 
 489. Id.
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ment of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.490  Failure to meet these obliga-
tions could result in the imposition of liability.491  Schools, coping with stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights and state legislatures’ anti-bullying statutes, 
must also deal with the Department of Education’s peer harassment require-
ments.492  What happens when there is a conflict?  This section will explore 
those topics. 
By 2010, the topic of school bullying had become so widespread and 
public493 that the Assistant Secretary for the Department of Education’s Of-
fice for Civil Rights, Russlynn Ali, spoke to the subject with a DCL on Oc-
tober 26, 2010.494  Directed to “state departments of education and local 
school districts,” the letter applauded the anti-bullying efforts made by these 
organizations, noting:  “Bullying fosters a climate of fear and disrespect that 
can seriously impair the physical and psychological health of its victims and 
create conditions that negatively affect learning, thereby undermining the 
ability of students to achieve their full potential.”495  The letter indicated that 
some behavior that would fall under a school’s anti-bullying policy might 
also “trigger responsibilit[y] under one or more of the federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws enforced by the Department[] [of Education].”496  The Department 
of Education then warned schools to not only address student conduct that 
fell under its bullying policies, but also to consider whether such conduct 
resulted in discriminatory harassment.497
According to the letter, labels used by schools to pigeon-hole behavior 
were not determinative as to how a school was expected to respond to an 
incident.498  The letter advised schools to impartially investigate incidents 
from a perspective of ascertaining whether the conduct involved harassment 
that was based on “race, color, national origin, sex, [or] disability.”499  To 
further explain, the Department of Education indicated that “[h]arassing con-
duct [could] take many forms.”500  It suggested the following examples: 
• “verbal acts and name-calling;” 
 490. Id. at 1–3. 
 491. See id.
 492. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 11–13. 
 493. See Bullying Statistics 2010, supra note 350. 
 494. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1, 10. 
 495. Id. at 1. 
 496. Id.
 497. Id.
 498. Id. at 3. 
 499. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2–3. 
 500. Id. at 2. 
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• “graphic and written statements, which may include the use of cell 
phones or the [i]nternet;” 
• “or other conduct that may be physically threatening, harmful, or hu-
miliating.”501
The letter stated that “[h]arassment does not have to include intent to harm, 
be directed at a specific target, or involve repeated incidents.”502  Instead, 
“[h]arassment creates a hostile environment when the conduct is sufficiently 
severe, pervasive, or persistent so as to interfere with or limit a student’s 
ability to participate in or benefit from the services, activities, or opportuni-
ties offered by a school.”503  The letter then explained that “[w]hen such har-
assment is based on race, color, national origin, sex, or disability, it violates 
the civil rights laws that [the Office for Civil Rights] enforces.”504
After defining harassment, the letter told schools that “[a] school is re-
sponsible for addressing harassment incidents about which it knows or rea-
sonably should have known. . . . When responding to harassment, a school 
must take immediate and appropriate action to investigate or otherwise de-
termine what occurred.”505  If the school determined there had been discrimi-
natory harassment, it was advised to “take prompt and effective steps . . . to 
end the harassment.”506  Punishment of the student offender would not neces-
sarily suffice.507  Instead, the school has a responsibility to discover and erad-
icate the problem, handle the transgressors, provide training, and put a pro-
gram in place to see that the harassment did not reoccur.508
Concerned about the implications of the above letter, Francisco M. Ne-
grón, General Counsel for the National School Boards Association, re-
sponded on December 7, 2010, writing to Charlie Rose, the Department of 
Education’s General Counsel.509  The letter began by stating the Board’s fear 
“that absent clarification, the [Department of Education’s] expansive reading 
of the law as stated in the DCL will invite misguided litigation.”510  Referring 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
 501. Id.
 502. Id.
 503. Id.
 504. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2. 
 505. Id.
 506. Id.
 507. See id. at 3. 
 508. Id.
 509. Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 1, 11. 
 510. Id. at 1. 
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tion,511 the letter noted that Davis imposed liability only upon the demonstra-
tion that the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, while the Octo-
ber 10th Department of Education letter provided for the imposition of liabil-
ity for harassment about which the school knows or reasonably should have 
known.512  Besides the distinction between actual knowledge and the standard 
of should have known, the letter further noted that: 
Davis holds that only “harassment that is so severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access 
to an educational opportunity or benefit” may result in [the imposi-
tion of] liability for the school district.  The DCL, in contrast, 
states the following:  “Harassment creates a hostile environment 
when the conduct is sufficiently severe, pervasive, or persistent so 
as to interfere with or limit a student’s ability to participate in or 
benefit from the services, activities, or opportunities offered by 
the school.”513
On page six, Negrón’s letter noted that the Department of Education’s Octo-
ber 26th letter only minimally acknowledged the limitations of schools to 
discipline students regarding harassment when students’ First Amendment 
free speech rights were involved.514  Negrón wrote: 
[S]chool districts may discipline students within the limitations of 
First Amendment for on-campus, non-school sponsored speech in 
the following instances only:  if the speech is likely to cause a 
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school ac-
tivities” or the speech collides with “the rights of other students to 
be secure and . . . let alone;” if the speech is “sexually explicit, in-
decent or lewd;” or if it “can reasonably be regarded as encourag-
ing illegal drug use.”515
Because of the Morse quartet, Negrón argued that many state legislatures, 
when enacting cyberbullying or bullying legislation, attempted to define bul-
lying, cyberbullying, and harassment in such a way that the terms did not run 
afoul of the meaning and application of students’ First Amendment rights as 
delineated by the Morse quartet.516  However, Negrón argued that the De-
 511. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 512. Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 2; see also Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 
2.
 513. Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 2–3. 
 514. Id. at 1, 6. 
 515. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
 516. See id.; see also Dickler, supra note 92, at 361–62. 
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partment of Education’s interpretation, enforcement, and imposition of liabil-
ity upon schools for violating the Department’s Civil Rights’ laws showed no 
such understanding.517  How could a school deal with Snyder’s hate speech 
without running afoul of the Department’s Civil Rights’ laws?518  It was in-
deed a dilemma. 
IV. STATE ANTI-BULLYING LAWS
Between 1995 and April 2011, forty-six states enacted legislation to 
deal with bullying.519  A quick look at the state legislation indicates that state 
legislatures have frequently used “harassment” and “bullying” interchangea-
bly.520  Given the specific legal definition of “harassment” as enforced by the 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights,521 more confusion en-
sues.522  Some states apply the legislation to off-campus speech while others 
do not.523  Some address cyberspeech while others ignore it.524
In December of 2011, the Department of Education released a report, 
Analysis of State Bullying Laws and Policies.525 The study states that be-
tween 1999 and 2010, there were over one hundred and twenty bills intro-
duced or amended by state legislatures to either require schools or the juve-
nile justice system to deal with bullying.526  While some of these laws require 
discipline by schools when bullying occurs, other laws require the interven-
tion of the juvenile justice system.527  Some legislatures included model bul-
lying policies that schools could adopt in order to show compliance.528
 517. See Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 6–7. 
 518. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011); Dear Colleague Letter, supra 
note 80, at 1–3. 
 519. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 15, 17. 
 520. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. States whose legislation uses the words “bul-
lying,” “cyber-bullying,” or “harassment” include, but are not limited to the following states:  
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, 
Washington, and West Virginia.  Id.
 521. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2. 
 522. See STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 17–18. 
 523. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. 
 524. Id.
 525. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at i–ii. 
 526. See id. at 16. 
 527. Id. at 16, 19–20.
 528. Id. at 19. 
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According to the report’s executive summary, forty-six states have en-
acted bullying laws.529  Forty-three of these states direct schools to create 
anti-bullying policies; yet three of these states fail to define the behavior that 
constitutes bullying.530  Thirty-six states prohibit bullying via electronic me-
dia while thirteen of the forty-six states give schools the authority to disci-
pline off-campus behavior if the behavior creates a hostile school environ-
ment.531
As state legislatures and school agencies as well as local school boards 
grapple with cyberbullying, the First Amendment, and the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights definition of “harassment,” there are 
many publications offering model legislation that will allegedly satisfy eve-
ryone and every requirement.532  According to Stuart-Cassel and Dayton, 
state legislatures should ensure that school bullying legislation incorporates 
the following components: 
• a statement of purpose that explains the reason for the legisla-
tion;533
• a statement of scope that defines the extent or reach of the leg-
islation, i.e. to what behaviors is it applicable and to what behav-
iors is it not applicable;534
• definitions and examples of behaviors that constitute bullying, 
cyberbullying, and harassment; these definitions should protect 
students from the day to day realities of bullying yet not be so 
overbroad that free speech rights are intruded upon;535
 529. Id. at x.  Hawaii, Montana, Michigan, and South Dakota were the only states that did 
not have some form of bullying legislation in effect as of April 2011.  STUART-CASSEL ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 17. 
 530. Id. at 25.  Arizona, Minnesota and Wisconsin enacted anti-bullying legislation but did 
not define the behavior that constitutes bullying.  Id. 
 531. Id. at 15. 
 532. See Dayton et al., Model Anti-Bullying Legislation:  Promoting Student Safety, Civil-
ity, and Achievement Through Law and Policy Reform, 272 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 24–32 (2011); 
see also STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 89–94.  John Dayton, Anne Proffitt Dupre, 
and Ann Elizabeth Blankenship discussed the creation of a model anti-bully statute that would 
protect students and promote civility and safety in a recent article.  See Dayton et al., supra 
note 532, at 25–32. 
 533. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 22; see also Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 
25.
 534. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 23; see also Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 
26.
 535. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 24–25; see also Dayton et al., supra note 
532, at 24, 26–27. 
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• the development and creation of state wide school policies 
that protect children’s rights to be free from bullying and to exer-
cise their First Amendment rights; such policies can be shared by 
school districts throughout the state;536
• a requirement that school personnel model appropriate behav-
ior and enforce anti-bullying policies;537
• a requirement that schools publicize and communicate the ex-
istence of school anti-bullying policies;538
• a requirement that training be provided for school personnel to 
model appropriate behavior and counsel students whose behavior 
violates school policies;539
• a mandatory reporting requirement, requiring schools to report 
violations of school policies;540
• a requirement that criminal acts be treated as criminal acts and 
not as bullying;541 and 
• a requirement that appropriate counseling and disciplinary 
provisions be provided for students whose conduct violates school 
bullying policies.542
While the above suggestions for model legislation and model school 
policies regarding bullying are useful, they are still not sufficiently detailed 
to answer the questions that courts and school districts continue to ask:  Can 
off-campus student cyberspeech be punished by schools?543  If so, under 
what circumstances can off-campus speech be punished?544  Answering these 
 536. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 18–19, 22, 24–25, 28. 
 537. Id. at 33; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 27–28. 
 538. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 32. 
 539. Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30. 
 540. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 36–37; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 28. 
 541. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 20; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30–31. 
 542. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 69–70; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30. 
 543. See, e.g., Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (N.D. Ohio 
2002) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 544. Presently, there are two student speech cases being appealed from federal district 
courts to federal circuit courts that involved the discipline of off-campus student cyberspeech.  
Brief of Appellants, Bell, supra note 481, at 7 (appealing to the United States Court of Ap-
66
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questions addresses the intersection of students’ First Amendment rights, the 
Department of Education’s enforcement of civil rights laws, and state anti-
bullying legislation.545
V. ANALYSIS
As Snyder so clearly stated:  Speech, even painful and hurtful speech, is 
revered and protected in America.546  Why?  It is believed that self-
government, to a great degree, is determined by the free exchange of ideas 
even if it does lead to an “uninhibited [and] robust” discussion.547  “‘[T]he 
essence of self-government’” is believed to be the ability to speak out on 
matters of public importance and to discuss unpopular viewpoints.548  The 
suppression of speech counteracts this belief.549  So deeply ingrained in the 
American psyche is the principle of free speech that America, as a society, 
was willing to tolerate the free speech rights of Nazis to march through a 
peals for the Fifth Circuit); Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 7 (being appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).  In Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board, Taylor Bell wrote and published, via Facebook and YouTube, a rap song that was 
critical of his coaches.  859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012).  Taylor was suspended 
for a week and then moved to an alternative school for the remainder of the semester because 
his rap song was deemed by the school board to constitute both harassment of school employ-
ees and threats.  Id.; Brief of Appellants, Bell, supra note 481, at 16.  In Wynar v. Douglas 
County School District, Wynar instant messaged a classmate, saying that he wanted to “shoot” 
named classmates.  No. 3:09-cv-0626-LRH-VPC, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 
2011); Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 12.  These instant messages were for-
warded to school administration.  Wynar, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1; Brief of Appellees, Wy-
nar, supra note 481, at 14–15.  The school then suspended Wynar for ninety days.  Wynar,
2011 WL 3512534, at *1; Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 18.  Also, there is a 
pending case in the District Court of Minnesota that involves off-campus discipline of a stu-
dent for cyberspeech.  R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 
2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012).  In that case, R.S. complained about a hall 
monitor and communicated about sex with a classmate via Facebook.  Id. at *1–2.  The class-
mate’s guardian complained to the school principal.  Id. at *2.  To determine the accuracy of 
these statements, R.S. was detained and her Facebook account was searched by school offi-
cials.  Id.
 545. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. at 681–83; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 546. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
 547. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). 
 548. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 
(1964)). 
 549. See id. at 1219 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). 
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village of Holocaust Jewish survivors in Skokie, Illinois.550  Given the prior-
ity that is placed on speech in American life, do K–12 students and their 
teachers have free speech rights in school where they are learning to partici-
pate in the “‘marketplace of ideas?’”551
In 1969, the Supreme Court made it plain in Tinker that students and 
teachers did not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate.”552  After Tinker, some would argue that 
later Supreme Court decisions on the topic made it less clear to what extent 
student speech rights existed and when schools could suppress or punish 
student speech.  Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse all indicated that while pro-
tection of student speech rights was important, it was not absolute.553  In Fra-
ser, Justice Burger wrote that “simply because the use of an offensive form 
of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker con-
siders a political point, [does not mean that] the same latitude must be per-
mitted to children in a public school.”554  It became obvious between 1986 
when Fraser was decided, and later in 2007 when Chief Justice Roberts au-
thored the majority opinion in Morse, that confusion within the courts as to 
the correct analysis regarding student speech still existed.555  Justice Roberts 
sought to clarify by writing: 
[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles.  First, 
Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”  Had Fraser delivered the 
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would 
have been protected.  In school, however, Fraser’s First Amend-
 550. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of Expres-
sion:  A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 
185, 203 (2003).  The article indicates that the ACLU’s defense of the Nazis to march through 
Skokie, Illinois, a town then heavily populated with Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, re-
flected the fact that while many theoretically agreed with free speech, the ACLU still lost 15% 
of its membership for defending the free speech rights of Nazis in Skokie in 1978.  Id. at 203 
& n.79.  According to the article, Strossen concluded that while the principle of free speech 
was firmly entrenched within the United States legal system, it was also poorly understood.  
Id. at 203. 
 551. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 552. Id. at 503, 506. 
 553. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 273, 276 (1988) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 509, 512–13); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 554. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 682. 
 555. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 409–10; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 264–66, 276; Fraser,
478 U.S. at 679–80, 685–86. 
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ment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment.”  Second, Fraser established that 
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.  Whatever 
approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the “sub-
stantial disruption” analysis prescribed by Tinker.556
With four Supreme Court opinions on K–12 student speech from 1969 
through 2007, it would seem that the issue was settled.557  The analysis 
should have been clear for lower courts to apply to the facts of cases before 
them.  However, the lower courts have applied the Tinker analysis to cases 
that involved similar facts; yet these courts have reached dissimilar conclu-
sions.558
In Doninger II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reiterated the problems facing lower courts.559  In addition to the confu-
sion surrounding the application of the Morse quartet analysis to student 
speech cases, courts and schools are now grappling with the implications of 
off-campus cyberspeech that ends up on-campus and is often described by 
schools as “cyberbullying.”560 Doninger II eloquently captured the dilemma 
of lower courts, saying “[t]he law governing restrictions on student speech 
can be difficult and confusing, even for lawyers, law professors, and judges.  
The relevant Supreme Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and courts often 
struggle to determine which standard applies in any particular case.”561
Judges are not alone in their confusion.562  As Naomi Harlin Goodno states in 
an article that she authored:  “There is no Supreme Court case squarely on 
point.  The split in the lower courts’ decisions shows that the law is ambigu-
ous.”563
What is a principal to do?  He or she is “damned if they do and damned 
if they don’t” act when confronted with off-campus cyberspeech that makes 
 556. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 404–05 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 557. See id. at 410; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273, 276; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686–87; Tinker,
393 U.S. at 514. 
 558. Compare Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84, 790 
(E.D. Mich. 2002), with J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 
2002). 
 559. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 560. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850–52; see also Evans v. Bayer, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 1365, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 561. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 353 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 430). 
 562. E.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyber-
bullying:  A Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and 
Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 657 (2011). 
 563. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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its way on-campus and involves either bullying or harassment.  Principals, 
school boards, and school districts face numerous questions, including: 
• Whether schools can regulate off-campus student speech that is 
online, i.e., cyberspeech, if it is directed at either school personnel or stu-
dents, and then arrives on-campus?564  If so, under what circumstances can 
this speech be regulated?565
• Whether geography, i.e., on-campus or off-campus, can be the litmus 
test for regulation of this speech?566
• Whether a substantial disruption is established by the arrival, in any 
form, of off-campus speech on the school’s campus?567  If not, is chaos re-
quired to meet the substantial disruption test?  What constitutes a substantial 
disruption? 
• Whether the individual student’s free speech right that collides with 
another student’s right to be let alone will prevail?  What about a student’s 
right to be free from bullying and harassment?568
Unfortunately, there appear to be more questions than answers, which is why 
many are urging the Supreme Court of the United States to grant certiorari 
and resolve the issue.569
The issues facing the courts, the schools, the state legislatures, the stu-
dents, and the Department of Education can be summarized as:  Can a school 
regulate student speech or expression that occurs outside of school and is not 
connected to a school sponsored event, yet subsequently makes its way on-
campus by either the speaker or others?  If so, under what circumstances can 
the speech be regulated?  If such speech is beyond the school’s ability to 
regulate, can schools escape the imposition of liability by the Department of 
Education and state laws for failure to respond to harassment or bullying?570
 564. See Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities:  Students, Social Networking, and the 
First Amendment, 31 PACE L. REV. 182, 214 (2011). 
 565. See id. at 199–200. 
 566. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Wheeler, supra note 564, at 214–15. 
 567. See Wheeler, supra note 564, at 199–200. 
 568. See id. at 217. 
 569. See id. at 185. 
 570. See id. at 183–85. 
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If it is possible to evade liability, how do schools, parents, and society want 
to handle the bullying that sometimes leads to suicide?571
A thorough review of Tinker reveals that the Court began its discussion 
by acknowledging that earlier court decisions affirmed “the comprehensive 
authority of the [s]tates and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school[].  
Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.”572  The language 
of Tinker indicates that the Court considered student speech to have First 
Amendment protection regardless of whether it took place inside or outside 
of the classroom.573  The Court said: 
A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom 
hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on 
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if 
he does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.  But con-
duct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of 
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech.574
The Court cites to the earlier decisions of Burnside v. Byars575 and Blackwell 
v. Issaquena County Board of Education,576 to support the above conclu-
sion.577
A literal reading of Tinker reflects that schools can regulate or disci-
pline student speech that occurs off-campus if it has an on-campus impact 
that either causes a substantial disruption with the school’s work, is reasona-
bly foreseeable that it will cause a substantial disruption with the school’s 
 571. See, e.g., id. at 183–84, 227; see also BULLY, http://www.thebullyproject. 
com/movement/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (providing information about the film, Bully,
produced by The Bully Project). 
 572. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (citations 
omitted). 
 573. Id. at 512–13. 
 574. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 575. 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 576. 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 577. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
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work, or it collides with the rights of others.578  While some lower courts 
have debated whether a school’s authority even extends to off-campus stu-
dent speech in any format, Tinker does not appear to contemplate that.579
From my perspective, Tinker is applicable to off-campus speech, including 
cyberspeech, that arrives on-campus and either creates a substantial disrup-
tion or collides with the rights of others.580  Given the technological advances 
of the last twenty years, a geographical litmus test as to when student speech 
can be disciplined by schools is too limited.581
While courts have discussed and analyzed both the “substantial disrup-
tion” and the “reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption” Tinker tests, 
courts have paid little attention to Tinker’s third prong, the “collides with the 
rights of others” test.582  Perhaps this third prong, in conjunction with the 
“substantial disruption” test could be developed and used to analyze student 
speech cases that do not fit the parameters of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse.583  Utilization of the “collides with the rights of others” test might 
resolve some of the behaviors that so bedevil and trouble school administra-
tors.584  How?  This prong could be used to discipline student speech that 
does not substantially disrupt the school’s work but that can be described as 
bullying, harassing, libelous, or threatening.  Speech described as bullying, 
harassing, libelous, or threatening, if it is directed at other students or school 
personnel, is not protected speech and can be disciplined even if it does not 
create a “substantial disruption.”585  Why should this approach be allowed?  
The school’s goal is to teach students civil discourse and debate while pro-
 578. See id. at 514. 
 579. See id. at 507–08; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).  The Court 
in Morse explained that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the 
school context, it would have been protected.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.  This statement adds 
further confusion to the analysis, as some lower courts have concluded that Fraser meant lewd 
speech, if off-campus, could not be regulated under any circumstances.  See Layshock III, 650 
F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 580. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 581. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *9 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 
11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 582. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14; see e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th 
Cir. 1966). 
 583. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 403; Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–73 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 677–80 (1986). 
 584. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14. 
 585. See id.
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tecting their rights to debate contentious issues.586  Yet the schools must also 
provide a safe environment in which students can thrive and learn without 
being subjected to harassment, bullying, libel, or threats.  Schools want to 
protect student political speech rights yet also allow schools the flexibility to 
cope with the cruelty, racism, sexism, libel, or threats that other types of stu-
dent speech create.587
With the above approach, the analysis of student school speech, whether 
on or off-campus, then becomes the following: 
• Is the speech lewd, involving a captive audience, and used on cam-
pus?588  If so, apply Fraser.
• If not, is it speech that carries the imprimatur of the school and in-
volves pedagogy?589  If so, apply Kuhlmeier.
• If not, is the speech off-campus speech at a school sponsored event 
that appears to promote illegal drug use?590  If so, apply Morse.
• If neither Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse is applicable, apply Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” test.  Did the speech arrive on-campus and disrupt 
school classes or administration?591  If so, the speech can be disciplined.592
An exception to the “substantial disruption” test might mean that pure politi-
cal speech can be protected even if it does cause a “substantial disruption.”  
What is a substantial disruption?  Courts are still debating this.593  In Don-
inger II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a 
“substantial disruption” occurred when the school administration was forced 
to have numerous meetings and handle many irate parental emails and phone 
calls because of Avery Donginer’s blog post.594  Yet the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Layshock III, held that the student discus-
sion and administrative uproar caused by Jason Layshock’s parody posting 
 586. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1–2. 
 587. See id. at 2. 
 588. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
859 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). 
 589. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 590. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 591. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 592. Id. at 513. 
 593. See Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub 
nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 
F.3d 334, 347 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 594. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 341, 351. 
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about the school’s principal did not constitute a substantial and material dis-
ruption.595  If the Supreme Court would define substantial disruption, it 
would greatly assist the analysis of student speech cases.  The definition 
should not be too restrictive, i.e. one person’s bad day should not constitute a 
substantial disruption, yet neither chaos nor turmoil should be required to 
establish substantial disruption.  A description or list of behaviors that dem-
onstrate substantial disruption would help resolve the issue.  From my per-
spective, student speech that requires school personnel to spend 75% of their 
week dealing with the problems generated by the speech could be considered 
a substantial disruption.  School personnel responding to telephone calls, 
emails, student and parent visits, counseling sessions, disciplinary sessions, 
hearings, and classroom time are examples of substantial disruption. 
• If the speech does not cause a substantial disruption, it could be regu-
lated under Tinker’s third prong—the “collides with the rights of others” 
test—if the speech is directed at other students or school personnel and can 
be described as speech that is bullying, harassing, libelous or threatening.596
The above analysis would balance competing rights, allowing schools to 
operate without chaos and disruption while preserving the political speech of 
students and providing a safe school environment that neither permits, con-
dones, or ignores student bullying or harassment. 
How should courts then handle Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable disrup-
tion” test?  While the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that a violent instant message icon in 
Wisniewski would cause a substantial disruption,597 district courts in Indiana 
and California concluded that raunchy student photos and bullying YouTube 
videos did not substantially disrupt nor was it foreseeable that the student 
behavior involved would disrupt school operations.598  Perhaps the “reasona-
bly foreseeable” test could be retired.  If the “substantial disruption” and 
“collides with the rights of others” tests are used, the “reasonably foresee-
able” test becomes irrelevant.599  Avery Doninger’s blast email and blog cre-
ated a substantial disruption, because parents and students behaved as she 
 595. See Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 207–09, 219. 
 596. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09, 513 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 
(5th Cir. 1966)). 
 597. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 598. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D. 
Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107–
08, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 599. J.C. ex rel R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
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requested, contacting the school and bombarding the school with messages 
on the topic of Jamfest.600  School personnel spent days dealing with phone 
calls, emails, and parental concerns that resulted from the Jamfest post.601
Too much staff time was wasted on an issue that can be judged to be rela-
tively unimportant.602  The “substantial disruption” test is necessary because 
Doninger’s speech did not fit in the category of a threat or libel nor did it 
constitute harassment or bullying which would be necessary to apply in a 
“collides with the rights of others” test.603
Using the “collides with the rights of others” test means the court’s 
holding in Wisniewski is correct, as it involved a true threat which would 
permit Wisniewski’s speech to be disciplined.604 T.V.’s holding is also then 
correct under this analysis.605  In T.V. ex rel B.V., the raunchy pictures did not 
involve harassment, bullying, libel, or threats.606  They also did not create a 
substantial disruption at school as only two or three parents complained to 
the school.607  This is not speech with which the school should be involved.608
This speech, while raunchy, should be protected.609  Parents who objected to 
it should interact directly with T.V.’s parents rather than requesting that the 
school act as the intermediary.  In T.V. ex rel B.V., there is not a sufficient 
nexus between the student’s speech, the aggrieved students and parents, and 
the school.610  This speech involved off-campus behavior that should have 
been handled by and among parents rather than involving the school.  Thus, 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana reached 
 600. Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 44–45, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d 
at 40), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 601. See id. at 44–45. 
 602. See id. at 46. 
 603. See id. at 53; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
513 (1969). 
 604. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d at 37–38 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).  
While some of the courts discussed “real” threats as opposed to “perceived” threats, this dis-
tinction is not helpful.  Given the ability of individuals to heavily arm themselves and then 
massacre those with whom they disagree, it seems unfair to place school administrators in the 
position of trying to sort through what constitutes a real threat as opposed to a joke. 
 605. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 
(N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 606. See id. at 771, 775. 
 607. Id. at 784. 
 608. See id. at 783–84.
 609. Id. at 776. 
 610. T.V. ex rel B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 783. 
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the correct decision in T.V. ex rel B.V., as did the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Wisniewski.611
Yet while the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California applied the correct analysis to the facts in J.C. ex rel. R.C., it 
reached the wrong conclusion.612  J.C.’s behavior toward C.C. constituted 
harassment, bullying, and possibly libel.  Had the court used the “collides 
with the rights of others” test rather than the “substantial disruption” test, it 
would have been easy for the school to discipline J.C. without worrying 
about whether J.C.’s behavior resulted in a substantial disruption of work at 
school. 
Using the above analysis, i.e., the student’s speech either creates a sub-
stantial disruption at school or collides with the rights of others, I would ar-
gue that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached 
the correct decision in Kowalski I, using the wrong analysis.  Kara Kowalski 
used the internet to mock, taunt, bully, and harass a fellow classmate, Shay 
N.613  While Kara’s off-campus speech may not have created a substantial 
disruption in terms of additional work created for school administrators, it 
was conduct that could certainly be described as bullying or harassing an-
other classmate.614  Again using the above analysis, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in its en banc opinions in Layshock III615
and Snyder III,616 reached incorrect decisions and used the wrong analysis.  
Since both of those decisions involved off-campus student cyberspeech that 
could be described as libelous or harassing of school personnel, one could 
conclude, using the “collides with the rights of others” test, that Tinker was 
satisfied and that both Layshock and Snyder could be disciplined for their 
speech.617
As Tinker is now being construed, it is difficult for courts to apply the 
appropriate analysis to the particular facts of a case before them.618  Melinda 
 611. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); T.V. ex rel B.V., 807 F. 
Supp. 2d at 784. 
 612. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117–
18, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 613. See Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567–69 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012). 
 614. See id. at 572. 
 615. Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 616. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 617. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 930; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219. 
 618. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
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Cupps Dickler’s excellent article suggests that despite the confusion of the 
student speech cases that the justices agree on the following principles: 
• “[S]tudents retain significant First Amendment protection [while] in 
school;”619
• However, students’ rights are limited and are not as extensive as 
those of adults;620
• “[S]chool officials [are] permitted substantial discretion to maintain 
discipline, even” if that results—not intentionally, but as a consequence—in 
the restriction of speech;621
• “[P]olitical . . . speech is strongly protected . . . from viewpoint dis-
crimination;”622
• “Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ test [is still] applicable to any stu-
dent speech that [is] not . . . regulated . . . by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse.”623
VI. CONCLUSION
Schools, state legislatures, courts, students, parents, and the Department 
of Education continue to grapple with balancing the speech rights of students 
with the rights of students to be “‘let alone.’”624  Since the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in three cases this past term, it seems clear that they con-
sider the matter settled.625  However, a reading of decisions from the various 
district and circuit courts in the last decade indicates confusion still exists.626
Lower courts are applying, misapplying, or misunderstanding the holdings 
from the Court’s decisions in this area.627  Different results, often with simi-
lar factual situations, continue.628  A citation analysis of Kowalski, indicates 
 619. Dickler, supra note 92, at 380. 
 620. See id. 
 621. Id. 
 622. Id. 
 623. Id.
 624. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 19–20; see also discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
 625. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 626. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
 627. See discussion supra Part V. 
 628. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
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that cases in the secondary student cyberspeech arena continue through the 
court’s pipelines.629  Given the importance of bully prevention, the liability 
issues involved, and the confusion surrounding what is deemed to be the 
appropriate reaction of school officials to off-campus student cyberspeech 
that comes on campus, it would be very helpful if the Court addressed this 
subject and provided a clear analysis soon. 
 629. See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 2012 
WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012); Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 
2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012); Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:09-cv-0626-LRH-
VPC, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2011). 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our law school has a faculty summer grant program,1 as do most law 
schools.2  Our program’s rules, set out in the appendix to this article, are 
∗ Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University (jarvisb@nsu.law.nova.edu). 
** Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University (colemanp@nsu.law.nova.edu). 
 1. Our law school was founded in 1974 and began its summer grant program in 1982 
after a faculty member, who had recently returned from a visit at Southwestern Law School, 
reported on its system to our dean.  The first work funded was a book about the nation’s drug 
epidemic.  See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS xxi (1986) 
(“Former Dean Ovid Lewis . . . selected my book proposal in a competition for a summer 
research grant, liberating me from the financial necessity of teaching summer school to pay 
the mortgage.  That support conferred upon me an exceptional opportunity to read and think 
about my subject free of mundane distractions.”). 
 2. Officially, it is unclear just how many law schools have faculty summer grant pro-
grams.  Anecdotally, however, it appears only a few do not have them.  See, e.g.,
ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE, 2012 SURVEY 
REPORT xii, available at http://www.lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload/2012Survey.pdf [here-
inafter 2012 ALWD-LWI Survey] (reporting that of the 153 law schools fully completing the 
survey, 147 had summer grant programs). 
  It is also unclear exactly when law schools first started offering summer grants.  
However, in a 1961 study, “two institutions reported the availability of summer research 
grants which relieve the faculty member from the pressure of having to engage in other mon-
ey-producing pursuits in summer months.”  ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS—
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simple in theory:  interested professors submit applications in January, get 
funded in June, and are expected to have a completed manuscript sometime 
thereafter.  In practice, however, the program has raised a host of knotty phi-
losophical, financial, and administrative issues.  Because these issues have 
also bedeviled other law schools,3 and as almost nothing has been written 
about summer grant programs for law professors,4 we examine the subject in 
greater detail below. 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION AND UNIVERSITY RELATIONS,
ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ADEQUACY AND 
MOBILIZATION OF CERTAIN RESOURCES IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 389 (1961) (the study 
does not reveal the identity of either school).  The earliest law review article that we have 
been able to find that specifically mentions being funded by a summer grant is Rodolfo Bati-
za, The Unity of Private Law in Louisiana Under the Spanish Rule, 4 INTER-AM. L. REV. 139, 
139 n.* (1962) (“The writer expresses deep appreciation to the Council of Research, the 
School of Law and the Institute of Comparative Law, Tulane University, for a Summer grant 
which made it possible to undertake research in the General Archives of the Indies, Seville, 
Spain on which the present article is principally based.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Erik Gerding, Summer Research Policies, THE CONGLOMERATE, May 31, 
2011, at http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/05/summer-research-policies.html (asking 
readers “are summer research [grants at your law school] given on merit or are they treated as 
essentially a salary supplement?  If they are given on merit, how is merit measured?  Based on 
whether past grants have yielded scholarship?  Based on the placement success of past law 
review articles?  Are the untenured given any preference?  What accountability is required 
after the summer is over?  Do recipients have to submit their work to the administration?  
Present at a faculty colloquium?”). 
 4. We are surprised that no previous article has focused on such grants, given that the 
subject is among the ones that regularly preoccupy law school faculties: 
Another cause for decanal celebration is finding a faculty member who can disagree with his 
or her colleagues—and the dean—without being disagreeable during the often heated annual 
debates in faculty meetings over such issues as faculty class schedules, teaching loads, first 
year class size, admission standards, faculty and student diversity matters, summer research 
grants, resources devoted to clinical programs, and the ever-present discussions about how the 
school can best move up in the U.S. News & World Report rankings of law schools. 
James K. Robinson, Tribute to Joseph D. Grano, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1295 (2000).  See 
also Clark Freshman, Lie Detection and the Negotiation Within, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
263, 265 (2011) (“I asked [the dean] again about how he considered . . . ‘pay’ and how it 
might include other items like ‘summer salary’ or ‘grants’ or ‘bonuses[.]’”); Paul M. Secunda, 
Tales of a Law Professor Lateral Nothing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 125, 147 (2008) (“[T]he 
sweetness of [a lateral] offer can be made especially sweet if summer grants and travel budg-
ets are not only generous, but guaranteed for a few years after your arrival. . . .”). 
  Apparently, summer grants also preoccupy other types of academicians: 
[While serving as the dean of the law school,] I once attended a glamorous dinner, at the resi-
dence of [the] university president, to honor a [non-law school] professor who was retiring.  
The food was excellent, the speeches and tributes moving, and the recognition of a life’s work 
impressive.  But the professor, enjoying the moment, still confessed to me his deepest reaction:  
fury at having been denied a summer grant by an administrator more than a decade before.  
Academic institutions, law schools included, inspire long memories and injured egos more 
than most other workplaces. 
Kent Syverud, Three Principles of Effective Deaning, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 751, 752 (2000). 
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II. PURPOSE
According to our law school’s rules, summer grants “provide financial 
support for research projects.”5  This somewhat ambiguous statement has led 
to four competing views as to the program’s purpose. 
Because we are on nine-month contracts,6 some faculty members see 
the program as largely a salary supplement.  As such, they believe that all 
professors who want a summer grant should receive one.  They also feel that 
just about any project will do and are not terribly concerned with the finished 
product.  Thus, surveys, chapter updates, and the like are all acceptable. 
Other faculty members regard the program as a home for “big ideas.”  
To them, only truly groundbreaking proposals should be funded (with a 
strong preference given to books), even if they turn out to be so grand, or so 
complex, that they never come to fruition.7
The third group considers the program a way to enhance the reputation 
of the law school.  These folks, with their sights set firmly on moving up in 
 5. See Appendix at VI.B.1. 
  Although we have never done it, we know of at least one law school that has consid-
ered the idea of setting aside summer grants for specific types of research.  See SMU School of 
Law, Centre for NAFTA and Latin American Legal Studies—Background Information, 4 
NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 23, 26 (Winter 1998) (discussing the possibility of setting aside 
funds for summer grants “into NAFTA, Latin American and Caribbean related subject mat-
ters[.]”). 
 6. The majority of law professors, of course, are on nine-month contracts: 
The traditional period for most law faculty appointments is nine months.  At many schools, 
particularly those giving faculty summer research grants, a tenure-track teacher will devote at 
least part of the three remaining months to scholarly pursuits; the normative expectations are 
that a teacher will be prepared, regardless of how the summer is spent, to teach his or her 
courses once the academic year begins. 
Jan M. Levine, “You Can’t Please Everyone, So You’d Better Please Yourself”:  Directing (or 
Teaching in) a First-Year Legal Writing Program, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 611, 632 n.68 (1995). 
  Interestingly, a law professor’s nine-month contract proved crucial to the plot of the 
1942 film The Talk of the Town (Columbia Pictures).  As the movie opens, Michael Lightcap 
(played by Ronald Colman), a faculty member at Boston’s Commonwealth Law School, is 
seen arriving in the small town of Lochester.  Upon meeting his new landlady Nora Shelley 
(Jean Arthur), he tells her, “I’ve just finished teaching, for nine months 400 weary young men 
the rudiments of law, Miss Shelley.”  ARK TV, Talk of the Town—Transcript, at 00:03:48, 
available at http://livedash.ark.com/transcript/according_to_jim-(the_stick)/13/KOFY/ Mon-
day_April_12_2010/190281/.  The next morning Shelley turns away various visitors by ex-
plaining, “Professor Lightcap came here for a quiet summer.  He wants to write a book.”  Id.
at 00:21:46-00:21:48.  Lightcap’s plans went awry, however, after he became involved in a 
local murder trial and a love triangle with Shelley and the accused, a political activist named 
Leopold Dilg (Cary Grant). 
 7. In defending this view, one of our colleagues once remarked (as best as we can now 
recall), “After you finish the great American novel, stick it in a desk drawer.  After all, the 
challenge is in the writing—not the publishing.” 
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the U.S. News & World Report rankings, prefer to fund articles that are likely 
to be completed in a timely fashion and have a realistic chance of appearing 
in a top law review.8
The final faction looks at the program as a way to help faculty members 
who do not have time to write during the school year9 or are new to the acad-
emy and just beginning to write.  Like the salary supplementers, this wing is 
not terribly concerned with what is produced but does hope that by having a 
block of time to devote to scholarship the recipients will catch “the writing 
bug” and be eager to tackle future projects.10
One point on which all four groups agree is that summer grants are only 
available for projects that will produce a tangible work product.11  As a re-
 8. This is probably the view held by most law professors.  See Edward Gordon, Round-
table on Prospects for Publishing in International Law, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 522, 533 
(1991) (“If you are in academic life and are going for tenure, or if you already have tenure but 
have a summer grant that you need to justify, you are going to be somewhat limited in your 
choice of journals in which to publish and formats to use.  So far as I am aware, doing short, 
pithy case notes, intellectually stimulating or not, gives you no professional credit whatso-
ever.”).  See also Bridget Crawford, If Steve Jobs Had Been a Law School Dean, THE 
FACULTY LOUNGE, July 26, 2012, at http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/07/if-steve-jobs-
had-been-a-law-school-dean.html (quiz involving a fictional law school dean who refuses “to 
give Professor X a summer research grant to support yet another bar magazine publication”). 
 9. Because of the nature of their jobs, legal research and writing teachers rarely find it 
possible to write during the year.  See Susan P. Liemer, The Quest for Scholarship:  The Legal 
Writing Professor’s Paradox, 80 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1008 n.2 (2001) (“I would like to thank 
Southern Illinois University School of Law for providing the summer grant that made it possi-
ble for me to have time to write this summer.  Without that grant it is likely I still would not 
have had the time to write about finding the time to write.”). 
 10. At least some faculty members do catch the writing bug.  After one of our colleagues 
published her first article with the help of a summer grant, she exclaimed (as we remember it), 
“Once you see your name in print, you just can’t wait to get started on the next article.” 
  Admittedly, there is a danger in giving summer grants to faculty members early in 
their careers, as they may become crutches.  Although we have worried about this possibility, 
we have accepted the risk.  Other law schools have done likewise.  See, e.g., James Lindgren, 
Fifty Ways to Promote Scholarship, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 126, 135 (1999) (“New faculty should 
receive grants automatically their first summer—like a smart drug dealer, you want to get 
them hooked.”); Ruth Fleet Thurman, A Remembrance of Dean W. Gary Vause, 33 STETSON 
L. REV. 89, 89 (2003) (“I mention my assignments—all of which I vividly remember and 
loved—as an example of the heavy demands on teachers in the mid-1970s.  These were the 
days before new teachers were given lighter teaching loads and summer research grants.  Most 
of us taught summer school to make ends meet.”). 
 11. See Appendix at VI.B.1.  This is true elsewhere.  See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, 
Jack Friedenthal:  A Scholar, a Teacher, and a Dean’s Dean, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 3, 5  
(2009) (“Jack’s signature program[,] designed to enhance the scholarly life of the school and 
the productivity of the faculty[,] was the institution of summer research grants, a program that 
still exists at the Law School today.  These grants are contingent on the production of a manu-
script of a law review article, a book chapter, or the like.”). 
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sult, our rules state that the following activities do not qualify for summer 
grants:  “(1) attendance or participation in summer conferences; (2) advanced 
academic study; (3) teaching; (4) working in clinical programs; (5) activity 
or travel as a director, reporter, advisor or consultant to a professional pro-
ject, publication or conference; (6) programs of summer reading or “enrich-
ment”; and (7) class preparation.”12
  One issue we have only begun to face is whether summer grants are available for 
works that will appear only in blogs.  We have had just one such application, and it was ap-
proved and funded.  Of course, law schools have been struggling for some time over whether 
such works constitute scholarship.  For an examination of the issue from multiple perspec-
tives, see Symposium, Bloggership:  How Blogs Are Transforming Legal Scholarship, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1025 (2006).  See also Steven Keslowitz, The Transformative Nature of 
Blogs and Their Effects on Legal Scholarship, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 252 (2009). 
 12. See Appendix at VI.B.1.  Faculty members at our law school who are interested in 
these activities can use their individual faculty development allotments (currently $1,850 a 
year) or seek funding from our dean’s office. 
  Other law schools’ summer grant programs similarly favor scholarship over teaching.  
See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Scholarship and Teaching After 175 Years, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2007) (“One of the strongest signals of dedication to faculty scholarship was [my] 
controversial decision [while serving as dean of the University of Cincinnati law school in the 
1980s] to eliminate summer classes in favor of summer faculty research grants with funded 
student assistants.  Some excellent teachers who taught summer classes for extra compensa-
tion were upset.  But it gave the scholars good incentives to finish works in progress and begin 
new ones.”). 
  The notion that summer grants should be available only for scholarship is not univer-
sally-shared.  See, e.g., Donald B. King, Commercial Law:  Times of Change and Expansion,
in COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 121, 145 
(Ross Cranston & Royston Miles Goode eds. 1993) (“Law schools should also consider giving 
commercial-law professors summer grants, not with the requirement of researching and writ-
ing an article or book, but for the study and learning of their greatly changing and expanding 
subject.”); Rogelio A. Lasso, Is Our Students Learning?  Using Assessments to Measure and 
Improve Law School Learning and Performance, 15 BARRY L. REV. 73, 99 (2010) (“In addi-
tion, law schools should provide summer ‘teaching grants’ that provide the same level of 
compensation as summer research grants.  This would permit teachers to develop effective 
assessment programs that can become an integral part of their teaching.”); Lea B. Vaughn, 
Integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Into the Curriculum at the University of 
Washington School of Law:  A Report and Reflections, 50 FLA. L. REV. 679, 690 n.31 (1998) 
(“In most law schools, summer stipends or grants are to be used solely for research.  Law 
schools may want to reconsider this policy.  In the current period of curricular upheaval, it 
may be well worth temporarily, if not permanently, diverting some research dollars to funding 
efforts that improve teaching and curriculum.”).  See also Christian C. Day, The Case for 
Professionally-Edited Law Reviews, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563, 586 (2007) (suggesting that a 
portion of the money currently used for summer grants be redirected to faculty who serve as 
law review advisors); Michael Millemann, The Institutional Barriers and Advantages Panel,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 502 (1998) (discussing the possibility of using summer grants 
“to support teachers who agree[] to develop and teach . . . new ethics units.”). 
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III. ELIGIBILITY
All faculty members are eligible for summer grants at our law school.  
But because our rules do not clearly define the word “faculty,” questions 
have arisen with respect to:  (a) adjuncts; (b) visitors; (c) administrators; (d) 
legal research and writing teachers; (e) clinicians; (f) academic support in-
structors; and, (g) departing faculty members.13
We do not allow adjuncts to apply for summer grants.  However, our 
dean recently began holding talks with an individual who is interested in 
funding adjuncts who want to conduct research.  It is too early to know what 
will become of this idea.14
We likewise do not give summer grants to visitors, although we are oc-
casionally asked.  It has been our feeling that visitors should receive grants 
from their home institutions. 
At one time, faculty members serving as administrators on 12-month 
contracts were assumed to be ineligible for summer grants, inasmuch as our 
grant rules require recipients to devote a minimum of eight weeks to their 
projects.15  However, when the issue was actually raised, we decided that 
applicants should not be penalized for their administrative service.16
 13. Because we are still a relatively young law school, we have not faced the question of 
whether emeritus faculty members are eligible for summer grants.  For an example of a law 
school funding such a professor, see Ludwik A. Teclaff, The River Basin Concept and Global 
Climate Change, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 355, 355 n.* (1991) (“Professor of Law Emeritus, 
Fordham University School of Law.  The author wishes to acknowledge receipt of a summer 
research grant from Fordham University School of Law which aided in the writing of this 
article.”). 
 14. Providing support for practitioners who want to write would help, at least in a small 
way, bridge the gap between the academy and the bar.  Cf. Yale Kamisar, Why I Write (and 
Why I Think Law Professors Generally Should Write), 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1747, 1756 
(2004) (“The distance between professors and practitioners grows still wider when one re-
members that practicing lawyers are not awarded research leave or summer grants in order to 
write.”). 
 15. See Appendix at VI.B.3 ¶ 1. 
  At other law schools, it appears that administrators are still prohibited from receiving 
summer grants.  While discussing his book The Vanderbilt Law School:  Aspirations and 
Realities, Associate Dean D. Don Welch noted, “Then there is the question of pay.  For me, 
this was my scholarly activity, so I continued to draw my regular salary and did not expect 
any additional pay.  Those of you who are on nine-month appointments, however, should 
arrange to get a summer research grant so you are not forced to teach while trying to work on 
your book.”  Law School Histories:  A Panel Discussion, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 311, 319 
(2010). 
 16. We currently have six faculty members serving in the following 12-month positions:  
dean; associate dean—academic affairs; associate dean—international programs; associate 
dean—critical skills program; associate dean for AAMPLE and online programs; and assistant 
dean—law library and technology center. 
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Like most law schools, our legal research and writing teachers are eligi-
ble for summer grants.17  Our clinicians are also eligible.18  However, our 
academic support instructors are not. 
In a few instances, we have awarded grants to faculty members who lat-
er announced that they would be leaving us for one reason or another.  Ex-
cept in unusual circumstances, we have required them to forfeit their grants. 
IV. APPLICATION
At our law school, summer grant applications are initially handled by 
the Faculty Development Committee (“FDC”).19  Early in the fall semester, 
the FDC asks for non-binding “expressions of interest.”20  In addition to get-
ting a sense of who might be interested in a summer grant,21 the FDC’s in-
quiry gets folks to start thinking seriously about their projects.22
 17. According to the ALWD-LWI, legal research and writing teachers are eligible for 
summer grants at 104 law schools.  See 2012 ALWD-LWI Survey, supra note 2, at xii. 
 18. Like legal research and writing teachers, clinicians have sought to be included in 
summer grant programs.  See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Broadening Scholarship:  Embracing 
Law Reform and Justice, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540, 541 (2002) (“We view institutional support, 
such as summer research grants, as an important affirmation of our scholarship.”).  But as they 
have pointed out, to achieve maximum effectiveness such programs need to take into account 
their specific circumstances: 
 Every spring, the dean circulates a notice to the faculty regarding applying for summer 
research grants.  Funding is set aside for this purpose in order to encourage scholarship.  Fac-
ulty may also teach in the six-week summer program for additional pay.  Although the clinic 
faculty are free to teach summer school or to apply for research grants, neither option is par-
ticularly attractive to those of us who are already working full-time during summers . . . man-
aging continuing case loads[,] including some big cases, while also overseeing clinic grant-
mandated community service and training activities.  Albany appears to be typical of other law 
schools in this regard.  Perhaps the summer stipend should be made available, by application, 
to clinic faculty for significant summer clinical work or “clinical scholarship.”  Such scholar-
ship could include significant case activity, the development of new clinical courses or pro-
grams, or other major clinic projects. 
Nancy M. Maurer, Handling Big Cases in Law School Clinics, or Lessons From My Clinic 
Sabbatical, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 879, 897-98 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
 19. The FDC is one of our nine standing faculty committees.  Its composition changes 
annually and all faculty members are eligible to sit on it (and are limited to three years of 
consecutive service). 
 20. See Appendix at VI.B.2 ¶ 1. 
 21. Because who writes affects who is available to teach summer school, the FDC works 
closely with the associate dean for academic affairs during this phase of the application proc-
ess.  The importance of maintaining a good balance is clearly illustrated by what happened at 
the University of San Diego.  Its in-house criminal clinic folded in 1995 when it became im-
possible to find enough faculty members to act as supervisors, in part because of summer 
grants: 
Even with only three students per instructor, supervision of the in-house clinic was enormously 
time-consuming.  Given the demands of tenure and various pay incentives (including merit pay 
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Completed applications are due by January 31.23  Pursuant to our rules, 
an applicant is expected to describe his or her project; explain what type of 
tangible work product will be produced; indicate when the project will be 
finished; and list all prior grants (and their outcomes).24
At one time, we permitted both “alternative projects” and “multiple pro-
jects” applications.  Now, however, we insist that applicants pick a single 
project.25  Somewhat surprisingly, our rules do not require applicants to list 
any potential conflicts of interest.26
The FDC typically meets in February to review and vote on the applica-
tions.27  Although our rules do not contain express guidelines, over the years 
the FDC has developed a three-part test:  1) does the project appear to have 
increases and summer research grants), instructors became more interested in producing schol-
arship than cooling their heels in courtroom hallways. 
Jean Montoya, The University of San Diego Criminal Clinic:  It’s All in the Mix, 74 MISS. L.J. 
1021, 1025 n.11 (2005). 
 22. It appears that more advanced planning is necessary at some law schools:  “Eligibility 
for summer research grants [at the University of Illinois College of Law], for example, is tied 
to demonstrated research productivity during the prior two academic years.”  Thomas M. 
Mengler, Celebrating the Multiple Missions of a Research I University-Based Law School, 31 
U. TOL. L. REV. 681, 682 n.4 (2000). 
 23. See Appendix at VI.B.2 ¶ 2.  If January 31 falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, 
applications are due on the next business day. 
  Our rules do not indicate what penalty, if any, attaches to a late application.  By long-
standing practice, the FDC accepts late applications but places them “at the back of the line” 
for funding priority purposes. 
 24. See id.  Similar requirements are in place at other law schools.  See, e.g., Richard C. 
Boldt, Public Education as Public Space:  Some Reflections on the Unfinished Work of Marc 
Feldman, 61 MD. L. REV. 13, 18 n.26 (2002). 
 25. Other law schools, however, allow such applications.  See, e.g., Gordon G. Young, 
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority:  Small Iceberg or Just 
the Tip?, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 971, 971 n.* (2003) (“Special thanks are due . . . the Dean of the 
[University of Maryland] School of Law for a summer grant that funded, among other re-
search, work on this article.”); Steven H. Resnicoff, The Attorney-Client Relationship:  A 
Jewish Law Perspective, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 349, 349 n.* (2000) (“I 
express my gratitude to the DePaul University College of Law for the 1999 summer research 
grant that enabled me to write this and other articles about Jewish law.”). 
 26. Thus, for example, we do not require applicants to disclose that they plan to use their 
grant to write an article to help a law firm that has retained them as an expert witness.  How-
ever, such a conflict might have to be disclosed when filling out our university’s annual em-
ployee conflicts form.  See Nova Southeastern University, Conflicts of Interest Declaration & 
Disclosure Statement, available at http://www.nova.edu/cwis/hrd/orientation/forms/ con-
flicts_interest.pdf.  For a further discussion of the issue, see, e.g., Shireen A. Barday, Note, 
Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 STAN. L. REV. 711 
(2008). 
 27. It frequently happens that a committee member is also a grant applicant.  In such 
cases, the person is excused from the room when his or her application is being considered. 
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“scholarly promise”?; 2) will the project require at least eight weeks of sus-
tained effort?; and, 3) is the project capable of completion in a reasonable 
amount of time?28
Projects approved by the FDC are sent to the dean with a recommenda-
tion that they be funded.29  Although our rules do not address the issue, pro-
 28. While individual faculty members can and do interpret this test differently, there have 
been only a handful of instances when the FDC has been split over a project’s merit. 
  There is, of course, always the concern that applications will be voted up or down 
based on personalities or politics.  See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE:
SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR PRIVATE GAIN 33 (1993), available at
http://www.afj.org/assets/resources/resources2/Justice-for-Sale.pdf (“[A Harvard Law School] 
professor, who describes himself as liberal, requested a summer research grant [from a fund 
linked to the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics].  Although the subject of the 
research was ‘squarely within the law and economics field,’ he was denied the grant because, 
he believes, he was not of the correct, i.e. conservative, philosophical orientation.”). 
  At some law schools, it has been alleged that race has been used against summer 
grant candidates: 
 A [minority law] professor moved from his previous position to one at a large research 
university.  Once there, to his surprise he found his requests for research assistance, a computer 
grant, and summer stipends regularly rejected.  This happened even though the professor’s 
writing record was at least as good as that of majority race colleagues who received funding.  
Among the proposals rejected was one requesting support for an article the professor subse-
quently had accepted in a highly-ranked law review.  The next year, the professor requested 
support for an article that, unknown to the research committee, had already been accepted by 
an even more highly ranked review.  This proposal was also rejected. 
Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors’ Lives:  The Bell-Delgado Survey,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 363 (1989). 
  In her autobiography, Anita Hill feared she would be victimized in a similar way:  “I 
questioned my own decision to return to the University of Oklahoma in the fall of 1995.  I was 
certain that my participation in the normal campus activities would never be the same.  The 
activities in whose involvement I had been welcomed—faculty committees, faculty awards 
and recognition, university projects, summer research grants—may in fact be off limits, 
judged by a standard and procedure limited to me. . . .”  ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH TO 
POWER 340 (1997). 
  The possibility of racial discrimination is not, of course, limited to minority law 
professors.  In summarizing his summer grants experience, a white law professor wrote: 
 I first considered writing about Stetson’s racist past in the Spring of 2000.  My thought at 
the time was to include it in the upcoming Stetson Law Review symposium issue celebrating 
the College [of Law]’s centennial.  Per my usual practice, I applied to the College for a grant 
that summer to finance the research.  My application stated:  “I plan on writing about the Col-
lege’s history of racial exclusion.  A recent article came out in the Florida Law Review chroni-
cling Virgil Hawkins’s failed attempt at integrating UF.  I want to explore Stetson’s history.”  
Because I had received a dozen grants for previous summer projects, (indeed, I had never been 
turned down) I assumed that I would receive one again.  The College denied my application. 
Mark R. Brown, Affirmative Inaction:  Stories From a Small Southern School, 75 TEMP. L.
REV. 201, 229 n.204 (2002). 
 29. For much of its existence, the FDC felt that its job was done once all the applications 
had been reviewed and forwarded with a cover note to the dean.  Nowadays, however, the 
FDC is taking a much more active role in mentoring applicants (particularly junior faculty 
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posals that fail to win the committee’s support are returned to the applicant, 
who is normally given 7-10 days to submit an amended application.  Appli-
cants have generally been limited to one revision. 
While this process has worked well, a number of questions have arisen 
over the years.  First, some faculty members find the January 31 deadline 
off-putting.  They would prefer that all interested faculty members be given 
“conditional grants,” without the need to specify a topic or commit to a par-
ticular schedule.  Under this system, payment would be made only after the 
project was completed. 
A second question has involved the necessary level of detail.  While 
some submissions include lengthy descriptions, extensive bibliographies, and 
even partial drafts, others are little more than bare-bones summaries.  These 
latter applications have caused the FDC some difficulty.  Of course, this is a 
chicken-and-egg problem, because until faculty members do preliminary 
research, they cannot say what they will be able to accomplish.  Yet what is 
the point of having the program if applicants must devote time during the 
school year to a summer project that might not be approved? 
A third question concerns the appropriate burden of proof.  Some fac-
ulty members believe that applications should be deemed “presumptively 
approved,” and thus rejected only if they are seriously deficient.  In contrast, 
a different wing of the faculty believes that the burden of proof rests with the 
applicant, who should have to demonstrate that his or her project is both aca-
demically worthwhile and technically feasible.  This division has led to the 
closely related issue of whether the FDC should send applications (either all 
or just the questionable ones) to outside experts.  Of course, adding an exter-
nal review component would greatly increase the time and money needed to 
administer the program. 
A final question has concerned co-authored projects.  Our rules do not 
say whether they are permitted, but the FDC has generally allowed them if 
they otherwise meet our criteria.30
The FDC only has advisory powers; under our rules the final decision 
on whether to fund a particular application rests with the dean.31  With a sin-
members) and helping them turn their ideas into published works.  In addition, we recently 
named our first director of faculty development.  This position’s duties include assisting pro-
fessors with their scholarship. 
 30. The same appears to be true elsewhere.  See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art 
and Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TUL. L. REV. 961, 961 n.*** (2002) (“The authors 
are grateful to Pepperdine University School of Law for its funding of this Article through 
summer research grants.”). 
 31. See Appendix at VI.B.4.  At other law schools, summer grants are often the responsi-
bility of an associate dean.  See, e.g., Linda Crane, Accepting the Job and First Key Steps, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 847, 850 (2008) (explaining that after she became John Marshall Law 
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gle exception, deans have accepted the FDC’s recommendations.  In the one 
instance where the dean did not go along with the FDC, he funded a project 
that the committee felt was submitted by an ineligible applicant.32
School’s first associate dean for faculty development, “we sort of had a ping-pong thing going 
with [respect to who should oversee] summer research grants[.]”). 
 32. As with everything else they do, deans can be praised or scorned for how they handle 
summer grants.  Those who start or enlarge summer grant programs are hailed as heroes.  See,
e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Bow-Tie Era of Lewis and Clark Law School:  Dean Jim Huff-
man, 1993-2006, 37 ENVTL. L. v, vi (2007) (“Huffman dramatically expanded summer re-
search grants for faculty as well as research assistant positions for students.  The result was an 
unprecedented outpouring of scholarship[.]”); Harvey Gelb, Tribute to Peter C. Maxfield, 34 
LAND & WATER L. REV. ix, x (1999) (“[As dean of the University of Wyoming law school, 
Maxfield] worked to provide summer research grants for faculty and other incentives for 
meritorious performance as teachers and scholars.”); Shirley A. Wiegand, In Memoriam—
Howard B. Eisenberg, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 348, 351 (2002) (“Faculty were awarded substantial 
summer research grants and professional development funds, fulfilling [Dean Howard B. 
Eisenberg’s] goal of encouraging [Marquette’s] faculty to produce more and better scholarship 
and rewarding them when they did so.”).  See also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The View From 
the Podium, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 593, 594 (2000) (presenting a hypothetical conversation be-
tween a law professor and a dean in which the former asks the latter what she has accom-
plished during her first two years as dean and then suggests as a possible answer:  “Increase 
summer research grants[.]”).
  Conversely, deans who have to cut summer grants are viewed as ogres and can lose 
their jobs: 
The profit from [the Law and Economics] Center programs helped to provide summer research 
grants to members of the faculty.  Faculty members had great confidence in [Henry G.] 
Manne’s ability to raise funds for the law school, and they believed that with sufficient effort 
he could raise the funds the school needed.  Their expectations were probably unrealistically 
high, and when the profit from the Center’s programs decreased and funds for summer faculty 
grants had to be cut, Manne got the blame.  The personal loss of expected research funds cou-
pled with the resentment that members of the faculty had accumulated over several years 
sparked the faculty revolt that ultimately led to Manne’s resignation. 
William H. Adams, III, The George Mason Experience, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 442-43 
(1999) (footnote omitted).  Although bad, Manne’s experience was not the worst: 
In a recent dean search at a law school, a background search was conducted on all candidates.  
One of the candidates had, at least once during his service as a dean, refused to give a summer 
research grant to a faculty member who was black.  This event was reported to several people 
who then evidently reported it to the people conducting the background check.  The descrip-
tion of the candidate eventually evolved to “He has a problem with race,” or “He is insensitive 
to issues of race.”  His candidacy was dead.  Further investigation revealed that, due in large 
measure to his efforts, minority enrollment at his law school had increased substantially as had 
involvement of the local minority bar. 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Race Lines:  Immunities and Bonuses . . . and Readers’ Response, 48 FLA.
L. REV. 419, 427 n.27 (1996). 
  Of course, the street runs both ways, inasmuch as deans can use summer grants to 
reward or punish faculty members: 
The fact is, absent a specific policy or law to the contrary, the school retains a wide array of 
possible negative actions.  Most commonly, we can refuse to give a salary increase.  We can 
reassign teaching responsibility.  We can deny summer research grants and sabbaticals.  We 
could, I suppose, reduce a faculty member’s salary. 
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In our program’s early years it was not possible for the dean to fund all 
of the projects recommended by the FDC.  In recent times, we have had 
enough money to fund every approved application.33
V. COMPENSATION
During our program’s early years, summer grants equaled 22% of a re-
cipient’s regular salary.34  Today, the figure is fixed at $12,000 (the same as a 
Thomas F. Guernsey, Continuing Professional Development in Law Schools, 41 U. TOL. L.
REV. 291, 303-04 n.49 (2010).  See also Martin H. Belsky, Law Schools as Legal Education 
Centers, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 17 n.126 (2002) (“Faculty now receive compensation from 
commercial bar review courses.  Having law schools provide this compensation [by moving 
the courses in-house] means that academic administrators have one more quiver—in addition 
to summer teaching, summer research grants, faculty travel, etc.—that they can use.”).  As a 
result, one commentator has argued that summer grant decisions should never be placed solely 
in the hands of the dean: 
 One difference I’ve noticed from school to school is the manner in which the summer re-
search grant is awarded.  At some institutions the process is purely a matter of decanal discre-
tion, at others it is a committee consisting of the dean and others. . . . 
 I think the best model is a committee model. . . .  [L]eaving all the power for scholarly 
awards in the hands of the Dean can lead to favoritism or an unwillingness on the part of a fac-
ulty member to rock the boat on an issue because it may come back to bite them when summer 
grant time comes around. 
Greg McNeal, Comment, THE FACULTY LOUNGE, Dec. 30, 2009 (2:11 p.m.), at
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2009/12/encouragingfacilitatingrecognizingrewarding-
faculty-scholarship.html (responding to Jacqueline Lipton, Encourag-
ing/Facilitating/Recognizing/Rewarding Faculty Scholarship).
 33. We consider ourselves quite fortunate in this regard.  Compare, e.g., Jayne W. Bar-
nard, Reflections on Britain’s Research Assessment Exercise, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 467, 483 
(1998) (“Certainly many [law] schools (including my own [William and Mary]) with competi-
tive programs for faculty summer research grants already make distinctions between fundable 
scholarship and other scholarly activities that will need to seek funding elsewhere.”); Clifford 
Larsen, The Future of Comparative Law:  Public Legal Systems, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 847, 862 (1998) (“[F]aculty may run into constraints, such as the limitation on sum-
mer research grants that makes them available for research that leads to publication of an 
article but not for research that leads to the publication of a book.”).  See also Allan W. Ves-
tal, “A River to My People . . .”  Notes From My Fifth Year as Dean, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 179, 
185 (2005) (observing that in tough economic times, “salary increases may be lower than 
expected; the number of staff assistants may shrink.  In truly dire circumstances, the amount 
of Xeroxing may go down, summer research grants may become tight, or travel budgets may 
disappear.”). 
 34. This put us in the middle of the pack.  See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal and Law School 
Malpractice:  Confessions of a Lawyer’s Lawyer and Law Professor, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 
909 n.121 (1996) (“[L]aw professors usually are entitled to summer teaching or summer writ-
ing grants that are anywhere between 10% and 30% of their base salaries.”). 
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three-credit summer school course).35  From what little information is pub-
licly available, this appears to be about average.36
Our law school generally awards 25 grants each summer,37 meaning that 
our program costs $300,000.  This is just a bit more than 1% of our law 
 35. Because it is treated as an “overload,” this amount does not qualify for our univer-
sity’s 401(k) retirement match.  And, of course, under the IRS’s rules it is fully taxable.  See
Marci Kelly, Financing Higher Education:  Federal Income-Tax Consequences, 17 J.C. & 
U.L. 307, 315 n.48 (1991). 
  Under our university’s rules, faculty members hold the rights to their writings.  See
Nova Southeastern University, Copyright and Patent – Policy Number 9 (revised Oct. 2004), 
available at http://www.nova.edu/cwis/hrd/orientation/forms/copyright.pdf (“All copyrights 
on Works will be reserved by the Staff Member. . . .”).  Where this is not the case, the poten-
tial exists for a law school to argue that a grant-funded project constitutes a “work made for 
hire”: 
A more difficult issue may arise in the context of the summer research grant or sabbatical 
leave, whereby the university compensates the faculty member for devoting a summer, semes-
ter or year to producing a scholarly work.  The summer grant or sabbatical leave is usually 
provided after a letter or memorandum outlining the research project is submitted to the dean 
or department head.  The dean or department head usually issues the grant, or permits the sab-
batical leave, with a note to the faculty member that the time is to be spent working on the 
agreed upon project and not on consulting or similar activities.  Thus, this factor has equities 
on both sides because the faculty member’s remuneration could be considered a salary or a 
contract price for a specified job. 
Sherri L. Burr, A Critical Assessment of Reid’s Work for Hire Framework and Its Potential 
Impact on the Marketplace for Scholarly Works, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 119, 135 (1990). 
 36. See 2011-12 SALT Salary Survey, SALT EQUALIZER, May 2012, at 1 (listing amounts 
ranging from $5,000 to $25,000).  Because only 66 law schools were willing to participate in 
this survey, see Survey Information and Methodology, SALT EQUALIZER, May 2012, at 1, it is 
hard to draw definite conclusions.  See also Fruehwald v. Hofstra University, 2010 WL 
1980810, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 2010), aff’d, 920 N.Y.S.2d 183 (App. Div. 2011) (le-
gal writing professor whose contract was not renewed sought reinstatement, back pay, and “a 
summer research grant of $12,000 for the summer of 2009.”).  The much-larger AWLD-LWI 
Survey reports that the average grant is $8,897.  See 2012 ALWD-LWI Survey, supra note 2, 
at xii. 
  Even when law schools do report on their summer grants, how they report can make 
comparisons very difficult: 
For instance, although the University of Virginia publicly reports faculty salaries . . . those re-
sults may be distorted by the inclusion or exclusion of certain benefits, depending on whether 
they are paid out of private or state funds.  As a result, two professors with the same salary and 
summer research grant may be reported as having vastly different salaries if the first receives a 
summer research grant from private funds that are not reported and the second from public 
funds that are. 
Clayton P. Gillette, Law School Faculty as Free Agents, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 213, 
222 n.24 (2008). 
 37. This covers 45% of our full-time faculty.  The remainder either teach summer school 
(35%) or engage in activities that are not compensated by the law school (20%). 
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school’s total annual revenues.38  As such, the program’s impact on student 
tuition is negligible.39
 38. Because the money for our summer grants comes from law school revenues, our 
university does not play any role in how we operate our program.  Where this is not the case, 
things can become very difficult: 
Every year the law school gets $100,000 in enhancement funding.  This is essentially non-
recurring but annually awarded money that the law school has used for travel, speakers, and 
the like.  [One year, when] my budget officer sought to have the funds transferred to help fund 
summer research grants, we were told that the funds had been transferred earlier by the Presi-
dent’s office to the capital projects division. . . . 
Allan W. Vestal, “Today the Administration Building Burned Down . . .”  Notes From My 
First Year as Dean, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 251, 254 (2001).  See also David L. Gregory, The 
Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 1002 (1991) (“University bureaucrats, 
unfamiliar with the norms of legal scholarship, may deliberately devalue the scholarship that 
is produced.  They may fail to provide sufficient incentives and supports for scholarship, such 
as merit-based salary increases, summer research grants, or sabbatical leaves.”). 
  In August 2012, Saint Louis University Dean Annette Clark resigned.  In a letter to 
the faculty and staff, she explained that the “last straw” involved a dispute with the university 
over the funding of summer grants: 
I dealt for months with convincing the university leadership to permit the law school to con-
tinue to provide summer research support to the faculty, finally reaching agreement on a proc-
ess and working with the faculty to follow all of the prescribed steps, only to be told by the 
vice president in May that the president would not permit the funding of any summer research 
stipends in the law school.  When I objected and took the issue to the faculty, I received a per-
emptory letter from the vice president informing me that further opposition to the president’s 
or vice president’s decisions would not be tolerated. 
 I could go on, but the last straw, the one that tipped the balance for me in deciding to re-
sign, is the president’s flagrant violation of an agreement he made just six weeks previously, 
an act that took from the law school over a quarter of a million dollars raised from our alumni. 
 A little over two weeks ago, one of my staff members discovered that on June 30, the last 
day of the fiscal year, $260,000 was transferred without our knowledge or agreement from the 
law school’s annual fund to the President's Opportunity Fund.  If you do the math, you’ll see 
that $260,000 equals 20 summer research stipends at $13,000 each.  In other words, despite the 
president’s agreement at the May 19th meeting with five faculty members and me that we 
could fund 20 summer research stipends from the law school operating budget, he purposefully 
undid that agreement a little more than two weeks after being embarrassed by the article that 
appeared in the Missouri Lawyers Weekly. 
 In a phone call, the vice president confirmed my suspicions, admitting that the with-
drawal from the annual fund was for the summer research stipends.  When I challenged him 
that this went against the prior agreement, he then claimed that the withdrawal was justified by 
the law school’s revenue shortfall.  However, in truth there was no substantial change in the 
enrollment/tuition revenue picture between May 19th when the president made the commit-
ment and June 30th when this withdrawal occurred.  In addition, an ordinary budget cut would 
not come from the annual funds contributed by our donors, it would come from specified lines 
in the operating budget, plus there is no apparent reason why the amount would be exactly 
equal to 20 summer research stipends.  I am thus firmly convinced that the president’s with-
drawing $260,000 from the School of Law’s annual fund was in retaliation for the truthful and 
accurate emails I sent to the faculty and the article that appeared in the Missouri Lawyers 
Weekly. . . . 
 So, now we are left in a position where the president first authorized us to use our operat-
ing budget to pay for the summer stipends and, then, after we made legally binding commit-
ments to the faculty, he unilaterally withdrew the amount of the summer stipends from the law 
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The entire grant is paid in one lump sum on June 15 (i.e., one month in-
to the grant period).  Although we would prefer it to be otherwise (so as to 
increase recipient accountability), we are unable to change the lump sum 
policy because:  1) any funds not expended by June 30 revert to our univer-
sity; and, 2) most faculty members have their paychecks “direct deposited.”40
school’s annual fund, putting us in a far worse financial position than if he had simply disap-
proved the summer stipends.  The vice president’s response to the concerns I raised was to 
shrug his shoulders and to tell me to start making cuts in discretionary expenditures.  He also 
told me specifically, when I asked what to tell the faculty, that I was not to say that this “budg-
et cut” was related to the summer stipends. 
 I am appalled and shocked by the president’s and vice president’s actions surrounding the 
summer research stipends generally, but especially by this most recent withdrawal from the 
annual fund.  I am telling you what has occurred, even though doing so is in clear contraven-
tion of the orders I received from the vice president, because I believe I have an ethical obliga-
tion to disclose this conduct, which I view to be immoral, in violation of an express commit-
ment made by the president, and harmful to the law school.  I do not wish to be complicit in, or 
provide cover for, these actions. 
Letter from Annette Clark, Dean—Saint Louis University School of Law, to her Faculty and 
Staff (dated Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/102368276/SLU-Law-
Dean-Annette-Clark-Resignation-Announcement-to-Faculty-Staff-8-8-2012. 
 39. Eliminating the summer grant program would save each of our 1,000 students ap-
proximately $300 a year in tuition.  While this amount is nothing to sneeze at, we believe that 
the scholarship produced by our grantees has at least an equal amount of intrinsic value.  
When one couples this with how much the recipients grow as experts in their field; the public-
ity their work generates; and the overall burnishing of the law school’s reputation, we view 
the program as a bargain. 
  Unfortunately, because of the on-going collapse in student enrollment, summer grants 
are definitely on the chopping block, both at our law school and elsewhere.  See, e.g., Jack 
Crittenden, How to Cut Tuition, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2013, at 22, 26 (quoting Gene Nichol, a 
professor of law at the University of North Carolina, as saying “schools should consider elim-
inating sabbaticals, trimming travel and reducing summer research grants.”).  Of course, in an 
ideal world we would not have to tap tuition dollars at all.  Cf. Kenneth C. Randall, The Dean 
as Fundraiser, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 149, 150 (2001) (exhorting law school deans to “be active 
in . . . fundraising [to] endow chairs[,] fund professorships . . . [and] provide support funds for 
faculty travel, research assistance, and summer research grants.”); Charles Silver, The Lost 
World:  Of Politics and Getting the Law Right, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 773, 774 (1998) (“In the 
summer of 1994, Kent Syverud and I received a grant from the International Association of 
Defense Counsel . . . and the Defense Research Institute . . . to undertake the first comprehen-
sive academic study of the professional responsibilities of insurance defense lawyers. . . .  The 
grant replaced summer research funds that we would have received in any event from our law 
schools.”).  As explained supra note 26, one has to be careful that outside donors do not end 
up controlling what is researched or published. 
 40. Other law schools, however, have found a way around these problems.  See Barnard, 
supra note 33, at 492 (observing that “some universities pay out summer research grants as 
‘progress payments’ to ensure that the project is completed.”). 
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Our program does not pay for travel and other out-of-pocket costs.41
However, such money is potentially available through our President’s Fac-
ulty Research and Development Grant program.42
VI. DUTIES
Under our law school’s rules, “[t]he grant period consists of not less 
than eight weeks of full time work.”43  Because our summers run from May 
15 to August 15, this means that recipients are expected to spend the bulk of 
their summers working on their projects. 
In the past, some recipients also taught.  Eventually, this became a prob-
lem, and so we amended our rules to prohibit grantees from teaching “sum-
mer school at NSU or any other school.”44
Despite the seeming clarity of this portion of our rules, there are a num-
ber of open issues.  First, does work done on the grant either before or after 
the summer count towards the “eight weeks of full time work”?  In other 
words, could a recipient spend eight weeks on his or her project in, say, 
March and April and take the summer off?  Alternatively, could he or she do 
nothing during the summer and then spend eight weeks on the project in Sep-
tember and October?  And what if a recipient, although intending to use all 
of June and July for his or her grant, is forced at the last moment to use those 
months to care for a sick relative?  We have had colleagues fall into each of 
these categories, and to date have always looked the other way. 
A second issue stems from our use of the phrase “eight weeks.”  Is this 
shorthand for the standard 35-hour work week?  If so, recipients would need 
to spend a minimum of 280 hours on their projects.  Of course, the typical 
law professor works closer to 50 hours per week,45 which would boost the 
required number to 400 hours. 
 41. Some law schools do pay for such expenses.  See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, Saunders 
(a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty Corporation, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 191, 
191 n.** (2004) (“Georgetown University Law Center provided me with a summer writer’s 
grant in 2002 as well as funds to gather a large collection of legal documents in the Javins
case.”). 
 42. For a description of this program, see Nova Southeastern University, President’s 
Faculty R & D Grant, available at http://www.nova.edu/cwis/vpaa/facscholar/index.html. 
 43. See Appendix at VI.B.3 ¶ 1. 
 44. Id.  We do permit recipients to teach in our on-line and intensive trial advocacy pro-
grams.  Id.
 45. See Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools:  Findings and 
Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 683 (2006) (“Even if many law professors generally 
work fewer hours than lawyers in private firms, many law professors do work fifty to sixty 
hours a week; these time demands can be quite unbounded.”); Patrick E. Longan, The Law 
and Economics of Aging and the Aged, 26 STETSON L. REV. 667, 674 n.22 (1996) (“A law 
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Assuming that one picks the latter figure, what should be done with the 
highly-efficient (or perhaps merely insomniac) law professor who works 100 
hours per week?  Would he or she be done after four weeks?  To date, this 
problem has been more theoretical than real, inasmuch as most recipients 
have needed more than 400 hours to complete their projects.  In those few 
instances in which recipients have finished with time to spare, they have usu-
ally worked on a second project. 
A third issue has to do with grant recipients who simultaneously serve 
as expert witnesses, bar review lecturers, and the like.  As explained above, 
our rules only ban summer school teaching.  Accordingly, many of our 
grantees have earned outside money while collecting their stipends, although 
this does not appear to have kept any recipient from completing his or her 
grant project.46
A final issue concerns the role of student research assistants.  Relying 
on such help is always tricky.47  But a summer grant, which commits the 
professor who is doing his or her job responsibly, however, will spend many more hours than 
[what is required by the accreditation rules].  Preparing for class, meeting with students, as-
sisting with the governance of the law school and the University, participating in bar associa-
tion activities, and conducting scholarship are just a few of the duties that keep law professors 
working happily for more than forty hours per week.”). 
 46. What should be done with the faculty member who, having been paid by a law firm 
to be an expert witness, later requests a grant to turn his or her research into an article or 
book?  Our rules do not address such “double dipping,” which also raises the conflict of inter-
est problem discussed supra note 26. 
  A more common form of double dipping involves a faculty member who gets a raise 
(or promotion) based on a piece for which he or she previously received a summer grant.  The 
inequity is heightened if professors who spent their summers teaching (because they did not 
get a grant) are passed over at raise (or promotion) time.  Of course, one way to fix this is to 
give “summer teaching grants,” as some commentators have suggested, see supra note 12, and 
then value teaching more at raise (and promotion) time.  See further Brent E. Newton, Preach-
ing What They Don’t Practice:  Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholar-
ship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 
S.C. L. REV. 105 (2010) (arguing that law schools focus too much on scholarship and not 
enough on teaching). 
  Because our sabbaticals only last a semester, we do encourage applicants to tack on a 
summer grant whenever possible.  Other law schools appear to do likewise.  See, e.g., Pedro 
A. Malavet, LatCritical Encounters with Culture, in North-South Frameworks, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 1 n.* (2003) (“I am grateful to the Levin College of Law [at the University of Florida] 
for allowing me to use a Summer Research Grant and part of a sabbatical to work on this 
project.”); Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.
L. REV. 343, 343 n.* (1997) (“The preparation of this article was greatly aided by the grant of 
a summer research stipend and a sabbatical leave from Brooklyn Law School in the Fall of 
1996.”). 
 47. Law professors face a host of ethical issues when they use student research assistants: 
Some law professors use lengthy tracts written by their research assistants in their own books 
or articles, representing that they wrote the work themselves.  Some acknowledge the “able as-
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recipient to producing a specific piece of writing in a relatively short period, 
exacerbates the difficulties. 
VII. COMPLETION
When an applicant receives a summer grant, he or she is expected to see 
the project through to the end.48  Occasionally, however, a grantee will want 
(or need) to change topics.49  After years without a formal mechanism, we 
recently adopted a specific rule to deal with such situations.50  It provides that 
substitution requests are to be made to the associate dean for academic af-
fairs, with a right of appeal to the dean.51
sistance” of research assistants in footnotes.  Very few explain that “sections II and III of this 
article were drafted by X.”  Even fewer make the research assistant a co-author or put quota-
tion marks around the section written by the student. 
 Law professors—who, like practicing lawyers, are experts in rationalization—offer many 
justifications for the use of the written work of research assistants without attribution.  They 
might say: 
♦ The research assistant is “just a law student;” he was just doing the drudge work.  
All the ideas in the piece were mine. 
♦ All law professors use the written work of research assistants without listing them as 
co-authors.  Everyone understands that my work may include some writing by a research assis-
tant. 
♦ The research assistant is getting paid.  His work is a “work for hire.”  It belongs to 
me. 
 All of these explanations sidestep the moral questions.  One moral question is whether 
the professor is or is not being truthful in representing that he or she is the author of the work.  
Another moral question is whether the appropriation of the work of a research assistant is an 
abuse of power, whether it is wrong because it is disrespectful or exploitative of the research 
assistant. 
Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship:  Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Author-
ship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 471-72 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 48. See Appendix at VI.B.5 ¶ 1. 
 49. Professors at other law schools have encountered the same situation.  See, e.g., Ver-
nellia R. Randall & Vincene Verdun, Two Black Women Talking About the Promotion, Reten-
tion, and Tenure Process in Law Schools, in BLACK WOMEN IN THE ACADEMY: PROMISES AND 
PERILS 213, 214 (Lois Benjamin ed. 1997) (“Last summer I [University of Dayton law profes-
sor Vernellia Randall] . . . received a summer research grant to write an article on fetal alcohol 
syndrome.  But you know how things go.  At the very beginning of the summer I got involved 
in the health care reform issue.  So I went to the dean and told him I wanted to change the 
topic for my summer research.  He agreed to the switch.”). 
 50. See Appendix at VI.B.5.  In the years before the rule, some recipients decided they 
were stuck with their topic and unhappily soldiered on; others sought out the chair (or, if he or 
she was unavailable, a member) of the FDC and asked for permission to change topics; still 
others went to the dean or associate dean for academic affairs; and a few simply switched 
topics on their own. 
 51. See Appendix at VI.B.5 ¶ 2. 
  In drafting this rule we thought about having the recipient go back to the FDC.  How-
ever, because substitution requests are likely to occur during the summer, this was impractical 
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Recipients must report on their progress to the FDC every six months, 
and this obligation continues until the project is done.52  Once it is accepted 
for publication, the recipient is eligible to apply for a new grant.53
Generally speaking, recipients cannot receive a second grant for the 
same project.54  We have two exceptions to this rule.  First, those writing 
books (or the equivalent) can apply for a second grant.55  Second, junior fac-
ulty members who have never published a scholarly work are entitled to a 
second grant if they can demonstrate “substantial progress.”56
Although suggestions have sometimes been made that they should, nei-
ther the FDC nor the dean reviews a recipient’s final work product.57  Nor are 
for two reasons:  1) most faculty are not around during the summer, making it difficult to 
convene a meeting; 2) our faculty committees change personnel on July 1, meaning that the 
recipient would in all likelihood be speaking to a different committee than the one that ap-
proved the original topic.  By putting the decision in the hands of the administration, the first 
problem is avoided (because administrators are on 12-month contracts) and the second prob-
lem is largely (although not entirely) eliminated. 
 52. See Appendix at VI.B.3 ¶ 2.  Fall reports are due by October 15 and spring reports are 
due by April 15.  Id.  To facilitate the process, the FDC sends an e-mail to each recipient prior 
to these dates requesting a status report.  The responses are then compiled by the FDC and 
circulated by e-mail to the entire faculty and posted on a secure intranet page.  Grantees are on 
their honor with respect to what they report. 
 53. Id.  A faculty member whose project is “substantially completed” is also eligible for 
future grants.  Id.
  Although becoming eligible for future grants is certainly important, there are many 
other financial reasons for wanting to get a piece finished.  As has been explained elsewhere: 
[V]irtually all the material rewards that tenured faculty members receive, other than basic job 
security, depend on their research production[:]  salary raises, their summer grants, their sup-
plementary expense funding, and their access to funds for organizing conferences or speaker 
series that are of interest to them.  It also determines whether they receive competing offers 
from other law schools, which not only provide the psychic reward of recognition, but also 
generally include a salary increase, and even if not accepted, can be used to extract further sal-
ary increases from their home institution. 
Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 139, 141-42 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
 54. See Appendix at VI.B.3 ¶ 2. 
 55. Id.  Other law schools also recognize that book-length projects will often need multi-
ple grants.  See, e.g., Judith Kilpatrick, Wiley Austin Branton:  A Role Model for All Times, 48 
HOW. L.J. 827, 827 n.* (2005) (“The University of Arkansas School of Law has supported the 
research with summer grants in 2001, 2002, and 2004.  This Article will become part of a 
more complete biography of Mr. Branton.”). 
 56. See Appendix at VI.B.3 ¶ 2. 
 57. At one time, we required summer grant recipients to present a talk about their re-
search findings to the faculty (and held weekly luncheons for this purpose).  As explained 
supra note 52, we instead now circulate by e-mail the various progress reports.  There is much 
to be said, however, for oral presentations: 
 A related suggestion is that those of us who benefit in any way from support for research, 
such as the recipients of summer research grants, should be expected to give a public lecture 
thereafter (that is, during the following school year) on some aspect of the matters researched.  
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bonuses awarded for pieces that are accepted by top-tier publishers.  As a 
result, there is a natural temptation to pick easy topics (especially because 
future eligibility depends on completing one’s existing project).  The FDC 
and the dean are expected to serve as a check against proposals that try to 
game the system. 
Occasionally, a grantee is unable to finish his or her project.  This is 
usually caused by some combination of writer’s block, boredom, and exhaus-
tion, although the fault sometimes lies with a recalcitrant co-author.  Simi-
larly, we have had instances in which grantees discovered, just as they were 
finishing their project, that they either had been preempted by another author 
or an unexpected development had rendered their piece unpublishable.  
While our rules do not address such situations, the dean has sometimes given 
such individuals “amnesty,” thereby making them again eligible for future 
grants. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In his recent book attacking legal education, Professor Brian Tamanaha 
harshly criticizes the practice of paying law professors to write in the sum-
mer: 
 The proliferation of summer research grants at law schools in 
the past several decades is indicative of the enhanced flow of mon-
ey to law professors.  Professors are paid for thirty-nine weeks a 
year; classes range from twenty-six to twenty-eight weeks; and the 
teaching load is six hours or less each week.  There is ample al-
ready-compensated time within this schedule to produce scholar-
ship.  Yet schools now also provide additional money to professors 
to write during the summer. 
 A mercenary pay-me-to-write quality attaches to these grants.  
One school, for example, offers a base summer grant of $8000, 
plus a $6000 bonus for placement in a second- or third-tier journal 
(journals outside the top 50 schools in US News), a $10,000 bonus 
for placement in a first-tier journal, or a $15,000 bonus for a top-
twenty placement or for producing two separate articles in first- or 
second-tier or peer-reviewed journals.  A more common practice is 
to offer a standard amount, say $15,000 or $20,000, half up front 
As it is now, it is hard for others to discover what any particular recipient might have done and 
learned with the aid provided.  These public lectures, too, should help students appreciate what 
truly matters to the faculty. 
George Anastaplo, Legal Education, Economics, and Law School Governance:  Explorations,
46 S.D. L. REV. 102, 122 (2001). 
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and half after the article is done.  At top schools the summer re-
search stipend runs in the tens of thousands of dollars (twenty-
eight professors at Texas law school received summer stipends 
above $60,000).  Schools justify this as a way to boost compensa-
tion to meet the competition, to reward active writers, and to moti-
vate people who might not otherwise write.  One must wonder 
whether scholarship motivated in this way suffers in quality or 
value owing to the lack of an intrinsic desire on the part of the 
scholar to write.58
Because Professor Tamanaha does not provide any evidence for his as-
sertion that summer-funded scholarship suffers in comparison to regular-
funded scholarship, it is difficult to comment on his position, other than to 
say that at our law school we have not detected any difference between the 
two types of scholarship.59  Indeed, we have found that some of our law 
school’s best writing has been produced precisely because we have a summer 
grant program.60
APPENDIX 
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER 
FACULTY HANDBOOK 24-25 (rev. ed. 2011) 
 58. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 50 (2012) (footnotes omitted).  See also
Steven Hetcher, Desire Without Hierarchy:  The Behavioral Economics of Copyright Incen-
tives, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 817, 823 (2010) (“All a law school has to do if it wants to 
insure some desired level of faculty output is to give summer grants contingent on production 
of publishable work.  We see then that money can indeed incentivize creativity.”). 
 59. Of course, some question the value of all legal scholarship.  See, e.g., Kenneth Las-
son, Scholarship Amok:  Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 
950 (1990) (“True, I like to think I have had something original to say (and have guiltlessly 
accepted remuneration via research grant or summer stipend).  Yet all of my ‘scholarship’—as 
that of most others—must be viewed as exceedingly modest when compared to that of a true 
scholar.”). 
 60. For those who have made it this far and may be wondering, we wrote this essay while 
taking a break from the projects for which we did receive Summer 2012 grants (respectively, a 
biography of an Indiana lawyer and a family law book). 
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VI. COMPENSATION/COURSES, GRANTS, SABBATICALS 
B. SUMMER RESEARCH GRANTS 
1. Purpose. 
Summer research grants provide financial support for research projects.  
The proposed project should be designed to produce scholarship such as (1) 
traditional research articles, (2) book chapters, (3) monographs or books, and 
(4) innovative teaching materials.  Proposals that would not be considered 
for summer research grant support include:  (1) attendance or participation in 
summer conferences; (2) advanced academic study; (3) teaching; (4) working 
in clinical programs; (5) activity or travel as a director, reporter, advisor or 
consultant to a professional project, publication or conference; (6) programs 
of summer reading or “enrichment”; and (7) class preparation. 
2. Procedures. 
The Faculty Development Committee will administer summer research 
grant proposals pursuant to the following procedures.  Early in the fall se-
mester, faculty members requesting a summer research grant will be required 
to notify the committee of such intent.  This notification serves as a general 
commitment by the faculty member that the administration will utilize for 
planning purposes, including scheduling summer school classes. 
All faculty members seeking a grant must submit a detailed proposal 
summarizing their intended research project by January 31.  The proposal 
should also include the following elements: 
a. Synopsis and statement of purpose:  What is the thesis and 
general subject matter of the proposed research?  Why does the 
faculty member want to undertake the project and what does he or 
she hope to accomplish? 
b. A description of format, i.e., book, research monograph, book 
chapter, law review article, innovative teaching materials, etc.; 
c. A timetable for completion; 
d. A statement of prior grants the applicant has received and a 
list of all publications that resulted from grant-funded projects.  If 
the applicant has previously received a grant that did not result in a 
publication, or innovative teaching materials, he or she shall pro-
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vide a detailed explanation, which must include any unfinished 
work product. 
3. Grant Requirements. 
The grant period consists of not less than eight weeks of full time work.  
Because the grantee should devote eight consecutive weeks to the project, he 
or she is not permitted to teach in summer school at NSU or any other 
school.  This limitation does not apply to AAMPLE™ online, MHL, other 
NSU non-law Master’s programs, and Intensive Trial Advocacy. 
Each faculty member receiving a research grant of any type will be re-
quired to submit a detailed report to the committee and to the Dean on the 
use of funds and the projects undertaken.  This report shall be updated every 
Oct. 15 and April 15 until the project is completed.  Faculty members are 
generally ineligible to receive subsequent grants until their previous grant 
work product has been accepted for publication.  However, applicants whose 
previous grant work is substantially completed, but has not yet been accepted 
for publication, and those who are working on longer term substantial pro-
jects such as book length manuscripts, may be awarded a second grant upon 
review and approval of their work progress by the committee.  In addition, 
recognizing the difficulty of publishing the first traditional law review arti-
cle, new faculty members who have never published a scholarly work who 
received a grant to write this type of piece may apply for another grant to 
complete their project if they can demonstrate “substantial progress” after the 
first summer.  The committee must evaluate the draft or other work submit-
ted, as well as reasons for failure to finish, in determining whether to award a 
second grant. 
4. Award of Grants. 
The Dean retains final authority to award grants and determine funding. 
5. Project Substitution. 
Once a project has been approved, it is expected that the faculty mem-
ber will complete it.  If a faculty member wishes to change his or her project, 
a written request to do so must be made to the Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs (“ADAA”) at the earliest possible moment.  Ordinarily, requests will 
be granted if:  (a) there is a compelling reason for the change; (b) the substi-
tuted project is meritorious; and, (c) the substituted project would most likely 
have been approved by the Faculty Development Committee. 
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The ADAA will give the faculty member a written decision in as timely 
a manner as possible, and will advise the faculty by e-mail of the decision.  If 
the ADAA rejects the request, the faculty member may appeal to the Dean.  
Except in highly unusual circumstances, the Dean will not reverse the deci-
sion of the ADAA. 
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MICHAEL J. DALE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida intermediate appellate courts decided a series of cases in 
the child welfare field ranging from issues related to representation of par-
ents in dependency proceedings and proper procedure at shelter hearings, to 
a range of issues in termination of parental rights (TPR) cases this past sur-
vey year.  The intermediate courts ruled on a lesser number of delinquency 
area cases.  As is true with each survey, decisions in the delinquency area 
that are linked to issues of criminal procedure, and which are not unique to 
the juvenile delinquency field, are not covered.1  Finally, this article summa-
rizes the symposium held at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad 
Law Center regarding the American Bar Association Model Act Governing 
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceed-
ings.2
II. DEPENDENCY
Dependency proceedings often start when the child is removed from the 
home and taken into custody based upon a probable cause determination that 
the child is “abused, neglected, or abandoned or . . . is in imminent danger of 
[an] illness or injury as a result of abuse, neglect, or abandonment,” there is a 
violation of an order of the court, or there are no parents or other guardians 
available.3  When the law enforcement officer takes the child into custody, 
the officer may release the child to a parent or legal custodian or other re-
 * Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  This 
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012. 
 1. See Michael J. Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 137, 137 (2010) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
 2. See generally Symposium, 36 NOVA L. REV. 309 (2012). 
 3. FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1)(b) (2012). 
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sponsible adult, or may place the child in the care of an authorized agent of 
the Department of Children and Families (DCF).4  The child may also be 
placed in shelter care under certain circumstances.5  When placement in a 
shelter occurs, the parent must be notified, and a shelter care hearing shall 
take place, generally speaking, within twenty-four hours after the placement.6
At that shelter hearing, the court will determine if there is probable cause to 
keep the child in shelter status pending further investigation of the case.7
Because parents are statutorily entitled to counsel at all stages of dependency 
proceedings in Florida, they must be advised of their right to counsel at the 
shelter hearing.8  Unfortunately, the intermediate appellate courts periodi-
cally must reverse on the grounds that the trial court failed to advise the par-
ents of their right to counsel.  In A.G. v. Florida Department of Children & 
Families,9 that is exactly what happened.10  At the shelter hearing, the court 
did not ask the father if he had representation, and the court did not “clarify 
whether the father wished to waive his right to counsel.”11  Only at the con-
clusion of the hearing did the court appoint counsel for future hearings.12  On 
that basis the appellate court granted the father’s writ of certiorari.13  In G.W. 
v. Department of Children & Families,14 the Third District Court of Appeal 
was faced with the same issue.15  The appellate court granted a father certio-
rari from an order at a shelter hearing in Miami in which the father claimed 
he was denied his rights to counsel.16  In granting the writ of certiorari, the 
appellate court was blunt in its reversal.17  The following description is in-
structive: 
 In the midst of the staccato-paced hearing conducted by the 
trial court in this case, the court stated, inter alia, “and I’m appoint-
ing counsel for the father.”  Under the circumstance, the father 
missed the point.  As the hearing continued, both the father and his 
family members begged to speak to the court.  The father stated on 
 4. Id. §§ 39.01(21), .401(2). 
 5. Id. § 39.402(4). 
 6. Id. § 39.402(5), (8)(a)–(b). 
 7. Id. § 39.402(8)(d)1. 
 8. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.320(a)(1), 8.515(a)(1). 
 9. 65 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 10. See id. at 1183. 
 11. Id. at 1181. 
 12. Id. at 1182. 
 13. Id. at 1181. 
 14. 92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 15. See id. at 308. 
 16. Id.
 17. See id. at 310. 
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two occasions:  “Can I say something?,” “Can I say something, 
please?”  Then, as the trial court indicated she was prepared to 
close down the hearing, he asked, “Why can’t I say anything?,” to 
which the court finally acceded briefly.  On the last page of the 
shelter hearing transcript, the . . . court stated, “And you call your 
lawyer, [G.W.], okay?,” to which G.W. responded, “Hold on, I 
didn’t know I had one.”  An unidentified speaker said, “They’re 
going to give [one] to you.”  After scheduling dates for further 
proceedings, the hearing then concluded.18
After referencing the due process right to counsel at a shelter hearing de-
scribing the statute as “replete with language requiring counsel at this critical 
stage of the dependency process,” the appellate court in A.G. closed with the 
following statement:  The trial court’s failure to provide the father the oppor-
tunity to have counsel present at the shelter hearing “constituted a clear de-
parture from the essential requirements of the law amounting to a miscar-
riage of justice.”19
In K.G. v. Florida Department of Children and Families,20 decided on 
the same day as A.G.,21 the First District Court of Appeal granted a petition 
for certiorari sought by the mother because, at a shelter hearing, the court 
would not allow the mother’s attorney to speak and directed that the child be 
placed with the maternal grandmother without allowing the mother to present 
any evidence or otherwise be heard.22  Florida law explicitly requires the trial 
court to provide an appearing party an opportunity to be heard and present 
evidence at all of the hearings.23  The appellate court held that the failure to 
allow the mother to present evidence violated her due process right to be 
heard and was “a clear departure from the essential requirements of the law 
amounting to a miscarriage of justice.”24
S.M. v. R.M.25 is yet another case in which the court failed to allow evi-
dence at a shelter hearing.26  In S.M., the appellate court treated the appeal as 
 18. Id. at 309 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 19. A.G. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 65 So. 3d 1180, 1182–83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 20. 66 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 21. A.G., 65 So. 3d at 1180; K.G., 66 So. 3d at 366. 
 22. K.G., 66 So. 3d at 367. 
 23. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(8)(c)(3) (2012); see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.305(b)(4); Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. v. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. (In re Interest of J.T.), 947 So. 2d 1212, 
1215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); L.M.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 935 So. 2d 47, 47 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); F.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 758 So. 2d 1262, 1264 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 24. K.G., 66 So. 3d at 368–69. 
 25. 82 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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a writ of certiorari and reversed.27  Contained in the opinion is the following 
statement from the transcript: 
Mother’s Attorney:  I object to the entire lack of due process in 
this case, to the procedure that has been followed, the questioning, 
and my failure to be allowed to put on any witnesses, the sudden 
urgency of the hearing . . . . The guardian ad litem’s report being 
admitted without any cross-examination and my [not being al-
lowed] to put on one witness.28
In granting the writ, the appellate court described the cases as being “indis-
tinguishable” from K.G.29
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes provides that a petition may be filed 
for dependency “by an attorney for the [DCF] or any other person who [is] 
knowledge[able] of the facts . . . or is informed of them and believes that 
they are true.”30  In Florida Department of Children & Families v. Y.C.,31 a 
mother filed a dependency proceeding naming herself as the respondent.32
Described as a private dependency petition,33 the mother “alleged that . . . her 
children were at risk of harm based on [the father’s] various acts of vio-
lence.”34  DCF had previously determined that intervention was not war-
ranted.35  The mother was upset with this finding and commenced the pro-
ceeding herself.36  The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) Program “moved to have 
the trial court order the [DCF] to file a case plan and provide services.”37
Then “DCF filed a limited appearance to object to [the] motion.”38  The trial 
court, without holding a trial or admitting any evidence, “entered an order of 
dependency.”39  As the appellate court explained, “[t]he sole basis then or 
ever asserted for the order was the fact that Y.C. had defaulted and thus ‘ad-
 26. Id. at 164. 
 27. Id.
 28. Id. at 166 (alterations in original). 
 29. Id. at 170. 
 30. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1) (2012). 
 31. 82 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 32. Id. at 1140. 
 33. Id.; Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 183 (2011) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
 34. Y.C., 82 So. 3d at 1140. 
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at 1140–41. 
 38. Id. at 1141. 
 39. Y.C., 82 So. 3d at 1141. 
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mitted’ her own allegations of dependency.”40  DCF sought a writ which the 
appellate court granted.41  In so doing, the appellate court explained that there 
was no “case or controversy and . . . therefore, [no] basis for court action.”42
The court explained that one cannot file a lawsuit, admit the allegations, and 
thus control authority of the court to act.43  Finally, the appellate court added 
the following:  “We are bound to say that neither the trial court nor the GAL 
should have allowed itself to become involved in the combination charade-
theatre of the absurd, which played itself out below.”44
Chapter 39 contains a number of grounds for findings of dependency.45
One of them is that while there is no present abuse, neglect, or abandonment, 
one of the three can be made out upon the basis that the parent’s behavior 
constitutes a present threat to the child which, although “prospective” in na-
ture, is imminent.46  The issue in S.S. v. Department of Children & Families47
was whether allegations of chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol, 
acts of violence, neglect of the children’s dental health, and psychological 
instability were proven to be prospective and imminent.48  The appellate 
court reversed, finding that while the mother drank a lot it was not sufficient 
to constitute “extensive, abus[e], and chronic use” and that a single item of 
evidence of alleged illegal substance abuse was the result of inadmissible 
hearsay evidence.49  The child protective investigator “neither administered 
[a urine screen, nor] performed the chemical analysis, [n]or interpreted the 
results,” and so could not testify “to lay the necessary predicate to introduce 
the lab report containing the drug test results.”50  There was no evidence that 
the children witnessed or that they were affected by incidents of domestic 
 40. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 41. See id. at 1141 & n.6. 
 42. Id. at 1141 & n.7. 
 43. Id. at 1141–42. 
 44. Y.C., 82 So. 3d at 1145 n.17. 
 45. See FLA. STAT. § 39.401 (2012). 
 46. S.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 81 So. 3d 618, 621 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (quoting J.B.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 870 So. 2d 946, 951 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1)(b)(1); Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra
note 33, at 182. 
 47. 81 So. 3d 618 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 48. Id. at 621–23. 
 49. Id. at 621–22 (citing J.B.M., 870 So. 2d at 949). 
 50. Id. (citing J.B.M., 870 So. 2d at 949). 
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violence.51  Finally, there was no nexus between the mother’s psychiatric 
disorder and the children’s health.52
A question upon which the intermediate appellate courts are split is 
whether a finding that a child who was “at substantial risk of imminent 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect”53 may be made where there was a prior ad-
judication of dependency against the other parent.54  The issue before the 
Third District Court of Appeal in D.A. v. Department of Children and Family 
Services,55 was whether it should follow the opinion of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in P.S. v. Department of Children and Families,56 which 
held that, as a matter of statutory construction, after a finding of neglect as to 
one parent, the only finding of dependency in the supplemental order against 
the second parent is that there be “actual” abuse, abandonment, or neglect.57
The Third District Court of Appeal rejected this approach in a split opinion, 
finding that the word “actual” is not in the statute, that the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal hindered the purpose behind the statutory prohibition 
against more than one dependency adjudication, and that two different stan-
dards have no apparent rationale.58
An interesting sidelight in D.A. is the fact that the DCF confessed error 
based upon the P.S. case, whereas the GAL Program took the position “that 
the trial court’s supplemental adjudication [in the] dependency [was] cor-
rect.”59  Of interest here is the fact the GAL Program undertook the role of 
petitioner to prove the allegation of prospective neglect.60  This action, taking 
on the role usually played by DCF—seeking to prove the allegation of ne-
glect—is permissible under Florida law although the usual role of the GAL 
in a dependency case around the country is solely to represent the best inter-
est of the child oftentimes as a non-party expert.61
 51. Id. at 623. 
 52. S.S., 81 So. 3d at 623 (quoting B.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 797 So. 2d 
1261, 1264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)) (citing I.T. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Servs., 532 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)). 
 53. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f) (2012). 
 54. Compare D.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 84 So. 3d 1136, 1138–39 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012), with P.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 4 So. 3d 719, 720–21 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 55. 84 So. 3d 1136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 56. 4 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 57. D.A., 84 So. 3d at 1139 (citing P.S., 4 So. 3d at 720–21); P.S., 4 So. 3d at 720–21. 
 58. D.A., 84 So. 3d at 1140, 1141; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f). 
 59. D.A., 84 So. 3d at 1138. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Michael J. Dale, Reporting the Child Crisis § 406 [1] pp 4 - 67 – 70 (LexisNexis 
2012), FLA. STAT. §§ 39.501(2), .807(2)(a)–(b); see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.215.  In addition, 
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Another case involving the issue of prospective neglect is S.T. v. De-
partment of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of K.C. & D.C.).62  In 
that case, DCF alleged that there was “prospective abuse [and] neglect by the 
father and prospective neglect by the mother.”63  The allegations were that 
the father’s use of alcohol was “chronic, extensive, and abusive [and] . . . 
would likely continue” and thus cause the children to be at “substantial risk 
of imminent abuse and neglect from the father . . . [and] that the mother was 
aware of the father’s use . . . but denied that he had a problem and allowed 
the father to transport the children home from school, despite his alcohol 
problem.”64  In a heavily documented analysis of the allegations, the appel-
late court demonstrated why it is necessary that the petitioner should present 
any admissible evidence that may form the basis of the court’s finding.65
DCF presented “[n]o representative of the [agency] who had contact with the 
family, . . . nor . . . either child, nor . . . any expert witness such as a psy-
chologist or counselor.”66  The individuals who testified were the parents, the 
elementary school principal, the assistant kindergarten teacher, and the sur-
rogate grandmother.67  The trial court discounted the parents’ testimony 
based upon credibility.68  However, the Second District Court of Appeal stat-
ed, “it is difficult to discern the evidence the circuit court relied upon to sup-
port its determination of dependency as to the mother.”69  As to the father, 
the independent witnesses did not provide evidence of the father’s alcohol 
use or that his use demonstrably affected the children as required by Florida 
law.70  Further, there was no “competent evidence that the mother knew that 
the father was endangering the children by his conduct.”71  Thus the Second 
District Court of Appeal reversed.72
In a dependency proceeding, after an adjudication and disposition in-
volving the development of the case plan, when the parent complies with the 
case plan, the parent may file a motion for a reunification.73  In C.M. v. De-
both DCF and the GAL Program are agencies of the executive branch.  See FLA. STAT. §§ 
20.19(2)(a), 39.8296(2)(a).
 62. 87 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 63. Id.
 64. Id. at 828–29. 
 65. See id. at 833. 
 66. Id. at 829. 
 67. In re Interest of K.C. & D.C., 87 So. 3d at 834. 
 68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. Id. at 834–35. 
 71. Id. at 835. 
 72. In re Interest of K.C. & D.C., 87 So. 3d at 836. 
 73. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2012). 
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partment of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of G.M.),74 the mother 
appealed from two final orders of the trial court.75  The court “denied her 
motion for reunification and terminated protective supervision with her child 
[who was] in the custody of [a] nonoffending father.”76  The child had been 
adjudicated dependent two years later and was reunified with his father in 
Georgia, where the child resided since that time.77  Under Florida law, there 
are a set of standards that the court must apply on a motion by a parent for 
reunification or increased contact with a child.78  In the case at bar, the trial 
court failed to include any of the findings required under either statute, and 
the Second District Court of Appeal was forced to reverse.79
A second reunification case involved the obligation of the court not to 
select a better permanency option, but rather to determine that the parent has 
complied with the case plan and to allow reunification, unless the reunifica-
tion would endanger the child.80  This was the issue in S.V.-R. v. Department 
of Children & Family Services.81  A mother of two children appealed from an 
order denying her motion for reunification with the child following substan-
tial compliance with the tasks in the case plan.82  The Third District Court of 
Appeal held, in reversing the trial court, that neither DCF nor the GAL 
proved endangerment of the safety, well-being, or health of the child.83  It 
also held that the permanency determination granting custody to the father 
instead of the mother incorrectly applied the best interest factor.84  The diffi-
cult issue described by the Third District Court of Appeal was how the law 
applies when a non-offending parent seeks to become the permanent custo-
dial parent when a dependency proceeding ends with the offending parent 
seeking reunification.85  The appellate court noted that the trial court charge 
was not to select the better dependency option, and that neither DCF nor the 
GAL program demonstrated that the health and well-being of the children 
 74. 73 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 75. Id. at 321. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id.
 78. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.522(2), .621(10). 
 79. In re Interest of G.M., 73 So. 3d at 323. 
 80. S.V.-R v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 77 So. 3d 687, 689–90 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 81. 77 So. 3d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 82. Id.
 83. Id. at 689. 
 84. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2012)). 
 85. Id. at 690. 
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will be endangered by the reunification.86  Thus the appellate court re-
versed.87
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide for discovery which in 
most respects follows the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.88  The issue in 
Colaizzo v. Office of Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional Counsel,89 was 
whether the Office of Regional Counsel or DCF should pay the fee to an 
expert witness in a deposition taken in a TPR case.90  “The doctor sent a bill 
for the deposition to” the Office of Regional Counsel.91  He had not been 
paid by an organization known as the “Child Protection Team, an independ-
ent, non-profit organization [that] investigat[ed] allegations of child abuse,” 
which was funded by the State, and operated under the Florida Department 
of Health for whom he worked.92  The Fourth District Court of Appeal held 
that under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the party seeking to take an 
expert deposition is responsible for the fee.93  Thus, the appellate court re-
versed and remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure that provides “‘[u]nless manifest injustice would result, the 
court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reason-
able fee for time spent in responding to discovery.’”94
The issue of the court’s ability in a dependency proceeding to order par-
ties to submit to a psychological evaluation was before the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in J.B. v. M.M.95  In a private dependency proceeding 
brought by the child’s paternal grandparent, the appellant brought a writ of 
certiorari to the Fourth District Court of Appeal in order to challenge the trial 
court’s order that she submit to a psychological evaluation.96  Under Florida 
law, in order to require such an examination, there must be a finding that the 
mental health of the parent is in controversy and good cause must be 
shown.97  While the mother suffered from a schizoaffective disorder, there 
was no finding of good cause because the only evidence of “the mother’s 
alleged inability to parent her daughter [was] over eight years old.”98  Thus, 
 86. S.V.-R., 77 So. 3d at 690. 
 87. Id. at 690–91. 
 88. Compare FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.245, with FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280. 
 89. 82 So. 3d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 90. Id. at 195. 
 91. Id. at 196. 
 92. Id.
 93. Id. at 197–98; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(b)(5)(A), (C), 1.390(c). 
 94. Colaizzo, 82 So. 3d at 197–98 (quoting FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(b)(5)(C)). 
 95. 92 So. 3d 888, 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
 96. Id.
 97. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(15) (2012). 
 98. J.B., 92 So. 3d at 890. 
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the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the writ.99  Oddly, the GAL at-
torney assigned to the case took no position on the issue.100
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Among the grounds for TPR in Chapter 39 is when a parent is involved 
in conduct that “threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or 
emotional health of the child.”101  In addition, it must be shown that termina-
tion is in the manifest best interests of the child.102  Applying this law to the 
facts in Caso v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,103 the Third 
District Court of Appeal found that the parent’s mental health problems 
made the parent unable to understand or appreciate the needs of the child.104
Experiencing delusions which made the parent unable to appreciate the real-
ity of the situation apparent to a child are grounds for a finding of TPR.105
Issues involving proper application of the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
1991 seminal opinion in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative 
Services106 come up regularly in the intermediate appellate courts.107  In 
Padgett, the court had determined that if the termination was based solely on 
abuse of the sibling, the welfare department must also prove before the court 
that there was a substantial risk of significant harm to the child from the 
abuse of the sibling.108  The issue in Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices v. K.D. & Z.H. (In re Interest of Z.C.(1) & Z.C.(2)),109 was whether 
applying the so-called “nexus test” for a prospective conflicted relationship 
between the past abuse of the child and prospective abuse of another child 
involves a totality of circumstance analysis.110  The court then applied the 
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c). 
 102. In re Interest of Baby Boy A., 544 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); 
see Caso v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 569 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990); In re Interest of J.A., 561 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per cu-
riam); In re Interest of M.J., 543 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 103. 569 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 104. See id. at 470. 
 105. D.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 87 So. 3d 1279, 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 106. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
 107. See Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 33, at 182. 
 108. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. 
 109. 88 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc). 
 110. Id. at 982–86. 
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totality of circumstances test developed in the series of cases following 
Padgett111 and found that the nexus existed.112
Florida law provides that in dependency cases, a case plan is generally 
required.113  One of the grounds for TPR in Florida is the situation where the 
child is adjudicated dependent, the parent has been offered a case plan, and 
that the welfare department alleges that the “child continues to be abused, 
neglected, or abandoned.”114  This ground is evaluated in terms of whether 
the parent has substantially complied with the case plan.115  The question of 
whether the parent substantially complied with the case plan was before the 
Second District Court of Appeal in N.F. v. Department of Children & Family 
Services (In re Interest of N.F.).116  Whether there has been substantial com-
pliance is an evidentiary question.117  In reversing and remanding the finding 
of TPR, the appellate court in In re Interest of N.F. said:  “In short, [DCF’s] 
position amounted to nothing more than parroted statutory phrases and bald 
incantations of buzzwords.  Such conclusory assertions, devoid of factual 
support, were not competent [to stand as] substantial evidence—let alone 
clear and convincing evidence—of anything.”118
A second case dealing with TPR based upon an assertion that the parent 
failed to substantially comply with the case plan is E.R.-J. v. Department of 
Children & Family Services (In re Interest of N.R.-G.).119  In that case, the 
Second District Court of Appeal also reversed.120  The sole ground for termi-
nation was that “the [f]ather . . . [failed] to substantially comply with [the] 
case plan.”121  The appellate court noted that “failure to comply with [the] 
 111. Id. at 983–86 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 608, 
611 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); R.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re Interest of M.F. 
& M.F.), 770 So. 2d 1189, 1194 & n.13 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); T.L. v. Dep’t of Children & 
Family Servs. (In re Interest of D.L.H.), 990 So. 2d 1267, 1272–73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2008); K.A. v. Dept. of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of K.A. & K.A.), 880 So. 2d 
705, 709–10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 2004); A.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re
Interest of G.D. & C.D.), 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); C.M. v. Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of C.M., C.M., & Z.M.), 844 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)); see also Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. 
 112. In re Interest of Z.C.(1) & Z.C.(2), 88 So. 3d at 986. 
 113. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2012). 
 114. Id. § 39.806(1)(e)1. 
 115. Id.
 116. 82 So. 3d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 117. See id.
 118. Id. at 1195–96 (citing C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 974 So. 2d 495, 502 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Norris v. Norris, 926 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
 119. 86 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 120. Id. at 582. 
 121. Id. at 579; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2012). 
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case plan is not sufficient, in and of itself, to support [TPR].”122  The appel-
late court held that there was no evidence that the child’s welfare and safety 
was in danger by any of the father’s alleged abuses of the case plan such as 
lack of financial resources, completing the parenting plan, or moving to Ok-
lahoma.123  Finally, the court noted that the failure to comply with the case 
plan was “attribut[ed] to the [f]ather’s lack of financial resources” as well as 
DCF’s “failure to provide services.”124  Thus the appellate court reversed.125
Just because the parent fails to complete a case plan does not mean that 
his or her parental rights should be terminated.126  In A.H. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Children & Family Services,127 the First District Court of Appeal 
agreed with the DCF’s concession that the evidence did not establish that the 
parent’s continuing involvement in his children’s lives threatened their safety 
or well-being because the DCF did not prove that the appellant failed to sub-
stantially comply with the case plan within the meaning of the Florida Stat-
utes.128  The Florida Statutes also require evidence that “the well-being and 
safety of the children would in any way be endangered if they were [with 
the] appellant.”129
The parents appealed from an order terminating their parental rights 
based upon their failure to comply with the case plan in D.M. v. Department 
of Children & Families.130  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed as to 
the father but reversed as to the mother, finding that there was no “clear and 
convincing proof that [the mother’s] parental rights should be terminated.”131
Specifically, the evidence showed that the mother made consistent efforts to 
improve and was on track for additional progress.132  The first therapist’s 
testimony applied favorably to the mother, as did the testimony of the 
GAL.133  In fact, the undisputed testimony was that the mother would not 
 122. In re Interest of N.R.-G., 86 So. 3d at 580 (citing In re Interest of N.F., 82 So. 3d at 
1192; I.Z. v. B.H., 53 So. 3d 406, 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); R.F. v. Dep’t of Children 
& Family Servs. (In re Interest of S.F., P.F., & C.F.), 22 So. 3d 650, 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009)). 
 123. Id.
 124. Id.
 125. Id. at 582. 
 126. A.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 85 So. 3d 1213, 1217 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)2. 
 127. 85 So. 3d 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 128. Id. at 1218–19; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c). 
 129. A.H., 85 So. 3d at 1218; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c). 
 130. 79 So. 3d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 131. Id. at 137, 139. 
 132. Id. at 139. 
 133. Id.
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usually decline therapy.134  In an interesting piece of dictum, the court re-
jected a challenge by one of the lawyers to the participation of the GAL.135
That the GAL’s recommendation regarding termination was contrary to the 
child’s express wishes was not reversible error because, while a party, the 
child’s wishes are not the sole governing factor in a TPR proceeding.136
Thirty-three years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida held that parents 
were entitled to counsel in a TPR proceeding.137  In T.M.W. v. T.A.C.,138 the 
trial court failed to provide counsel to a father in a TPR proceeding.139  In 
this case, the mother, rather than the DCF, filed a petition to terminate the 
father’s parental rights.140  The petition alleged that, inter alia, the father’s 
rights should be terminated because he had been sentenced to life in prison 
for attempted first degree murder.141  “The trial court heard both [the father’s 
pro se] motion to dismiss and the petition to terminate parental rights at a 
single telephonic hearing” as the father was in prison.142  Although there was 
no transcript of the hearing provided to the appellate court, the father, pro se
before the appellate court, argued that “the trial court did not advise him that 
he had a right to counsel, and denied [him counsel] when he asked for repre-
sentation even though he [told] the trial court that he was indigent.”143  The 
appellate court held that there was no evidence that the court appointed 
counsel for the father, nor was there evidence that the judge made “written 
findings indicating that [the father] waived that right.”144  The appellate court 
noted that, even in the context of a private TPR proceeding, under the state 
statute there is the right to counsel as the law makes no distinction in the type 
of proceeding.145  Incredibly, “the trial court [also] held that [the father] did 
not have standing to contest the TPR because he was not listed on the puta-
tive father registry, was not on the child’s birth certificate, [and] had never 
been named as the father by any court,” nor had he ever paid child support.146
 134. Id. at 139–40. 
 135. D.M., 79 So. 3d at 140. 
 136. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.810 (2012)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.807(2)(b).  It ap-
pears that one of the children was not represented by counsel.  See D.M., 79 So. 3d at 137. 
 137. In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980). 
 138. 80 So. 3d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 139. Id. at 1105. 
 140. Id. at 1104. 
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 1104–05. 
 143. T.M.W., 80 So. 3d at 1105. 
 144. Id. at 1106. 
 145. Id. at 1105–06; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.807(1)(a) (2012). 
 146. T.M.W., 80 So. 3d at 1105. 
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The appellate court found that there was “a final judgment of paternity in the 
record . . . establish[ing] that [the individual was] the father of the child.”147
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A juvenile appealed from a conviction of trespass on school grounds.148
In B.C. v. State,149 the issue on appeal was whether there was any evidence 
that the school principal or his designee ordered the respondent to leave the 
school grounds.150  That requirement is part of the statute, and thus, the First 
District Court of Appeal reversed.151  The person who ordered the individual 
to leave was a deputy police officer who described himself as a “‘school 
board police officer’ assigned to [the] school.”152  The evidence demonstrated 
that the police officer “was not under the ‘command’ of the . . . principal and 
had no ‘connection’ with the principal’s office.”153  In reversing the decision, 
the court recognized conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion in D.J. v. State.154  To the extent that the opinion did not comport with 
the Third District opinion, the First District certified conflict.155
As previous surveys have indicated, among the various dispositional al-
ternatives available in Florida is an order of restitution.156  In D.W. v. State,157
the juvenile appealed the restitution order requiring her to pay $400 to her 
grandmother.158  The Second District Court of Appeal reversed based upon 
procedural irregularities.159  The juvenile court ordered the restitution matter 
to be heard by a magistrate.160  The appellate court reversed because first, it 
could “[find] no . . . authority that allowed the juvenile court to delegate its 
judicial determination of the amount of restitution to a magistrate,” and sec-
ond, the magistrate relied upon a rule of juvenile procedure related to de-
 147. Id.
 148. B.C. v. State, 70 So. 3d 666, 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see also FLA. STAT. § 
810.097(2). 
 149. 70 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 150. Id. at 669. 
 151. Id. at 671. 
 152. Id. at 668. 
 153. Id.
 154. B.C., 70 So. 3d at 669; see also D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App.), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010), and rev’d, 67 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. 2011). 
 155. B.C., 70 So. 3d at 669, 671. 
 156. See Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 1, at 150; Michael J. Dale, 2009 
Survey of Juvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009). 
 157. 77 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 158. Id. at 804. 
 159. Id.
 160. Id.
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pendency cases which would allow the child to file exception for the magis-
trate’s ruling.161  Based upon this strange behavior—the appellate court also 
noted “that the magistrate usually [handles] dependency hearings and has 
little experience with . . . restitution,”—the appellate court reversed.162
In a case involving a rather minor contretemps between a police officer 
and a juvenile, the juvenile appealed from adjudication on two grounds—
providing a false name and resisting an officer without violence.163  Under 
the facts of the case, the police officer saw a group of individuals standing 
near a “‘no loitering or soliciting’” sign.164  “There [is] no evidence that the 
officer in any way restrained [the] appellant’s . . . movement . . . or in any 
way indicated to [the] appellant and his friends that they were not free to 
leave.”165  Thus, when the appellant provided a false name to the officer, the 
two “were engaged in a consensual encounter.”166  If there was no lawful 
detention or arrest, the juvenile could not be guilty of the crime of providing 
a false name.167  Furthermore, evidence of the existence of the no trespassing 
sign was insufficient to establish that the property was posted in a way within 
the meaning of Florida law so that the officer would have probable cause to 
arrest the appellant for trespassing.168
At the dispositional stage of a delinquency case, the court is given the 
authority to deviate from the recommendations of the Department of Juvenile 
Justice (DJJ) when the DJJ issues a predisposition report (PDR).169  In M.H. 
v. State,170 the juvenile “pled guilty to possession with intent to sell, manu-
facture, or deliver a controlled substance.”171  The trial court deviated from 
the recommendations of probation and placed the juvenile in a moderate-risk 
facility.172  The test for deviation is contained in E.A.R. v. State.173  There, the 
Supreme Court of Florida set out a two-part test which makes deviation a 
 161. Id. at 805 (citing Mansell v. State, 498 So. 2d 604, 604 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 162. D.W., 77 So. 3d at 805. 
 163. D.T. v. State, 87 So. 3d 1235, 1237–38 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 164. Id. at 1237. 
 165. Id. at 1238. 
 166. Id. (citing State v. Page, 73 So. 3d 351, 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); O.A. v. 
State, 754 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 167. Id. (citing K.D. v. State, 43 So. 3d 829, 829 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per cu-
riam)). 
 168. D.T., 87 So. 3d at 1240 (citing Baker v. State, 813 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002)). 
 169. See FLA. STAT. § 985.433(7)(b) (2012); see also M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325, 326 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 170. 69 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 171. Id. at 326. 
 172. Id.
 173. 4 So. 3d 614, 638 (Fla. 2009). 
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difficult matter.174  The trial court must do more than place generalized rea-
sons on the record.175  Rather, it must engage in a well-reasoned and com-
plete analysis of the PDR of the court and the type of facility to which the 
court intends to send the child.176
A second case involving a deviation from a recommendation of the DJJ 
in a delinquency case is B.L.R. v. State.177  There the First District Court of 
Appeal reversed a court order committing a child to a maximum-risk facility 
rather than a high-risk facility as suggested by the DJJ.178  Applying E.A.R.,
the appellate court held that the trial court may not deviate just because it 
disagrees with the disposition recommended by the DJJ, and it may neither 
“‘parrot’ [n]or ‘regurgitate’ the information in the PDR to support [the] de-
parture” decision.179
V. CONCLUSION
In the survey year, the Florida appellate courts focused heavily on de-
pendency and TPR cases.180  The Supreme Court of Florida was inactive re-
garding these issues.181  And finally, in February of 2012, the Nova Law Re-
view sponsored a symposium on the implementation of the American Bar 
Association Model Act governing representation of children in abuse, ne-
glect, and dependency proceedings, co-sponsored by the American Bar As-
sociation.182 Nova Law Review published eight articles from authors around 
the country.183  Included are articles directed to the ABA Model Act184 and 
 174. See id.
 175. See id.
 176. See id.; see also C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678, 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(per curiam) (quoting E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 638). 
 177. 74 So. 3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 178. Id.
 179. Id. at 176 (quoting E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 633, 638); see also M.J.S. v. State, 6 So. 3d 
1268, 1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 638); N.B. 
v. State, 911 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing K.M. v. State, 891 So. 2d 
619, 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 180. See S.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 
3d 827, 828 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); D.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 84 So. 
3d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); S.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 81 So. 3d 
618, 620 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012); T.M.W. v. T.A.C., 80 So. 3d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012); D.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 79 So. 3d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 181. See Florida Supreme Court 2012 Opinions, FLA. SUPREME CT., 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2012/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 182. Athornia Steele, Introduction to the Symposium, 36 NOVA L. REV. 309, 309 n.* 
(2012). 
 183. See generally Symposium, supra note 2. 
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the role of counsel or lack of counsel for children in Connecticut,185 Flor-
ida,186 Georgia,187 New York,188 and Washington.189
 184. Steele, supra note 182, at 309–11; see generally Amy Harfeld, The Right to Counsel 
Landscape After Passage of The ABA Model Act—Implications for Reform, 36 NOVA L. REV.
325 (2012); Andrea Khoury, The True Voice of the Child:  The Model Act Governing the 
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, 36 NOVA L.
REV. 313 (2012). 
 185. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Carolyn Signorelli, Connecticut’s Road 
to “Real” Attorneys for Kids, 36 NOVA L. REV. 391 (2012). 
 186. Steele, supra note 182, at 310–11; see generally Clark Peters & John Walsh, Fiscal 
Returns on Improved Representation of Children in Dependency Court:  The State of the 
Evidence, 36 NOVA L. REV. 435 (2012); Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids 
Aren’t Alright:  Every Child Should Have an Attorney in Child Welfare Proceedings in Flor-
ida, 36 NOVA L. REV. 345 (2012). 
 187. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Ira Lustbader & Erik Pitchal, Implemen-
tation of the Right to Counsel for Children in Juvenile Court Dependency Proceedings:  Les-
sons from Kenny A., 36 NOVA L. REV. 407 (2012). 
 188. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Gary Solomon & Tamara Steckler, 
Perspective:  New Era in Representing Children, 36 NOVA L. REV. 387 (2012). 
 189. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Erin Shea McCann & Casey Trupin, 
Kenny A. Does Not Live Here:  Efforts in Washington State to Improve Legal Representation 
for Children in Foster Care, 36 Nova L. Rev. 363 (2012). 
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JOSEPH M. MORGESE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2010 school year began the same for Tyler Clementi as it had for 
college students the year before, and as it will for others in the future at Rut-
gers University—full of excitement and promise—but ended abruptly on 
September 22, 2010, when Tyler jumped off of the George Washington 
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Bridge and plunged into the Hudson River.1  Tyler, an accomplished violinist 
and talented individual,2 took his own life after “his roommate . . . secretly 
used a webcam to stream [Tyler]’s romantic [encounter] with another man 
over the [i]nternet.”3  Word of Tyler’s death reached Rutgers in an ironic 
fashion:  On the same day the University had begun a campaign to raise 
awareness of the “use and abuse of new technology.”4  The unfortunate cir-
cumstances leading up to Tyler’s suicide created more than a splash.5  Ty-
ler’s death has produced a wave of change evidenced in the New Jersey Leg-
islature’s recent amendments to anti-bullying legislation:  The “Anti-
Bullying Bill of Rights.”6
As methods of communication have advanced, our lives have become 
laced with technology, establishing new methods of transmitting and sharing 
information as well as creating byproducts; unforeseen side effects produced 
as a direct result of internet social networking.7  Cyberbullying is recognized 
as “‘willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell 
phones, and other electronic devices.’”8  Essentially, any form of harassment, 
intimidation, or bullying (HIB) that is executed by means of technology may 
constitute cyberbullying.9
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Cyberbullying presents a novel issue for schools and adults because ex-
posure is more difficult to detect, control, and monitor than traditional forms 
of bullying, like pushing a peer into lockers or one student taunting another.10
School districts also “walk a very fine line in prohibiting cyberbullying by 
conducting a balancing act between a student’s constitutional rights and the 
policing of off-campus student-on-student harassment.”11  Cyberbullying has 
gained increasing attention in society as a result of the spike in youth sui-
cides and violence resulting from the behavior.12  Enough lives have been 
lost to cyberbullying for anti-bullying activists to coin the term “bully-
cide”—“a suicide provoked by the depression and distress that results from 
bullying and harassment.”13  Several states around the nation have been 
forced to draft or reform anti-bullying legislation in order to keep pace with 
technology and combat the growing problem, while others have struggled 
with formulating an approach.14  New Jersey has enacted the “Anti-Bullying 
Bill of Rights”—the most stringent law of its kind—in order to treat this 
growing epidemic threatening students of all ages.15
This article will begin with an overview of cyberbullying divided into 
the methods, causes, evidentiary findings, and outcomes of victims who are 
bullied through the advancement and popularity of social networking sites.16
Next, legislative solutions that address the evasive characteristics of cyber-
bullying will be discussed in relation to formulating a thorough law.17  Then, 
the recently amended New Jersey “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights” will provide 
a model framework for the nation in addressing cyberbullying.18  This analy-
sis will include the valuable lessons learned through the Tyler Clementi and 
 10. What Is Cyberbullying, supra note 9.
 11. Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies:  Legislative and Judicial Responses to Cyber-
bullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 659–60 (2009). 
 12. Susan Hayes, Cyberbullying Is a Serious Problem, in CYBERBULLYING 11, 11 (Lauri 
S. Friedman ed., 2011). 
 13. Jason A. Wallace, Note, Bullycide in American Schools:  Forging a Comprehensive 
Legislative Solution, 86 IND. L.J. 735, 741 (2011); see also SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W.
PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR., CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY:
CYBERBULLYING AND SUICIDE 1 (2010) [hereinafter HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING 
RESEARCH SUMMARY], available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_ 
and_suicide_research_fact_sheet.pdf (referring to suicides attributed to cyberbullying as “cy-
berbullicide”). 
 14. See BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 15. Winnie Hu, Bullying Law Puts New Jersey Schools on Spot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2011, at A1; see HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND 
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 18. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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Dharun Ravi case in New Jersey,19 which have helped foster the improve-
ments in the law.20  A breakdown of key anti-bullying law components will 
follow the New Jersey statute for comparison.21  Additionally, perceived 
weaknesses in the New Jersey law will be examined.22  Furthermore, this 
article will address the gaps state legislators must bridge in existing laws to 
craft effective legislation that curtails cyberbullying.23
II. CYBERBULLYING: THE “CANCER” OF INTERNET SOCIAL NETWORKING
Words have always been referred to as weapons, but innovations in 
technology and the enhancement of communications have reengineered the 
amount of damage words can cause in the twenty-first century.24  Bullying 
has become the cancer of online social networking—exposing victims to 
harsher, more frequent, and even unprovoked attacks—evidenced in the in-
creasing number of suicides as a result of harmful behavior that occurs 
through modern forms of communication.25  Traditional bullying is catego-
rized by its direct and physical nature that occurs in a more controlled set-
ting, whereas cyberbullying is characterized by intimidation through a virtual 
setting without physical constructs.26  Further, cyberbullying can occur 
through phone calls, text messages, e-mails, or posts on social networking 
sites⎯limitless lines of communication that are at our fingertips.27
Cyberbullying can be executed in various ways, directly or indirectly, 
through harassment, cyberstalking, denigration, impersonation, or outing.28
Harassment involves “[r]epeatedly sending offensive and insulting mes-
 19. See Indictment at 1–4, State v. Ravi, No. 11-04-00596 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Mar. 16, 2012). 
 20. See BULLY POLICE USA, supra note 14. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 24. See Turbert, supra note 11, at 652. 
 25. See HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 1; 
Michel Walrave & Wannes Heirman, Towards Understanding the Potential Triggering Fea-
tures of Technology, in TRUTHS AND MYTHS OF CYBER-BULLYING: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITY AND CHILDREN’S SAFETY 27, 40 (Shaheen 
Shariff & Andrew H. Churchill eds., 2010) (inferring the “toxic effect” of cyberbullying on 
schools). 
 26. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 33–34; Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 
35–36. 
 27. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 33; see A. James Spung, Comment, From Back-
packs to Blackberries:  (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell Phone, 61 
EMORY L.J. 111, 119 (2011). 
 28. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 39. 
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sages” to an individual, becoming “[t]he online equivalent of direct bully-
ing.”29  Cyberstalking occurs when technology is used to harness control 
over an abusive relationship through use of a threat or fear.30  Denigration is 
a form of cyberbullying that involves “[s]ending or posting cruel gossip or 
rumors about a person [in order] to damage his or her reputation or friend-
ships.”31  Impersonation is a result of one person pretending to be another to 
“make the person look bad” or even damage his or her reputation.32  Finally, 
outing pertains to “[s]haring someone’s secrets or embarrassing informa-
tion,” which can be obtained through deception.33  These forms of online 
bullying can be achieved either directly by the bully or indirectly through 
another person who serves as a “‘proxy’”—an individual acting on the behalf 
of the bully.34  This advanced form of intimidation can be attributed to the 
increased sense of anonymity by bullies, the continuous access to the victim, 
a lesser likelihood of detection by adults, the larger audience, and lack of 
physical contact required to carryout the harassment.35  Although these 
methods and tools of cyberbullying are not exhaustive, they provide a greater 
understanding of what is required to lead to better detection, protection, and 
prevention through legislation.36
The prevalence of cyberbullying is very often underestimated by par-
ents and underreported by victims in research.37  While cyberbullying may 
not be continuous, victims are often left with lasting psychological effects 
such as “anger, fear, helplessness, and loss of concentration” for a prolonged 
period of time after the occurrence.38  Cyberbullying presents a “growing 
problem because increasing numbers of kids [and young adults] are using 
and have completely embraced interactions via computers and cell phones.”39
As technology continues to progress, so do the methods of destroying self-
esteem and disseminating harmful information about others—graying the 
 29. Id.
 30. Id.
 31. Id.
 32. Id.
 33. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 39. 
 34. Id. at 34. 
 35. See Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 34–35. 
 36. See id. at 33–34. 
 37. Id. at 28. 
 38. See Dianne L. Hoff & Sidney N. Mitchell, Gender and Cyber-bullying:  How Do We 
Know What We Know?, in TRUTHS AND MYTHS OF CYBER-BULLYING: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITY AND CHILDREN’S SAFETY 51, 60 (Shaheen 
Shariff & Andrew H. Churchill eds., 2010). 
 39. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE,
supra note 8, at 2. 
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line between direct and indirect methods of bullying—in several taps of the 
keyboard and just a few clicks of a mouse.40
A. Methods of Cyberbullying 
Cyberbullying has spread alongside the exploding popularity of social 
networking sites like MySpace and Facebook, but has also gained momen-
tum through cell phones and smart phones.41  This type of intimidation is 
easily distinguished from the more traditional forms of bullying because 
technology separates the bully from the victim and removes the “face-to-
face” confrontation that is normally associated with bullying.42  Harassment 
morphs into cyberbullying when technology, such as social networking, is 
used as the conduit for delivery of rumors, insults, or hurtful messages.43
This harassment can be accomplished directly—through text, email, or in-
stant messages—or indirectly where social networking sites are used to post 
or disseminate harmful messages about the victim.44  However, the line be-
tween direct and indirect cyberbullying has blurred as technology continues 
to shrink “the distance between worlds, which are separated by time and 
space in reality” making the resulting harm more serious.45
1. Direct Cyberbullying 
While direct bullying is often associated with actions like “hitting, kick-
ing, shoving, [and] spitting,” cyberbullying can still be performed directly 
without any of these actions.46  Bullies can utilize tactics such as “taunting, 
teasing, . . . [or] verbal harassment” to effectuate bullying.47  These methods 
are made possible by technology and often do not require a physical assault 
in order to trigger or result in more serious outcomes, such as suicide.48  Di-
 40. See id. at 1–2. 
 41. Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbully-
ing:  A Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and 
Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 641 (2011). 
 42. Id. at 650. 
 43. See Natasha Rose Manuel, Comment, Cyber-Bullying:  Its Recent Emergence and 
Needed Legislation to Protect Adolescent Victims, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 219, 221 (2011). 
 44. Cyberbullying, U.N.C. SCH. OF L., http://www.unc.edu/courses/2010spring/ 
law/357c/001/Cyberbully/criminal.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 45. See Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 36. 
 46. See Patti Agatston, Cyber Bullying:  Bullying in the Digital Age, NAT’L CENTER FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH PROMOTION & YOUTH VIOLENCE PREVENTION, http://www.promoteprevent. 
org/webfm_send/1152 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 47. Id.
 48. Wallace, supra note 13, at 741; Agatston, supra note 46. 
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rect bullying is no longer required in order to inflict physical pain on indi-
viduals because psychological harm leads victims to inflict pain upon them-
selves.49  Thus, while direct bullying appears to pose a viable threat, the in-
herent indirect nature of cyberbullying creates a more serious danger as a 
result of the relationship with the bully; “psychologists believe that a victim 
of cyberbullying may experience ‘low self-esteem, depression, chronic ill-
ness . . . school problems, familial problems, and suicidal ideation.’”50
2. Indirect Cyberbullying 
Cyberbullying can also be performed through indirect means, often re-
ferred to as bullying by “proxy.”51  Indirect forms of cyberbullying include 
using another’s social networking account to generate harassing posts, mes-
sages, or spreading rumors about the victim.52  Bullies can manipulate, im-
personate, or “send inflammatory messages to online discussion groups or 
social networks under the guise of the victim.”53  Although direct actions in 
traditional bullying can be distinguished based on the actor and behavior, 
cyberbullying blurs the line between direct and indirect bullying.54  For ex-
ample, cell phones and accounts that belong to individuals are easily hi-
jacked and accessed without the owner’s knowledge or consent.55  This 
makes the bullying less direct and more indirect because the perceived actor 
is operating as a “proxy” for the bully by generating the harassing messages 
at the victim’s expense.56  Therefore, the distinction between direct and indi-
rect bullying has decreased as the function and use of technology continues 
to increase mobility and accessibility.57
B. Causes of Cyberbullying 
The purpose of cyberbullying “is similar to that of traditional bullying 
in that the aggressor seeks power and control.”58  There are often “three pri-
mary motivations for conventional bullying [including] the need to demon-
strate dominance, to receive a reward (e.g. admiration by peers) and finally, 
 49. Wallace, supra note 13, at 741. 
 50. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1112; Turbert, supra note 11, at 655. 
 51. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 34. 
 52. See id. at 40; Agatston, supra note 46. 
 53. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1114. 
 54. See id. at 1113–14. 
 55. See id. at 1114–15; Spung, supra note 27, at 119. 
 56. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 34.
 57. See Lipton, supra note 7, at 1113–14. 
 58. Turbert, supra note 11, at 653. 
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the satisfaction of causing suffering and injury [to] a victim.”59  The lack of 
social cues, such as observing the victim’s reaction, may leave some bullies 
“unconvinced that they are actually harming or hurting someone badly.”60
Coincidentally, the lack of social cues with the victim can leave the bully 
“genuinely convinced that they are not doing anything wrong.”61  Addition-
ally, the physical and social disconnect between the bully and the victim can 
be attributed to participation in cyberbullying by well-rounded students; in-
dividuals that would not typically participate in traditional forms of bully-
ing.62
Many cyberbullies perform or continue their actions because “some 
adults have been slow to respond to cyberbullying” and, therefore, a belief 
exists that “there are little to no consequences for their actions” as a result.63
Technology has innovated traditional bullying and left statutes powerless or 
ineffective because of the differentiating characteristics that separate cyber 
from ordinary forms of bullying.64  “Until recently, these [i]nternet-based 
forms of communication [like social networking sites] and file sharing were 
accessible exclusively through personal computers.”65  Currently, smart-
phones incorporate wireless access to the internet, simplifying one’s ability 
to enter social networking sites virtually anywhere; therefore, taking even 
less effort than before to reach an audience.66  The accessibility associated 
with cyberbullying has become a factor in promulgating its expansion and 
discouraging victims from reporting its occurrence.67  Some of the main at-
tractions of cyberbullying—higher anonymity, increased access, lower detec-
tion, a greater audience, and lack of physical contact—also act as catalysts in 
avoiding legislation attempting to address this harmful activity.68
1. Increased Anonymity 
Online anonymity creates such a perception that “may lead pupils to 
think that they can get away with cyberbullying without being sanctioned.”69
 59. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 41. 
 60. Id.
 61. Id.
 62. See TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 35, 43; Lipton, supra note 7, at 1114. 
 63. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND 
RESPONSE, supra note 8, at 2. 
 64. See Goodno, supra note 41, at 650–53. 
 65. Spung, supra note 27, at 117. 
 66. See id. at 117–18. 
 67. See TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 41–42. 
 68. See Goodno, supra note 41, at 650–53. 
 69. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 34. 
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While anonymity can be viewed as a benefit in some respects, this feature of 
cyberbullying “strip[s] away non-verbal communication cues by the victim,” 
and does not allow for the bully to witness the victim’s reaction.70  Although 
anonymity may create a perception of a less personal threat, or even a cow-
ardly attempt to bully another, ignoring the behavior usually results in more 
inflammatory comments.71  As a result, anonymity often leads bullies to 
“post messages or create websites . . . to be more hurtful because they can 
launch their invective with little fear of reprisal.”72  The anonymous nature of 
cyberbullying causes the bully to act more aggressively73 and the victim to 
suffer greater humiliation because of the unknown, larger audience and re-
sulting embarrassment.74  When anonymity is partnered with continuous ac-
cess, lower detection rates, a larger audience for cyberbullies to reach, and no 
required physical contact, the totality of circumstances can create a more 
devastating scenario for the victim.75  These characteristics of cyberbullying 
can be directly linked to extreme actions of victims, like suicide.76  “The an-
onymity provided by the [i]nternet may increase the volume of abusive con-
duct because it may encourage individuals who would not engage in such 
conduct offline to do so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the 
[i]nternet . . . .”77  Subsequently, “anonymity naturally makes it more diffi-
cult for victims and law enforcement officers to identify and locate cyber-
wrongdoers.”78
2. Continuous Access 
Historically, bullying was something that occurred before, after, or dur-
ing school, providing victims with an eventual escape.79  Even though tradi-
tional bullying can occur anywhere, access to the victim is often limited.80
Cyberbullying “victims often do not know who the bully is, or why they are 
 70. Id. at 33, 39. 
 71. See id. at 41; Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyberbullies:  Remedies for Vic-
tims on the Internet Playground, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1641, 1643–44 (2009). 
 72. Auerbach, supra note 71, at 1643–44. 
 73. Id. at 1643–44, 1644 n.17. 
 74. See Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 38–39. 
 75. See id. at 34–39. 
 76. Hayes, supra note 12, at 12. 
 77. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1114. 
 78. Id.
 79. See Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 35–36. 
 80. See id.
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being targeted.”81  Traditional bullying allows a victim to know his or her 
attacker and possibly retreat to safety.82  Having “24/7 accessibility to the 
victim is a new issue,” as a result of social networking and increased avail-
ability of internet access.83  While “[t]raditional types of bullying occur 
mostly at school, on the school bus, or walking to and from school,” cyber-
harassment is novel because—unlike traditional notions of intimidation—
limits of “time and space” do not exist.84  For example, “if a victim moves 
offline, this does not stop others from posting harmful things about her that 
may continue to harm her personal and professional development.”85  Im-
provements in technology allow “minors to extend bullying episodes beyond 
the confines” of the classroom.86  This scenario provides the bully an oppor-
tunity to continue his or her attack on the victim, even though school is not in 
session or there is no longer any physical contact between the bully and the 
victim.87  Bullies’ access to their victims has been furthered by advancements 
and the increasing popularity of social networking sites where “the home 
environment” is no longer considered “a safe retreat.”88  Therefore, “[o]nline 
communications . . . have a permanent quality that real world conduct lacks,” 
intensifying the negative effects resulting from the bulling.89
3. Lower Detection 
Cyberbullying is very difficult to observe because it often occurs “be-
yond the boundaries of school supervision,” therefore, victimized students 
fail to report the incident to parents or teachers.90  While “many forms of 
traditional bullying share an increased likelihood of remaining unnoticed for 
teachers and school administrators,” the lower detection rate of cyberbully-
ing—alongside anonymity and access to the victim—also makes it less likely 
to be reported as a result of its inconspicuous nature.91  In addition, “[o]ne 
striking variation [from traditional bullying] is that cyberbullies often have 
 81. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE,
supra note 8, at 2. 
 82. See id.
 83. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 36. 
 84. Id.
 85. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1113. 
 86. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 35. 
 87. See id. at 35–36. 
88. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND 
RESPONSE, supra note 8, at 1; Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 36.
 89. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1112. 
 90. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 37. 
 91. See id. at 34–38. 
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good relationships with their teachers, thus making their detection even hard-
er.”92  Although several scenarios involving traditional bullying can remain 
undetected by adults, adolescents remain more inclined to “engage in covert 
types of bullying [like cyberbullying], because they believe that adults and 
bystanders are unlikely to intervene.”93
Most cyberbullying occurs in group-chats, through social networking 
websites, and via text messages, making detection more challenging.94  It has 
even begun spreading to “portable gaming devices, in 3-D virtual worlds and 
social gaming sites, [including] newer interactive sites such as Formspring 
and ChatRoulette.”95  The use of cell phones and computers removes physi-
cal restrictions, allowing adolescents to take “pictures in a bedroom, a bath-
room, or another location where privacy is expected,” and share the images 
with another who subsequently posts or distributes the photo online where 
privacy is nonexistent.96  A clear example of this behavior is exemplified in 
more recent events, like the Tyler Clementi and Dharun Ravi case, where 
video footage was captured and streamed over the internet for others to “see, 
rate, tag, and discuss.”97
4. Greater Audience, Less Physical Contact 
In addition to higher anonymity, increased access, and lower detection 
rates, cyberbullying targets—and often reaches—a larger audience than tra-
ditional forms of bullying.98  While bullying can subject the victim to several 
or many members of an audience, cyberbullying amplifies “hurtful texts and 
images” by exposing the individual to a virtually “unlimited audience in a 
very short period of time.”99  This feature of cyberbullying is compounded by 
attributing a more “permanent quality [to the actions] that real world conduct 
lacks,” because the posts or messages often remain accessible to the audience 
for a prolonged or indefinite period of time.100  The “‘viral’ nature” of infor-
mation through social networks “can greatly expand the extent of victimiza-
 92. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 43. 
 93. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 37–38. 
 94. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE,
supra note 8, at 1. 
 95. Id.; see Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 36. 
 96. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE,
supra note 8, at 1; Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 36. 
97. Indictment, supra note 19, at 1; HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING:
IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE, supra note 8, at 1; Foderaro, supra note 1. 
 98. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 37–38. 
 99. Id. at 38. 
 100. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1112. 
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tion” when the bully is aware “that the embarrassing or harmful content is 
being viewed and shared—perhaps repeatedly—by so many people.”101  The 
rampant nature of bully-shared information online creates the appearance of 
audience approval, which parallels to the gratification a traditional bully re-
ceives from a chanting crowd.102
Also, cyberbullying requires no physical contact in order to carry out an 
attack on a victim.103  This magnifies the likelihood that more individuals 
will participate in the bullying since the need for “physical confrontation” 
has been removed by technology.104  “[I]n cyberbullying, the perpetrator is 
less likely to see any suffering from the victim, which might reduce the grati-
fication for [those] who enjoy watching pain and suffering” and leave the 
bully unfulfilled or unaffected by his or her actions.105  The lack of physical 
contact does not allow the victim to merely step away, or remove him or 
herself from the bullying; “in today’s interconnected world that is not a vi-
able option, as people who are forced offline forgo important personal and 
professional opportunities.”106  “Since emotional feedback is missing, cyber-
bullies may assess quite wrongly the damage they are causing,” and exercise 
less restraint in what is said or written.107  Finally, “it is often easier to be 
cruel using technology because cyberbullying can be done from a physically 
distant location, and the bully doesn’t have to see the immediate response by 
the target.”108  Furthermore, statistics reporting cyberbullying frequently fail 
to capture the actual impact this behavior will have on victims because the 
defining characteristics of cyberbullying—anonymity, access, detection, au-
dience, and lack of physical contact—make it inherently difficult to accu-
rately project.109
C. Statistical Evidence 
The high occurrence of cyberbullying can be attributed to a combination 
of the frequency minors use the internet and the increasing popularity of so-
 101. SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR.,
ELECTRONIC DATING VIOLENCE: A BRIEF GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS AND PARENTS 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/electronic_dating_violence_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 102. See Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 38–39. 
 103. Goodno, supra note 41, at 652. 
 104. Id.
 105. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 41. 
 106. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1113. 
 107. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 39–40. 
 108. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND 
RESPONSE, supra note 8, at 2. 
 109. See id. at 1–2. 
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cial networking sites.110  The number of youths who have experienced cyber-
bullying—“ranging from 10-40% or more”—is dependent on the age of the 
group being studied alongside the definition used to describe cyberbully-
ing.111  In 2010, a study based on a random sample of 4400 eleven to eight-
een-year-olds revealed that 20% of the participants had become a victim of 
cyberbullying at some point.112  Approximately “35% of kids have been 
threatened online,” and “[n]early one in five has experienced it more than 
once.”113  Accordingly, about “53% of kids admit having said something 
mean or hurtful to another person online,” where “[m]ore than one in three 
have done it more than once.”114  Perhaps the most disturbing statistic indi-
cates that “75% of those who are bullied or harassed will go on to bully or 
harass others.”115  Therefore, victimization is not an indication that bullied 
individuals will learn from their experiences and not recreate the harm that 
they have endured.116
Revenge and embarrassment are a common concern for victims who re-
port cyberbullying.117  In actuality, “adult intervention is problematic in cy-
berbullying [because] a considerable proportion of victimized students 
choose not to tell anything about the harassment.”118  An English study re-
vealed that 43.7% of victims “did not report the [cyberbullying] to parents or 
teachers.”119  Additional studies have revealed similar results, where victims 
“preferred not to tell an adult because they feared that their internet and mo-
bile phone access would be suspended in case parents and teachers found 
things out.”120  “Furthermore, many teens report that they would rather try to 
handle cyberbullying by themselves, by signing off the internet, deactivating 
their accounts on a site, or by ignoring or blocking any persistent or hurtful 
messages, rather than tell anyone about the cyberbullying.”121  Thus, cyber-
 110. Matthew C. Ruedy, Comment, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide:  Should 
Anti-Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 331 (2008). 
 111. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE,
supra note 8, at 1. 
 112. Id.
 113. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 41. 
 114. Id.
 115. Id. at 47. 
 116. See id.
 117. Manuel, supra note 43, at 225. 
 118. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 37. 
 119. Id.
 120. Id.
 121. Bethan Noonan, Crafting Legislation to Prevent Cyberbullying:  The Use of Educa-
tion, Reporting, and Threshold Requirements, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 330, 336 
(2011). 
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bullying statistics reflect only a portion of actual victims that fall prey to 
online assaults.122
D. The Aftermath 
Subsequently, “60% of cyberbullying victims are negatively” impacted 
as a result of the harassment.123  The absence of physical harassment—
commonly associated with harming the victim—does not discount the “short-
and long-term effects” of cyberbullying.124  Emotional harm is only the be-
ginning for some victims, escalating to severe psychiatric issues, and possi-
ble suicidal ideation when a victim does not receive relief or treatment.125
“[S]ocial isolation, discrimination, and bullying” that leads to suicide is often 
associated with homosexual youths, who “experience higher rates of bullying 
than their straight peers.”126  Verbal and textual abuse through cyberbullying 
that leads to another’s suicide—“cyberbullycide”—is not limited to homo-
sexual youths.127  This abuse allows aggressors to “kill their victims without 
ever laying a hand on them,” where the harassment instills such psychologi-
cal pain that victims are lead to commit suicide.128  All forms of cyberbully-
ing have been found to contribute to the “increases in suicidal ideation,” 
where “20% of respondents reported seriously thinking about attempting 
suicide.”129  Research has also revealed that victims of bullying and cyber-
bullying face an increased risk of suicidal thoughts when compared to of-
fenders, and cyber victims are more likely to attempt suicide than individuals 
exposed to traditional bullying scenarios.130  The perception of permanence is 
a qualifying characteristic of cyberharassment, intimidation, and bullying 
that may explain the increased ideation of suicide when compared to tradi-
tional bullying.131  Therefore, the perception of permanence in the harm con-
tinues beyond the initial harassment and metastasizes—like cancer—
spreading into other aspects of a victim’s life.132
 122. See id. 
 123. Manuel, supra note 43, at 225. 
 124. Id.
 125. See id. at 226. 
 126. Wallace, supra note 13, at 741. 
 127. See, e.g., HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 13, 
at 2.
 128. Wallace, supra note 13, at 741. 
 129. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 1. 
 130. Id. at 1–2. 
 131. See id.; Lipton, supra note 7, at 1112–13, 1116. 
 132. See Lipton, supra note 7, at 1112–13, 1116. 
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Trends in the harm faced by victims of cyberbullying and bullies alike 
can be linked to damaging the “educational, social, and health related” as-
pects of individuals, but “the lasting effects of cyberbullying have yet to be 
determined.”133  Victims of cyberbullying often forfeit educational opportuni-
ties by not attending school as a result of the stress and anxiety that flows 
from the harassment.134  In addition, cyberbullying can create trust issues for 
a victim, which “affects a child’s ability to make and keep friends,” compli-
cating the individual’s potential to cope with and recover from the harass-
ment.135  The effects of cyberbullying take an immediate toll on victims.136
Cyberbullying legislation fails when it does not provide a response or rem-
edy at the onset of the bullying, resulting in more severe, and often fatal out-
comes.  Therefore, in order to adequately address unknown concerns—like 
the long-term effects of cyberbullying—legislators must consider the known 
categories affected by cyberbullying:  “[E]ducation, social, and health re-
lated” interests of targeted individuals.137
III. LEGISLATIVE “CURES” TO CURB CYBERBULLYING
Until recently, “[c]urrent criminal laws, including those targeted spe-
cifically at online conduct, [have] fail[ed] to comprehensively deal with to-
day’s cyber-abuses.”138  In 2009, only thirty-six states had anti-bullying stat-
utes.139  Currently, forty-nine states—excluding Montana—have passed leg-
islation addressing cyberbullying either explicitly or through electronic har-
assment.140  Bully Police USA, a watch-dog organization that advocates for 
state bullying legislation, grades each state using letters “A++” through “F” 
based on a jurisdiction’s commitment to meeting twelve criteria.141  New 
 133. Noonan, supra note 121, at 336, 338. 
 134. Id. at 336–37. 
 135. Id. at 337–38. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 336–38. 
 138. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1117. 
 139. Auerbach, supra note 71, at 1659. 
 140. BULLY POLICE USA, supra note 14; see also NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, STATE ANTI-
BULLYING STATUTES APRIL 2012 (2012), 
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Safety/Table.pdf. 
 141. Auerbach, supra note 71, at 1659 nn.109–10; see also Brenda High, Making the 
Grade:  How States Are “Graded” on Their Anti Bullying Laws, BULLY POLICE USA, 
http://www.bullypolice.org/grade.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (establishing grading crite-
ria for state legislation based upon:  1) utilizing the word “bullying;” 2) creating a law that is 
clearly anti-bullying and not a school safety net; 3) including the definitions of bullying and 
harassment; 4) recommending a model policy; 5) providing an implementation plan; 6) man-
dating anti-bullying programs; 7) setting a deadline for schools to establish policy; 8) provid-
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Jersey ranks among the highest with an “A++,” awarded for meeting all 
twelve criteria—including a direct reference to cyberbullying and electronic 
harassment with an eye toward victim care.142  While all states that have bul-
lying laws require a school policy, forty-three provide school sanctions as 
punishment, twelve provide for criminal sanctions, and only ten—including 
New Jersey—apply the policy to off-campus behavior.143
The defining characteristics that make cyberbullying more invasive, 
such as anonymity, access, detection, audience, and lack of physical contact, 
make many anti-bullying statutes throughout the country ineffective.144
Many authors who have addressed cyberbullying agree that “[t]he prevalence 
of this conduct suggests that more effective means are necessary to redress 
online wrongs and to protect victims’ reputations, but action against cyber-
abusers has posed significant challenges for the legal system.”145  Contrary to 
previous articles on cyberbullying, this Article examines the challenges cy-
berbullying presents to legislation, analyzes New Jersey’s framework in the 
“Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights,” and advocates for states to adopt a similar 
legislative approach—laws embodying key components that address the gaps 
in current statutes and bridge policy to legislation resulting in successful ap-
plication to cyberbullying. 
A. New Jersey & the “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights” 
The New Jersey “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights” is currently being con-
sidered the Nation’s most stringent legislation designed to tackle bullying of 
all forms that have an effect on education in public schools.146  Since New 
Jersey enacted the public school anti-bullying statute in 2002, a 2009 study 
has revealed that “32% of students aged 12 through 18 were bullied in the 
previous school year,” and “25% of the responding public schools indicated 
that bullying was a daily or weekly problem.”147  The “[s]tate amended th[e] 
ing protection from retaliation; 9) granting a school district protection for compliance; 10) 
assigning counseling for victims; 11) requiring accountability reports; and 12) including pro-
visions for cyberbullying or “electronic harassment”). 
 142. High, supra note 141; see BULLY POLICE USA, supra note 14. 
 143. SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR., STATE 
CYBERBULLYING LAWS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES 1 
(2013) [hereinafter HINDUJA & PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLING LAWS], available at
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf.
 144. See Goodno, supra note 41, at 650–53. 
 145. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1106; see also Goodno, supra note 41, at 642–43; Noonan, 
supra note 121, at 332. 
 146. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.2 (West 2012); Hu, supra note 15. 
 147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1a. 
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law in 2007 to include cyberbullying and [again] in 2008 to require each 
school district to post its anti-bullying policy [and report of occurrences] on 
its website and distribute it annually to parents or guardians of students en-
rolled in the district.”148  Finally, in 2010—the most recent amendment, ap-
proved January 5, 2011—several sections of the law have been amended to 
facilitate successful implementation in schools throughout the state—
specifically, application to institutions of higher education, minimum policy 
requirements, and funding.149
The purpose of amending the law, which originated in 2002, was “to 
strengthen the standards and procedures for preventing, reporting, investigat-
ing, and responding to incidents of [HIB] of students that occur on school 
grounds and off school grounds under specified circumstances.”150  First, title 
18A, section 37-13.2 establishes that the Act, including the amendments 
“shall be known and may be cited [to] as the ‘Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights 
Act.’”151  Title 18A, section 37-13.1 provides legislative findings on the 
prevalence of HIB and sets forth the goals of the amendments:  Clarity, fiscal 
responsibility, and effectiveness.152  The legislature noted that “[HIB] is also 
a problem which occurs on the campuses of institutions of higher education” 
in the State of New Jersey.153
Next, title 18A, section 37-15.3 of the amendment makes the law appli-
cable to conduct “that occurs off school grounds,” where the implementation 
is “consistent with the board of education’s code of student conduct and oth-
er provisions of the board’s policy on [HIB].”154  Subsection five requires an 
incident report be provided to the principal within two days of its occurrence, 
or within two days of receiving notice of its occurence.155  Subsection six 
allows ten days to conduct an investigation, two days subsequent to the in-
vestigation to apprise the superintendent of the findings, and five days fol-
lowing the investigation to make a report available on the incident.156  This is 
a large step forward for state legislation because it creates a definite timeline 
 148. Id. § 18A:37-13.1d. 
 149. See id. § 18A:37-13.1g.–j. 
 150. N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS ON IMPLEMENTING THE ANTI-BULLYING 
BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1 (2011), 
http://nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/guidance.pdf [hereinafter N.J. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS]. 
 151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.2. 
 152. See id. § 18A:37-13.1e.–i. 
 153. Id. § 18A:37-13.1j. 
 154. Id. § 18A:37-15.3. 
 155. Id. § 18A:37-15b.(5). 
 156. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15b.(6)(a)–(d). 
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to investigate and address bullying.157  Although the majority of cyberbully-
ing that occurs through social networking sites and technology may occur off 
campus, the effect it has on a victim touches and concerns the education pro-
cess by impacting the victim’s concentration and focus in the classroom.158
Lower self-esteem, self-worth, and grades are characteristics attributable to 
individuals that are continually harassed, intimidated, or bullied regardless of 
where the acts take place.159
In addition, title 18A, section 37-17 requires schools to adopt an educa-
tional program for bullying prevention160 and section 37-20 requires the ap-
pointment of an “anti-bullying specialist” who leads in investigations, ad-
dresses incidents, and works with the district anti-bullying coordinator, who 
strengthens school policies and collaborates with the superintendent to even-
tually provide data to the Department of Education regarding HIB.161  This is 
significant because it provides an organized line of communication that re-
quires adults to be educated, aware, and proactive in addressing bullying.  
Also, section 37-21 has created a school “safety team,” which is responsible 
for receiving complaints, maintaining copies of the complaints, “iden-
tify[ing], and address[ing] patterns,” as well as offering and participating in 
professional development on the prevention of HIB.162  Beyond educating 
adults in the school setting, professional development alerts educators of the 
impact and consequences this conduct can have on a victim.163 This theme is 
evidenced in section 37-22, requiring all newly-certified teachers to complete 
a program in HIB as established by the State Board of Education and made 
applicable to district administrators’ certification through section 37-23.164
Additionally, title 18A, section 37-24 commands schools to develop a 
“guidance document for use by parents or guardians, students, and school 
districts” to aid in the understanding and implementation of the law.165  This 
portion of the statute attempts to reconcile the low rate of detection by par-
ents or guardians in addition to victims’ frequent failure to report bullying.166
Sections 37-25 and 37-26 place the Commissioner of Education in charge of 
training, implementation, and communication with the county superinten-
 157. See id.
 158. See Manuel, supra note 43, at 243–44; Turbert, supra note 11, at 686. 
 159. See N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS, supra note 150, at 2–3; Turbert, 
supra note 11, at 654–55. 
 160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-17a. 
 161. Id. § 18A:37-20. 
 162. Id. § 18A:37-21a., c.(1)–(3), d. 
 163. See Noonan, supra note 121, at 356. 
 164. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-22a.–c., -23. 
 165. Id. § 18A:37-24a. 
 166. See id. § 18A:37-24a.(2); Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 37. 
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dents to ensure compliance with the “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights”.167
Therefore, administrators are accountable to victims of bullying and the bul-
lies themselves.168  Section 37-27 requires that the Commissioner of Educa-
tion make an “online tutorial [available regarding] harassment, intimidation, 
and bullying.”169  Ultimately, this portion of the law informs parents and stu-
dents of the causes and safeguards in place to detect and rectify bullying at 
its onset.170
Subsequently, title 18A, section 37-28 creates a fund for the Department 
of Education—the “Bullying Prevention Fund”—in order to carry out the 
provisions of the “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights.”171  This additional funding 
addresses shortcomings in previous amendments due to the economic cli-
mate, by providing the financial support to aid districts with compliance.172
In section 37-29, the week starting with the “first Monday in October of each 
year is designated as a ‘Week of Respect’ in the State of New Jersey,” where 
education and instruction focus on preventing HIB.173  By providing educa-
tion specified in the law as “age-appropriate,” this provision is created to 
reinforce the regulations, channels of communication, and consequences 
associated with bullying to deter students from promulgating or participating 
in this behavior.174  Section 37-30 states that the law does not affect the “pro-
visions of any collective bargaining agreement,” whereas section 3B-68 re-
quires “public institution[s] of higher education [to] adopt [the] policy.”175
The tragic incident between Tyler Clementi and Dharun Ravi occurred at 
Rutgers University—a New Jersey institution for higher education—
demonstrating the significance of applicability beyond high school.176  Fi-
nally, section 37-31 encourages nonpublic schools to adopt the provisions of 
the “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights,” and sections 37-13 and 37-32 state that 
the amendments strengthen the rights of victims and do not remove certain 
prior protections put in place by previous revisions.177
 167. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-25, -26. 
 168. See id.
 169. Id. § 18A:37-27. 
 170. See id.; N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS, supra note 150, at 1. 
 171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-28. 
 172. See id.
 173. Id. § 18A:37-29. 
 174. See id.; N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS, supra note 150, at 13. 
 175. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-30, :3B-68a. 
 176. Foderaro, supra note 1. 
 177. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-31a., -13.1(f), -32. 
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B. Tyler Clementi, Dharun Ravi, and the Effects of this New Legislation 
Dharun Ravi filmed his roommate—Tyler Clementi—without his 
knowledge, using the camera on his computer to capture an intimate moment 
between Tyler and another man.178  About two days later, Tyler discovered 
that his privacy was compromised over the internet, and ultimately took his 
own life by jumping off the George Washington Bridge on September 22, 
2010.179  The Grand Jurors of the State of New Jersey indicted Ravi on fif-
teen counts including:  Invasion of privacy, attempted invasion of privacy, 
bias intimidation, tampering with physical evidence, hindering apprehension 
or prosecution, and witness tampering.180  The prosecutor argued that these 
charges stemmed from a planned hate crime, designed to violate “his room-
mate’s privacy,” and subsequently “expose Mr. Clementi’s sexual orientation 
and an intimate encounter with another man.”181  In response, the defense 
emphasized Ravi’s immaturity, rather than categorizing his actions as a fail-
ure to respect his roommate’s privacy—claiming no link to Tyler’s sexual 
orientation.182  The 2008 amendments to the anti-bullying legislation in New 
Jersey incorporated cyberbullying through the term “electronic communica-
tion,” but like many other states, failed to account for institutions of higher 
education or provide applicability to off-campus activity.183  Tyler’s death 
sparked “public outcry” leading to “comprehensive antibullying policies,” 
which now includes “increase[d] staff training and adhere[nce] to tight dead-
lines for reporting episodes” of HIB.184  Although New Jersey would have 
eventually passed a broader law, the circumstances Tyler faced and his sub-
sequent suicide resonated with legislators and motivated the express passage 
of a more sweeping, comprehensive approach.185
Essentially, Ravi—an eighteen-year-old Indian citizen—cyberbullied 
Tyler—an eighteen-year-old homosexual—leading Tyler to commit suicide 
after tricking, denigrating, and outing him.186  Tricking refers to someone’s 
attempt to have another reveal secrets or share information through deceit 
 178. Foderaro, supra note 1; Pervaiz Shallwani, Clementi Case Trial Begins, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 25, 2012, at A15. 
 179. Foderaro, supra note 1; Shallwani, supra note 178. 
 180. Indictment, supra note 19, at 1–5; Shallwani, supra note 178. 
 181. Shallwani, supra note 178. 
 182. Id.
 183. See HINDUJA & PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 143, at 1, 9–10. 
 184. Hu, supra note 15. 
 185. Matt Friedman, Christie Signs Anti-Bullying Legislation, RECORD (N.J.), Jan. 7, 2011, 
at A3. 
 186. Foderaro, supra note 1; Shallwani, supra note 178. 
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online for purposes of humiliation.187  Ravi set up a camera without Tyler’s 
knowledge, after he had agreed to leave their shared dorm room and give 
Tyler complete privacy.188  Ravi tricked Tyler by physically leaving the 
room, setting up a camera, and invading his privacy.189  “Denigration” occurs 
when “cruel gossip or rumors about a person” are spread “to damage his or 
her reputation or friendships,” which is also “[t]he online equivalent to indi-
rect bullying with wider dissemination.”190  Ravi indirectly bullied Tyler by 
streaming a live video feed from their room, without Tyler’s knowledge, and 
tweeting an open invitation for others to iChat Ravi and view Tyler’s inti-
mate moment live.191  In addition, outing occurs when a bully “[s]har[es] 
someone’s secrets or embarrassing information or images online,” without 
their permission or knowledge.192  Tyler was described as a private person, 
who kept to himself, and his sexual orientation remained unclear; Tyler was 
not openly homosexual.193
The amendments made to the 2002 bullying law in 2007, 2008, and 
2010 have been the direct product of gaps in the legislation made evident by 
cases like Tyler’s where the law does not provide a clear resolution.194  Prior 
to Tyler’s death, one of the law’s shortcomings included a failure to “ex-
pressly instruct a district on how to thwart off-campus cyberbullying, which 
is a problem considering that the majority of cyberbullying does not occur on 
school grounds but rather in the comfort of students’ homes.”195  The New 
Jersey Legislature’s most recent revision has addressed concerns regarding 
applicability and workability in formulating the latest set of amendments to 
the anti-bullying law.196  The State has mandated a system where experts 
advise and oversee the implementation of the law.197  By maintaining current 
education programs in New Jersey that address HIB, a web of delegated ad-
ministrators and district employees collect data, report incidents, and teach 
students about the dangers of this behavior.198  “Each school must designate 
an anti-bullying specialist to investigate complaints; each district must, in 
 187. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 39. 
 188. See Foderaro, supra note 1. 
 189. See id. 
 190. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 39. 
 191. Foderaro, supra note 1. 
 192. TROLLEY & HANEL, supra note 9, at 39. 
 193. See Foderaro, supra note 1. 
 194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1c.–d. (West 2012); see Hu, supra note 15, see also 
N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS, supra note 150, at 1. 
 195. Turbert, supra note 11, at 659. 
 196. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15.3. 
 197. See Hu, supra note 15. 
 198. See id. 
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turn, have an anti-bullying coordinator; and the State Education Department 
will evaluate every effort, posting grades on its Web site” for each school 
district in the state.199  The Department of Education oversees the process, 
which involves data collection and reports and providing clearer education 
for parents online in addition to a response timeline.200  Students have one 
week of every school year that focuses on education to prevent HIB.201  This 
improved system is reinforced by a new state fund created through the law to 
provide financial support and execute bullying education while maintaining 
funding for the program.202  Some districts in the state have even partnered 
with local authorities to ease reporting and “up[] the ante by involving law 
enforcement rather than resolving issues in the principal’s office.”203  There-
fore, New Jersey has incorporated the new additions into their bullying law 
with the preexisting functions to forge a well-oiled machine that operates 
effectively.  Furthermore, the law’s reach goes beyond school grounds to 
include off-campus incidents of bullying that conflict with the board of edu-
cation’s policies and spread applicability to public institutions of higher edu-
cation.204  At first blush, the implications of the law appear to expose school 
boards and open court houses to increased litigation, but ultimately, this 
marks the beginning of schools and communities sharing accountability and 
responsibility for controlling cyberbullying at its roots through broader legis-
lation. 
IV. WHY OTHER STATES SHOULD ADOPT THE “ANTI-BULLYING BILL OF 
RIGHTS”
The Garden State provides a comprehensive approach to the growing 
problem of cyberbullying—through the “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights”—
because New Jersey’s law includes key components such as the policy, the 
policy review, and the revision of the policy in addition to legal remedies for 
victims.205  A complex problem like cyberbullying requires a well-guided 
approach to detect, report, address, and avert repetition in the future.  New 
 199. Id.
 200. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-24a.–b.; N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR PARENTS 
ON THE ANTI-BULLYING BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 38–39 (2012), 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/ParentGuide.pdf. 
 201. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-29. 
 202. Id. § 18A:37-28. 
 203. Hu, supra note 15. 
 204. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-15.3, :3B-68. 
 205. New Jersey Anti-Bullying Laws & Policies, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stop 
bullying.gov/laws/new-jersey.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
18A:37-13.1–.2, -16 to -30. 
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Jersey’s approach provides a model framework that other states throughout 
the country should adopt for several reasons.  First, the law provides a com-
munication network and protocol to monitor and document bullying.206  Sec-
ond, the statute creates an educational program to strengthen the faculty and 
students’ understanding of the effects of HIB.207  “Education provides a way 
for states to combat cyberbullying while avoiding the negative effects that 
result from imposing criminal penalties on children.”208  In addition, educa-
tion is key to overcoming the disregard for cyberbullying resulting from mis-
conceptions that lead many to believe “there are more serious forms of ag-
gression to worry about.”209  Finally, legal ramifications continue to be an 
important part of the formula in addressing cyberbullying by allowing vic-
tims to seek other legal remedies and placing future bullies on warning.210
A. Key Components of a Model Anti-Bullying Law 
In order to achieve results, the Education Secretary of the United States 
has set forth a list of eleven “Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws” 
and policies throughout the nation.211  The first component of a cyberbullying 
law requires a purpose statement to “[o]utline[] the range of detrimental ef-
fects bullying has on students, including impacts on student learning, school 
safety, student engagement, and the school environment.”212  This initial sec-
tion should include a declaration “that any form, type, or level of bullying is 
unacceptable, and that every incident needs to be taken seriously by school 
administrators, school staff (including teachers), students, and students’ 
families.”213  Next, the statute should provide specific types and examples of 
prohibited conduct alongside “a clear definition of cyberbullying.”214  In ad-
dition, an “Enumeration of Specific Characteristics” should explain conduct 
included in the behavior, but not limit bullying to specific acts or any par-
 206. Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey’s Antibullying Law Should Be a Model for Other 
States, TIME IDEAS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://ideas.time.com/2011/09/06/why-new-jerseys-
antibullying-law-should-be-a-model-for-other-states/. 
 207. Id.; Friedman, supra note 185. 
 208. Kelsey Farbotko, Comment, With Great Technology Comes Great Responsibility:  
Virginia’s Legislative Approach to Combating Cyberbullying, 15 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 55, 73 
(2011). 
 209. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE,
supra note 8, at 2. 
 210. See Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV,
http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/key-components/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 211. Id.
 212. Id.
 213. Id.
 214. Id.
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ticular characteristic.215  The next guideline calls for “Development and Im-
plementation of [Local Educational Agency] Policies” that memorialize the 
prohibited conduct and provide a course of action that includes reporting, 
recording, and referring the victim and bully for professional help.216  Addi-
tionally, effective laws must face state review to remain current and “ensure 
the goals of the state statute are met.”217  Successful statutes “[i]nclude[] a 
plan for notifying students, students’ families, and staff of policies related to 
bullying, including the consequences for engaging in bullying.”218  States 
should “[i]nclude[] a provision [mandating] school districts to provide train-
ing [and education] for all school staff”—not only teachers—in “preventing, 
identifying, and responding to bullying.”219  Training and transparency 
emerge as key components to a comprehensive statute because they include a 
reporting system and allow districts to draft their own policy, creating ac-
countability and responsibility that leads to greater community awareness 
and investment.220  Finally, a statement of legal rights should be included 
allowing other paths of recourse for the victim.221
B. Perceived Weaknesses in the New Jersey Law 
The “Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights” has taken an aggressive approach to 
HIB by incorporating all faculty and staff—an all-hands-on-deck approach—
into the law’s education and enforcement.222  The law became effective in 
classrooms throughout the State of New Jersey in the Fall of 2011.223  Ad-
ministrators in school districts have labeled the law a tall order that “‘has 
gone well overboard’” in allocating additional responsibility to employees by 
requiring them “‘to police the community [twenty-four] hours a day.’”224  In 
most districts, guidance counselors and social workers already on staff, have 
acquired the additional responsibilities mandated by the law, including inves-
tigations, reports, and anti-bullying education.225  Enforcement of the law—
requiring additional time and effort—is being achieved by current staff 
members with existing job descriptions, therefore, raising compliance con-
 215. Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, supra note 210. 
 216. Id.
 217. Id.
 218. Id.
 219. Id.
 220. See Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, supra note 210. 
 221. Id.
 222. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13 (West 2012); Hu, supra note 15. 
 223. See Hu, supra note 15. 
 224. Id.
 225. Id.
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cerns with regard to time and experience.226  Training equips every em-
ployee, like janitors and aides, who may come into contact with students and 
witness bullying to file an incident report.227  Accordingly, superintendents 
throughout the state argue that the statute subjects districts to increased op-
portunities of “lawsuits from students and parents dissatisfied with the out-
come” from a school district’s response to bullying allegations.228  While 
fiscal responsibility remains a concern for boards of education, many schools 
within the state are building on existing programs and policies or making use 
of local authorities to help comply with and enforce the law.229
“[L]aws . . . serve an important expressive function about acceptable 
modes of online behavior even in situations where their enforcement may be 
limited by a variety of . . . factors.”230  The benefits reaped by schools under 
the law’s bullying policy mandate outweigh the burdens placed on state ad-
ministrators and districts.231  Newspaper articles have examined these finan-
cial, legal, and interpretive implications regarding compliance with the law, 
but continue to view this statute as a touchstone for anti-bullying legisla-
tion.232  Despite the expenses districts have incurred as a result of the legal 
requirements for compliance, schools have been “proactive [to address bully-
ing] regardless of the money” received through the anti-bullying fund.233
Utilizing guidance counselors and social workers has helped the state’s 
schools take on the additional responsibilities associated with fulfilling these 
requirements.234  In addition, the state is limiting the liability of districts by 
establishing a baseline of protection through investigating, holding a hearing, 
and issuing a decision—appealable to the Commissioner of Education—all 
of which are governed by individual timelines.235  While critics tend to focus 
on the ability of schools to correctly categorize behavior as actionable under 
the statute, it is important to note that schools formulate their own policies 
under the law.236  The legislation sets a minimum level of safeguards and 
 226. Id.
 227. Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, supra note 210. 
 228. Hu, supra note 15. 
 229. See id.
 230. Lipton, supra note 7, at 1116. 
 231. Cohen, supra note 206. 
 232. See, e.g., id. (arguing the shortcomings of the law’s compliance and noting the impor-
tance of New Jersey’s stance in bullying victim rights). 
 233. Charles Hack, School Districts Stunned by Disparity in Anti-Bullying Funding 
Awards, NJ.COM (July 3, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2012 
/07/school_districts_stunned_by_di.html. 
 234. See Hu, supra note 15. 
 235. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15b.(6)(a)–(e) (West 2012). 
 236. See Turbert, supra note 11, at 659; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15b. 
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criteria that must be present in each policy throughout the state, while afford-
ing inherently different school districts flexibility to detail and define bully-
ing.237  An urban school in New Jersey faces different challenges in regulat-
ing the school climate rather than a suburban location.238  Giving boards of 
education the ability to establish policy in their respective school systems 
creates a greater sense of investment by the community into anti-bullying 
education and injects efficacy into the programs.239
C. Bridging the Gaps in Anti-Bullying Legislation with Policy 
“Other states’ laws have similar aims but lack the rigorous oversight 
and quick response mechanisms that New Jersey is putting in place.”240  As 
of January 2013, forty-nine states have passed some type of law that ad-
dresses bullying, forty-seven of which include electronic harassment, and 
sixteen states have legislation that uses the term “cyberbullying.”241  While 
only ten states currently have laws that regulate off-campus bullying, nine 
states have proposed general updates to their bullying legislation—but only 
two of those proposals incorporate the addition of off-campus bullying.242
State laws should address off-campus behavior, provide a clear and accessi-
ble policy, and provide an education of cyberbullying awareness that in-
cludes remedies for faculty, staff, students, and parents.243  From nonprofit 
organizations to governmental agencies, these groups agree with the estab-
lishment of a baseline for anti-bullying legislation consisting of eleven crite-
ria.244
In an effort to bridge the existing gaps in states’ anti-bullying legislative 
attempts, an effective statute should include:  (1) A purpose statement; (2) 
the scope of the law; (3) specification of prohibited conduct; (4) additional 
characteristics of prohibited conduct; (5) collaborative policy development; 
(6) an investigative, reporting, responding, and recording policy; (7) a fre-
quent policy review provision; (8) a communication plan; (9) a training and 
preventative education provision; (10) transparency and monitoring; and (11) 
the right to other legal recourse.245  These characteristics may not be entirely 
 237. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15b. 
 238. Hack, supra note 233. 
 239. See Turbert, supra note 11, at 659; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15b. 
 240. Cohen, supra note 206. 
 241. HINDUJA & PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 143, at 1. 
 242. Id. at 1–2, 4, 6–9. 
 243. See Turbert, supra note 11, at 685. 
 244. See BULLY POLICE USA, supra note 14; Key Components in State Anti-Bullying 
Laws, supra note 210. 
 245. Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, supra note 210. 
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exhaustive, but address the primary facets of a comprehensive bullying law 
needed for states throughout the nation.246
V. CONCLUSION
Enacting detailed legislation for cyberbullying is an important step that 
states must take in order to curb this growing problem.  “Cyberbullying is 
venomous student expression that scars schools’ basic educational mission 
and the development of civility in children.”247  The psychological sting that 
results from cyberbullying is attributed to increased anonymity, constant 
internet access, lower detection by adults, and the increased audience with a 
lack of physical contact between the bully and the victim.248  Unlike tradi-
tional notions of bullying, cyberbullying and electronic harassment contrib-
ute more harmful, long-term effects to victims resulting from the virtual 
permanence of the actions and perceived inability of escape by the victim.249
The difference between comprehensive laws on anti-bullying and ineffective 
legislation is traced through the level of response and treatment of the vic-
tim.250
In the wake of Tyler Clementi’s suicide, New Jersey has developed a 
meticulous piece of legislation that details the prohibition of harassment, 
intimidation, and bullying by going beyond the key components of an effec-
tive law.251  Through an anti-bullying legislation amendment, the state has 
created a model framework to define, monitor, and deter bullying beyond its 
roots in the school zone, branching out to off-campus activity.252  Although 
Tyler’s death ignited the prompt revision and application of anti-bullying 
policies in institutions of higher education,253 this statute has been created to 
address indefinites—like the many forms of cyberbullying—with definite 
timelines of response to reported incidents.254  New Jersey has taken the 
guesswork out of policy formulation by enlisting experts to oversee the 
state’s protocol, procedure, and communication.255  Alternatively, critics of 
the law highlight funding, categorization of bullying, and increased litigation 
 246. See id.
 247. Turbert, supra note 11, at 686. 
 248. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 249. Walrave & Heirman, supra note 25, at 35–36; Manuel, supra note 43, at 224–25. 
 250. See Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, supra note 210; see also Cohen, 
supra note 206. 
 251. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 2012); Cohen, supra note 206. 
 252. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15.3. 
 253. See id. § 18A:3B-68a.; Friedman, supra note 185. 
 254. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:3B-68a., :37-13.1f.; see also Friedman, supra note 185. 
 255. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-20. 
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as inherent flaws to the statute.256  The amendments forming the “Anti-
Bullying Bill of Rights” utilize existing members of faculty, such as psy-
chologists and counselors, to alleviate some of the financial straps attributed 
to the law in light of actual funding awards.257  In addition, many schools in 
the state have built on preexisting policy and procedure, dovetailing the new 
requirements into practice.258  Education and transparency have been man-
dated throughout the process to reinforce bullying detection and proactively 
decrease future occurrences.259  Furthermore, while increased exposure to 
litigation initially alarmed districts,260 the law has created a responsive, hier-
archical system that provides a procedural checklist for school districts under 
state supervision.261  Ultimately, the benefits of enacting a comprehensive 
approach to bullying encompassing its multifaceted contexts outweigh the 
burdens expressed by critics.262  The gaps between state bullying legislation 
and victims’ needs must be bridged to ameliorate the disconnect under cur-
rent law.  These bridges should not become a resource that inadvertently 
facilitates the suicide of cyberbullying victims because of the absence of 
legislative relief.  The Garden State has cultivated a twenty-first century law, 
designed to keep pace with technology and bullying through continuous re-
evaluation of policy; like software updates built directly into the statute, New 
Jersey has enacted the latest hardware in anti-bullying legislation. 
 256. Cohen, supra note 206; see also Hu, supra note 15. 
 257. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-20a.; see also Hu, supra note 15. 
 258. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 15. 
 259. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-24; see also Cohen, supra note 206. 
 260. See Hu, supra note 15. 
 261. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15; Hu, supra note 15. 
 262. Cohen, supra note 206. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is June 15, 2012, and Annie Soto1 has just heard President Barack 
Obama give a live speech concerning immigration reform in the United 
 * The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard 
Broad Law Center.  Stephania Bertoni received her Bachelor of Arts from the Dorothy F. 
Schmidt College of Arts and Letters, Florida Atlantic University with a major in political 
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States.2  For the majority of Americans, this speech was like any other 
speech made by the President before an election.  However, for Annie and 
almost one million undocumented young people in the United States who are 
in her similar position, President Obama’s speech could potentially be life 
altering.  Four years ago, Annie graduated top of her class from a local south 
Florida high school.  As a result of her hard work, Annie was awarded for 
her merits with a full scholarship to a Florida university that upcoming se-
mester.  Unfortunately, Annie would have to decline an opportunity which a 
majority of her peers can only dream of having.  Like thousands of other 
undocumented teenagers in the United States, Annie was brought to America 
illegally by her parents as a young child.  Moreover, Annie, like so many 
others, was oblivious to her status in the United States.  In her eyes, she is, 
and will always be, an American.  Annie has been in the United States for 
twenty-one years; she is now twenty-two.  This talented young woman has 
had to put down her studies for what she thought would be an indefinite pe-
riod of time.  The President’s speech however, gave this young woman, 
alongside hundreds of thousands of undocumented young people who were 
brought to the United States illegally and raised Americans, some hope of 
continuing the education that was promised to them their whole lives.  It is 
an opportunity for individuals like Annie, who have worked hard to reach 
that point in their lives, to live from amongst the shadows again.3  For Annie, 
this means that she can now remain in the United States without the fear of 
being deported at any given time.4  But most importantly, this will allow 
Annie, and the 800,000 other undocumented individuals in Annie’s same 
shoes, to continue their efforts toward legislation that will grant them a 
pathway to citizenship—allowing them to finally further their education like 
the friends they grew up with and have the chance to achieve the American 
science and interdisciplinary studies/social science and a minor in history.  The author wishes 
to thank her family and loved ones for all of their support, love, and motivation throughout the 
years.  The author would also like to thank her mother and father for encouraging her to pur-
sue her legal education and always believing in her.  Additionally, the author would like to 
extend sincere gratitude to Nova Law Review, its members, and the faculty for all their hard 
work and dedication. 
 1. Annie Soto is a fictional character, whose story is based on the lives of thousands of 
undocumented young people living in the United States. 
 2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-
immigration. 
 3. See id.
 4. See id.
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dream.5  The speech and actions by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) have allowed this select group of qualified individuals a chance to 
surface from amidst the shadows without fear of deportation to estranged 
countries.6  However, this action is in no way a permanent fix, which means 
that this effort may be rescinded at any time by a future administration.7
This will mean that once again, these individuals, who are not a threat to 
American society, may be subject to deportation.8  The resolution to these 
individuals’ problems is an act by Congress.9  The President in his speech 
stated, “Congress needs to act” since these individuals merit a permanent fix, 
not just a temporary solution to their ongoing problem.10
There have been critics who have surfaced stating that the President and 
the DHS have gone beyond their constitutional authority in executing this 
new immigration policy that immediately stops the deportation or future de-
portation of more than 800,000 young, undocumented individuals who meet 
a certain criteria.11  Such critics have stated that the President and the DHS 
have circumvented Congress by halting the deportation of individuals who 
would have qualified for the DREAM Act,12 which was rejected in Congress 
on numerous accounts, the latest rejection being in 2010.13  Moreover, critics 
want the Supreme Court of the United States to overturn the DHS’s use of 
prosecutorial discretion in relation to halting the deportation of these quali-
fied immigrants.14  This article will attempt to explain in detail the new im-
migration policy laid out by President Obama, his administration, and the 
 5. Humberto Sanchez, Marco Rubio’s Immigration Plans Foiled, ROLL CALL, June 18, 
2012, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_152/Marco_Rubio_Immigration_Plans_Foiled-
215430-1.html. 
 6. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 7. Id.
 8. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Secretary Napolitano Announces De-
ferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 
2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-
process-young-people-who-are-low [hereinafter Deferred Action Press Release]; President 
Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 9. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 10. Id.
 11. Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?, at 2:39 (FOX News 
television broadcast June 18, 2012), available at http://video.foxnews.com/v/1695684924001 
/is-president-obamas-immigration-move-legal/; see Sanchez, supra note 5. 
 12. Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?, supra note 11, at 
5:00; see also DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010) (stating that “[t]his Act 
may be cited as the ‘Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010’”). 
 13. Sanchez, supra note 5. 
 14. See Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?, supra note 11, 
at 3:44. 
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DHS on June 15, 2012.15  This article will further explain the right of the 
Executive Branch to execute its prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases 
by first explaining the role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases, 
followed by an explanation of the role prosecutorial discretion plays in im-
migration cases today and the role of judicial review.16  Next, this article will 
address how the DREAM Act, a law exclusive to the determination of Con-
gress, differs from the Executive Branch’s use of prosecutorial discretion on 
individuals who would have qualified for the DREAM Act.17  Lastly, this 
article will address the potential future of the individuals who will be affect-
ed by the new immigration policy in regards to Congress’s possible passing 
of legislation that will give a more permanent answer to an ongoing prob-
lem.18
II. THE EXECUTIVE HALT ON THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS OF 
QUALIFIED UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS 
President Barack Obama, acting as head of the Executive Branch, 
alongside Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, an entity of the 
Executive Branch,19 executed a memorandum enforcing “the Nation’s immi-
gration laws against certain young people who were brought to [the United 
States] as children and know only this country as home.”20  The President 
announced in a live speech on June 15, 2012, that Secretary Napolitano had 
proclaimed that the DHS and the President’s administration will be taking 
“new actions . . . to mend [the] nation’s immigration policy.”21  The Presi-
dent also stated that the administration’s efforts along with the efforts of the 
DHS would ensure the fairness and efficiency of the new immigration policy 
regarding certain individuals who meet the strict criteria.22  The President 
referred to the individuals that would be affected by this new enforcement by 
the Executive Branch as “Dreamers,” similar to the “Dreamers” associated 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 20. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 1 
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-
young-people.pdf. 
 21. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 22. Id.
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with the DREAM Act.23  However, the DREAM Act, as the President points 
out and as outlined above, has failed numerous times in Congress due to 
“politics.”24  Despite Congress’s rejection of the proposed legislation, the 
President stated in his speech that effective immediately, the DHS would halt 
the deportation proceedings of eligible individuals that do not pose a threat to 
the security of the nation or the safety of the public.25  Such individuals who 
meet the criteria presented by the DHS will be able to request, within the 
upcoming months, “temporary relief from deportation proceedings and apply 
for work authorization.”26
The President went on to assure the nation that this effort on behalf of 
his administration and the DHS was not the DREAM Act, since the passing 
of the DREAM Act is left to Congress to decide, but rather is a temporary 
relief for individuals who meet certain strict criteria.27  The temporary relief 
received by qualified individuals will not provide the individual with perma-
nent lawful status in the United States, nor will it lead to permanent lawful 
status.28  Rather, it is the job of “Congress, acting through its legislative au-
thority, [to] confer these rights” to permanent lawful status.29  The President 
also assured that this action was not amnesty and would not promote the con-
tinuation of illegal immigration into the United States.30  Moreover, the Pres-
ident explained that immigration enforcement would be and has been di-
rected at individuals who are a threat to national security and the public, as 
well as the strengthening and prioritizing of their efforts to block the borders 
from individuals attempting to enter the United States illegally.31  The Presi-
dent also stated that individuals who would be eligible for requesting tempo-
rary relief from deportation would have to meet strict guidelines, explained 
in further detail in a following section.32
 23. Id.  The President stated: 
These are young people who study in our schools, they play in our neighborhoods, they’re 
friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our flag.  They are Americans in their heart[s], 
in their minds, in every single way but one:  on paper.  They were brought to this country by 
their parents—sometimes even as infants—and often have no idea that they’re undocumented 
until they apply for a job or a driver’s license, or a college scholarship. 
Id.
 24. Id.
 25. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 26. Id.
 27. Id.
 28. ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, ICE, 2, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ offic-
es/ero/pdf/faq-deferred-action-process.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 29. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 30. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 31. Id.
 32. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2; infra Part II.A. 
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A. Provisions Outlined in the Memorandum Executed by the Department 
of Homeland Security 
The Secretary of Homeland Security has executed the provisions re-
garding the recent enforcement of immigration laws in a memorandum pur-
suant to the ongoing efforts by DHS to direct the allocation of funds on high 
priority cases like the deportation of criminals and terrorists.33  The memo-
randum dated June 15, 2012 sets out the immediate exercise of “prosecutori-
al discretion”34 in the enforcement of “the Nation’s immigration laws against 
certain young people.”35  The characteristics of the qualifications for this 
temporary immigration effort are almost identical to the required qualifica-
tions for an individual who would have benefited from the proposed 
DREAM Act legislation.36  The efforts of the recent enforcements, as dis-
cussed by the President in his speech earlier this year, is a temporary path-
way for the possibility of passing a form of DREAM Act legislation by Con-
gress, on which members of both parties can come to a consensus.37  Moreo-
ver, the DHS and the Obama Administration are focusing their efforts on 
prosecuting high priority cases, which include individuals who had the intent 
to cross American borders and remain illegally in the United States, and to-
wards individuals who pose a threat to national security and the safety of the 
public.38  Rather, the President has stated that individuals who pose no threat 
like the individuals typically referred to as “Dreamers,” should be given 
temporary relief from deportation proceedings through “deferred action”39
due to their lack of intent in committing the crime of purposely remaining in 
the United States illegally.40
The first requirement for an individual to qualify for the DHS’s immi-
gration efforts is that the individual arrived in the United States before the 
 33. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–3. 
 34. Id. at 1.  The use of prosecutorial discretion “confers no substantive right, immigra-
tion status, or pathway to citizenship.  Only the Congress, acting through its legislative author-
ity, can confer these rights.  It remains for the [E]xecutive [B]ranch . . . to set forth policy for 
the exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing law.”  Id. at 3. 
 35. Id. at 1. 
 36. Compare id. at 1–3, with DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 4 (2010). 
 37. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 38. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–2; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
 39. President Barack Obama, supra note 2.  “Deferred action is a discretionary determi-
nation to defer removal action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.  Deferred 
action does not confer lawful status upon an individual.”  ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process,
supra note 28, at 2. 
 40. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1; see President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
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age of sixteen,41 is currently below the age of thirty, and knows only this 
country as his or her country.42  The Secretary of Homeland Security stated 
that such individuals “lacked the intent to violate the law,” and thus, are not 
priority cases to which the DHS should focus its efforts on deporting.43
Moreover, the individual must demonstrate that he or she has “continuously 
resided in the United States for a [sic] least five years”44 before the actual 
date of the memorandum—June 15, 2012.45  Additionally, the individual 
must show that he or she is either currently enrolled in school, such as high 
school, “has graduated from high school, [or] has obtained a general educa-
tion development certificate” (GED).46  Honorably discharged veterans who 
have served in the Coast Guard or Armed Forces may qualify for temporary 
relief as well.47  Furthermore, to qualify for temporary relief, the individual 
must “undergo [a] biographic and biometric background check[].”48  The last 
requirement to be eligible is the need for good standing and a virtually clean 
record.49  The person may not receive this help if they are a convicted felon, 
have been convicted of “a significant misdemeanor offense,” or more than 
three misdemeanor offenses that did not occur on one specific date or arise 
from a specified act.50  Individuals that risk the security of the nation or the 
safety of the public are disqualified from receiving temporary relief from 
deportation.51  The above requirements must be met through “verifiable doc-
 41. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1.  Documentation used to 
evidence that an individual came to the U.S. prior to the age of sixteen “includes, but is not 
limited to:  financial records, medical records, school records, employment records, and mili-
tary records.”  ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, supra note 28, at 4. 
 42. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1. 
 43. Id.
 44. Id.  Documentation used to demonstrate that an individual has been in the U.S. for 
five years preceding June 15, 2012 “includes, but is not limited to:  financial records, medical 
records, school records, employment records, and military records.”  ICE FAQ:  Deferred 
Action Process, supra note 28, at 4. 
 45. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1. 
 46. Id.  Documentation used to show that an individual “is currently in school, has gradu-
ated from high school, or has obtained a GED certificate includes, but is not limited to:  di-
plomas, GED certificates, report cards, and school transcripts.”  ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action 
Process, supra note 28, at 5. 
 47. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1.  Documentation used to 
demonstrate an individual “is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed 
Forces . . . includes, but is not limited to:  report of separation forms, military personnel rec-
ords, and military health records.”  ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, supra note 28, at 5. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. See id.
 50. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1; ICE FAQ:  Deferred Ac-
tion Process, supra note 28, at 4. 
 51. ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, supra note 28, at 4.
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umentation” before the individual can qualify for temporary relief.52  Each 
case will be decided on an individual basis and the DHS will not provide 
assurance as to whether or not a qualified individual will be granted tempo-
rary relief.53
1. Process for Individuals Encountered by a Division of the Department of 
Homeland Security 
Additional requirements addressed in the memorandum by the Secretary 
of Homeland Security pertain to individuals who have encountered United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), United States Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), or United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS).54  ICE and CBP must exercise discretion on an individual 
level when dealing with individuals who have met the above requirements to 
avoid qualified individuals being55 “apprehended, placed into removal pro-
ceedings, or removed.”56  USCIS will ensure the implementation of the 
guidelines concerning “notices to appear” expressed in the memorandum.57
The above process is to ensure that ICE and CBP narrow their efforts on high 
priority cases, rather than cases pertaining to individuals who pose no threat 
to national security or to public safety and simply wish to further their educa-
tion.58
2. Process for Individuals Currently in Removal Proceedings 
The memorandum issued by Janet Napolitano also focuses one of its 
sections in addressing the steps ICE will take in relation to individuals who 
have met the aforementioned requirements for temporary relief, but are cur-
rently “in removal proceedings but not yet subject to a final order of remov-
al.”59  In such cases, ICE, through its prosecutorial discretion, will immedi-
ately offer deferred action for a two-year period with the possibility of re-
newal.60  The memorandum further directs ICE to begin implementation of 
the provisions pursuant to the memorandum within sixty days of the date of 
 52. Deferred Action Press Release, supra note 8. 
 53. Id.
 54. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2. 
 55. Id.
 56. ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, supra note 28, at 3. 
 57. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2. 
 58. See ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, supra note 28, at 3. 
 59. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2. 
 60. Id.; Deferred Action Press Release, supra note 8. 
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the memorandum, dated June 15, 2012.61  ICE must also “use its Office of 
Public Advocate to [allow] individuals who believe they [have met] the 
above [requirements to present] themselves through a clear and efficient pro-
cess.”62
3. Process for Individuals Not in Removal Proceedings 
In addition to the aforementioned practices to now be taken by the 
agencies, the memorandum explains the process to be taken by USCIS when 
dealing with individuals who have met the requirements mentioned previous-
ly, and who also have not begun removal proceedings, but passed a back-
ground check.63  According to the memorandum, the “USCIS should estab-
lish a clear and efficient process for exercising prosecutorial discretion, on an 
individual basis, by deferring action” on individuals who are at least fifteen 
and meet the requirements.64  The deferred action shall consist of temporary 
relief for two years, with the possibility of renewal.65  This process set forth 
by USCIS must be made available to all persons, despite age, to whom a 
final order for deportation has been entered.66  In order for the USCIS to 
begin the above process on an individual, the individual must submit a re-
quest to allow the USCIS to review the individual’s case.67
4. Qualifications for Work Authorization 
Finally, the memorandum states that for all individuals who have re-
ceived “deferred action” by ICE or USCIS, pursuant to the new immigration 
policy outlined in the memorandum, USCIS must accept said individuals’ 
applications68 for determination of eligibility “for work authorization during 
 61. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 62. Id. at 2.  The Office of the Public Advocate is a division created by ICE.  Public 
Advocate, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/enforcement-removal-operations/ 
publicadvocate/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).  “The public advocate works directly for ICE’s 
Executive Assistant Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).”  Id.
 63. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2–3. 
 64. Id.
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. Id.
 67. See Deferred Action Press Release, supra note 8. 
 68. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3.  Individuals, who qualify 
for temporary relief, may request work authorization by filing a Form I-765, Application for 
Employment Authorization.  See id. at 2–3; I-765, Application for Employment Authorization,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ (follow “Forms” menu; click on 
“Application for Employment Authorization” hyperlink) (last updated Nov. 29, 2012). 
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th[e] period of defer[ment].”69  The individual must prove that he or she has 
“an economic necessity for . . . employment” to receive authorization to 
work during the deferment period.70  Furthermore, once the two-year period 
has expired, and an individual requests and successfully receives an addi-
tional two years of deferment, the individual must also re-request an exten-
sion on his or her employment authorization if the economic need is still 
present.71
B. The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases 
Prosecutorial discretion plays a crucial part in immigration cases.72  Do-
ris Meissner, Commissioner of the then Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS),73 issued a memorandum directing all service officers of the INS 
to execute prosecutorial discretion when dealing with immigration cases and 
reiterating the importance of the role of prosecutorial discretion when deal-
ing with illegal immigration.74  The Meissner memorandum, which is still in 
use today by the DHS, highlights how prosecutorial discretion is to be used 
by officers acting on behalf of the INS on a case-by-case basis.75  The role of 
prosecutorial discretion is of utmost importance in the enforcement of immi-
gration law, so much that the Meissner memorandum begins with the most 
important direction for the execution of such discretion by stating: 
Service officers are not only authorized by law but expected to ex-
ercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforce-
ment process—from planning investigations to enforcing final or-
ders—subject to their chains of command and to the particular re-
sponsibilities and authority applicable to their specific position.  In 
 69. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 70. ICE FAQ:  Deferred Action Process, supra note 28, at 2. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, & Reg’l & Dist. Counsel 1 (Nov. 
17, 2000), available at http://Iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-
materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/government-
documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-
00.pdf/view. 
 73. Id.  In 2003, the Bush Administration reorganized the presidential power by combin-
ing the INS with the Customs Service.  THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 244 (5th ed. 2003). 
 74. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 1. 
 75. See id.; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, & All Chief Counsel 1 
(June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf 
/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2. 
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exercising this discretion, officers must take into account . . . [the] 
effective enforcement of the immigration laws and the interest[] of 
justice.76
Prosecutorial discretion extends in a number of ways, such as deciding 
which “offenses or populations to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and ar-
rest; whether to detain or to release a noncitizen; whether to initiate removal 
proceedings; whether to execute a removal order; and various other deci-
sions.”77  However, prosecutorial discretion is the sole responsibility of the 
agencies responsible for the enforcement of the law.78  It is solely within their 
discretion to prosecute an individual or not.79  The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held, in cases such as Heckler v. Chaney80 and Reno v. American 
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,81 that it is an agency’s responsibility to 
enforce laws and it has the sole discretion of whether to enforce the laws or 
whether or not to prosecute an individual.82  The purpose of executing prose-
cutorial discretion in immigration cases is to make sure that the allocation of 
money is directed where it is most needed.83  This is specifically laid out in 
the Meissner memorandum, which states that prosecutorial discretion is not a 
summons for the violation of the law, but “[r]ather . . . a means to use the 
resources [the INS has] in a way that best accomplishes [their] mission of 
administering and enforcing the immigration laws of the United States.”84
The Meissner memorandum is still the basis for the use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion at the DHS today.85  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Professor at Pennsyl-
vania State University Dickinson School of Law, highlights the importance 
of prosecutorial discretion in attaining “cost-effective law enforcement and 
relief for individuals who present desirable qualities or humanitarian circum-
stances.”86  The primary need for this tool is because it is economically im-
possible to be able to prosecute and investigate all the violations incurred as 
 76. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 1.
 77. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law,
9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010); see also Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra
note 72, at 2. 
 78. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 2. 
 79. Id.
 80. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 81. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 82. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 3 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 
831) (citing Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 483–84). 
 83. See Wadhia, supra note 77, at 244. 
 84. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 4. 
 85. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 75, at 1. 
 86. Wadhia, supra note 77, at 244. 
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a result of illegal immigration.87  Therefore, by using prosecutorial discre-
tion, the allocation of money has been geared to a priority system, with the 
most concern and money distribution going to cases considered high priori-
ty.88  High priority cases include those that concern the “protecti[on] [of] 
public safety, promoting the integrity of the legal immigration system, and 
deterring violations of the immigration law.”89  Without this tool—which has 
been widely used for years in matters concerning immigration law—such 
high priority cases will go unresolved, which may result in danger to the 
public and the nation as a whole.90
It is important to note, as President Barack Obama and Secretary Napo-
litano have stated numerous times, that the execution of prosecutorial discre-
tion does not confer any form of immigration status on an individual, nor is it 
a pathway to citizenship; rather, it is a temporary halt to the deportation pro-
ceedings of certain qualified individuals.91  This has been addressed multiple 
times when executing the INS’s prosecutorial discretion in immigration cas-
es, including the Meissner memorandum, which directed all agencies that “it 
must [be made] clear to the alien that exercising prosecutorial discretion does 
not confer any immigration status, . . . or any enforceable right or benefit 
upon the alien.”92
1. Deferred Action as a Primary Function of Prosecutorial Discretion 
One of the ways prosecutorial discretion is exercised is through the use 
of “deferred action.”93  Deferred action has been and still remains one of the 
primary ways the DHS executes its right to prosecutorial discretion.94  Fur-
thermore, the “theory of prosecutorial discretion” has been used in immigra-
tion cases for over sixty years on both an individual level and a group level.95
 87. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 4. 
 88. Id.
 89. Id.
 90. See id. at 3–4. 
 91. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also Memorandum from Janet Napoli-
tano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 92. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 12; see also Memorandum 
from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 93. Wadhia, supra note 77, at 246.  “Deferred action is a discretionary action initiated at 
the discretion of the agency or at the request of the alien . . . .”  Memorandum from Emilio T. 
Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Citizen & Immigration Servs., to Prakash Khatri, Ombudsman, U.S. 
Citizen & Immigration Servs. 1 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/cisombudsman_rr_32_o_deferred_action_uscis_response_08-07-07.pdf. 
 94. Wadhia, supra note 77, at 246; see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra
note 20, at 2–3. 
 95. Wadhia, supra note 77, at 265. 
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Secretary Napolitano stated that deferred action is an act of prosecutorial 
discretion which an agency—DHS—must employ.96  But it is important to 
note, however, that an individual or group may not request deferred action 
unless the DHS has granted it.97
The use of prosecutorial discretion has been evident in recent years.98
Secretary Napolitano announced four years ago that the granting of deferred 
action for a period of two years would be issued to both widows and widow-
ers, who have been married to their citizen spouse for less than two years and 
reside in the United States, alongside their unmarried children who are below 
the age of twenty-one.99  More recently, however, the DHS has executed its 
prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred action at a micro level 
concerning individuals who would have qualified for the DREAM Act.100
For instance, in 2009 the DHS granted deferred action at a micro level to 
eighteen-year-old Taha, who was brought to the United States by his parents 
at the age of two from Bangladesh, India.101  Now, effective June 15, 2012, 
the Obama Administration and the DHS, in an attempt to fix the current 
American immigration system absent action by Congress, used its prosecuto-
rial discretion by deferring the deportation or future deportation of young 
individuals who meet a certain criteria.102  The purpose for this, as both Pres-
ident Obama and Secretary Napolitano announced, is to “focus [the] immi-
gration enforcement resources in the right place[].”103  However, the Presi-
dent and Secretary Napolitano have assured the American people and critics 
that this action on behalf of the DHS is within its scope of prosecutorial dis-
cretion and that such discretion has been a part of the immigration system 
since long before the current presidential term.104
 96. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 97. Wadhia, supra note 77, at 265. 
 98. Id. at 262–63. 
 99. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, DHS Establishes Interim Relief for Widows 
of U.S. Citizens (June 9, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1244578412501.shtm. 
 100. See News Flash:  Taha Receives Deferred Action!!!, DREAM ACTIVIST (July 24, 
2009), http://www.dreamactivist.org/news-flash-taja-recieves-deffered-action/. 
 101. Id.
 102. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 103. Id.; see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1. 
 104. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
161
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
392 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
2. The Possibility of Judicial Review for the Use of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion 
Many critics have questioned the constitutionality of the latest move 
made by the DHS and the Obama Administration, arguing that both groups 
went beyond their constitutional authority when executing their prosecutorial 
discretion to halt the deportation of more than 800,000 young individuals 
who meet a certain criteria.105  However, the memorandum issued on June 
15, 2012 to David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner CBP,106 Alejandro 
Mayorkas, Director of the USCIS,107 and John Morton, Director of ICE108
specifically notes that “[t]his memorandum confers no substantive right, im-
migration status or pathway to citizenship.  Only . . . Congress, acting 
through its legislative authority, can confer these rights.  It remains for the 
[E]xecutive [B]ranch . . . to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion 
within the framework of existing law.”109  Thus, if the issue were submitted 
to the Supreme Court to review the current actions of the DHS, the likely 
outcome would most likely go in favor of the DHS, due to precedent cases 
demonstrating the Court’s hesitation to review discretionary decisions made 
by immigration agencies.110  Professor Wadhia has commented on the matter, 
stating that immigration agencies are “virtual[ly] immun[e] from judicial 
review.”111  The reason that the Supreme Court hesitates in reviewing the 
prosecutorial decisions of immigration agencies is because such decisions are 
based on a multitude of unknown factors considered by the agencies in mak-
ing their decisions whether or not to prosecute an individual.112  In Chaney,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the agencies are better equipped than the 
courts in making expert decisions as to whether or not to enforce the law.113
 105. Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?, supra note 11, at 
0:04, 0:10, 1:56. 
 106. Federal Government’s unified border agency.  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 
244. 
 107. Federal agency that deals with matters pertaining to “naturalization and . . . immigra-
tion benefits.”  Id. 
 108. ICE Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security . . . and the second largest investigative agency in the federal 
government.  [It was] [c]reated in 2003 through a merger of the investigative and interior en-
forcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, [which are no longer in effect] . . . . 
Id.
 109. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 110. Wadhia, supra note 77, at 287. 
 111. Id. at 286. 
 112. Id. at 287. 
 113. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). 
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The Court stated that “the agency must not only assess whether a violation 
has occurred, but whether [the] agency resources are best spent on this viola-
tion or another . . . [or] whether the agency has enough resources to under-
take the action at all.”114  Furthermore, the Court also stated that Congress 
would have to essentially decide whether an agency’s decisions should be 
subject to review, and that it is not up to the courts to make such a determina-
tion.115  Similarly, in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the 
Supreme Court held that decisions by the Attorney General as to whether or 
not to “‘commenc[e] proceedings, adjudicat[e] cases, [or] execut[e] removal 
orders’” against an undocumented individual were discretionary in nature 
and not subject to judicial review.116  Supreme Court precedent has made it 
difficult for judicial review in this area absent some congressional act to limit 
the prosecutorial discretion of immigration agencies.117  For this reason, it is 
unlikely that—without some congressional act to limit DHS’s prosecutorial 
discretion—the Supreme Court will review the actions of Secretary Napoli-
tano and the Obama Administration in halting the deportation of more than 
800,000 undocumented individuals.118
III. THE DREAM ACT
This morning, Secretary Napolitano announced new actions my 
administration will take to mend our nation’s immigration policy, 
to make it more fair, more efficient, and more just—specifically 
for certain young people sometimes called “Dreamers.”  These are 
young people who study in our schools, they play in our neighbor-
hoods, they’re friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our 
flag.  They are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every 
single way but one:  on paper.  They were brought to this country 
by their parents—sometimes even as infants—and often have no 
idea that they’re undocumented until they apply for a job or a driv-
er’s license, or a college scholarship.119
The above excerpt comes from a speech given by the President of the 
United States on June 15, 2012 in the Rose Garden of the White House.120
 114. Id. at 831.
 115. Id. at 838. 
 116. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483, 485–86 (1999). 
 117. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832. 
 118. See Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?, supra note 11, 
at 0:11; see also Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 483; Chaney, 470 U.S. at 
832. 
 119. President Barack Obama, supra note 2.
 120. Id. 
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To those Americans familiar with the DREAM Act, a federal legislative act 
that recently failed in Congress in 2010, the President’s speech sounds all too 
familiar.121  However, this speech was not an announcement that the federal 
government would provide a pathway to citizenship for hundreds of thou-
sands of undocumented minors.122  Rather, this speech was the announce-
ment of an executive decision not to prosecute or deport certain young un-
documented individuals that meet specific detailed criteria, provided for by 
the DHS.123  As the President stated in his speech the morning of June 15, 
2012, “[t]his is a temporary stopgap measure that lets us focus our resources 
wisely while giving a degree of relief and hope to talented, driven, patriotic 
young people.  It is the right thing to do.” 124  Many critics have stated that 
the President and the DHS’s actions circumvented congressional authority 
since Congress most recently denied the DREAM Act in 2012.125  However, 
although the concept and individuals affected by this new immigration policy 
remain the same, the outcome is significantly different.126  As stated previ-
ously in this article, the DHS and the Obama Administration have made it 
clear that the execution of prosecutorial discretion through the use of de-
ferred action on qualified individuals is not permanent relief like the relief 
that would be afforded by the DREAM Act.127  Rather, it is a temporary “pol-
icy for the exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing 
law.”128  Thus, this action does not evade congressional authority, and is also 
within the scope and nature of executive authority.129  This recent decision 
 121. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  “[A] year and a half ago, Demo-
crats passed the DREAM Act in the House, but Republicans walked away from it.  It got 
[fifty-five] votes in the Senate, but Republicans blocked it.”  President Barack Obama, supra
note 2. 
 122. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3; President Barack Obama, 
supra note 2. 
 123. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2; President Barack Obama, 
supra note 2. 
 124. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 125. Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?, supra note 11, at 
1:34, 2:45. 
 126. PBS Newshour:  What Obama’s Immigration Move Means for Undocumented Youth, 
Politics (PBS television broadcast June 15, 2012), available at www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
bb/politics/jan-june12/dreamact_06-15.html.  Cecilia Munoz, Director of the White House 
Domestic Policy Counsel, points out in an interview with PBS that the decision by Secretary 
Napolitano is not permanent and will not give these qualified undocumented individuals a 
pathway to citizenship as would the DREAM Act, which is up to Congress to decide on, not 
the DHS.  Id. 
 127. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
 128. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 129. See id.
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leaves an opportunity for Congress to once again act in a positive way and 
create a pathway to citizenship for undocumented minors, who through no 
fault of their own have been brought to the United States and raised Ameri-
cans.130  As the President stated, “[p]recisely, because [the execution] is tem-
porary, Congress needs to act.”131
This portion of the article will explain the DREAM Act that was reject-
ed by the Senate in 2010 and its provisions, as well as the differences be-
tween it and the DHS’s execution of prosecutorial discretion.  Moreover, this 
section will discuss the future of the individuals affected by both a future 
passing of the DREAM Act and the new immigration policy laid out by both 
the Obama Administration and the DHS. 
A. Overview of the DREAM Act 
Up until June 15, 2012, undocumented minors who were brought to the 
United States illegally as young children or infants through no fault of their 
own could potentially be deported at any moment by the ICE.132  Some of 
these individuals, if lucky, would receive deferred action through the use of 
prosecutorial discretion at the micro level.133  However, not every undocu-
mented minor who met these criteria would receive deferred action, and most 
would have to be deported back to countries they may not know “or even 
speak the language.”134  This constant deportation of young, talented individ-
uals from the United States is what brought about the creation of some form 
of legislation that would allow these hardworking individuals to continue 
their quest to live the American Dream.135  The legislative act that resulted 
from this need for fairness was the DREAM Act; however, numerous ver-
sions of the DREAM Act have been before Congress throughout the years, 
yet not one version has been able to pass Congress and become law.136  The 
most recent version presented to Congress of the DREAM Act was in 
2010.137  Ironically, both the Republican and the Democratic Parties drafted 
 130. President Barack Obama, supra note 2.  “There is still time for Congress to pass the 
DREAM Act this year, because these kids deserve to plan their lives in more than two-year 
increments.”  Id.
 131. Id.
 132. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–2; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
 133. Elisha Barron, The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) 
Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 624 (2011). 
 134. Id.; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2. 
 135. Barron, supra note 133, at 623–24. 
 136. Id. at 623. 
 137. Id.
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the legislation.138  However, only the Democratic Party voted for it in the 
House of Representatives while the Republican Party did not.139  Although 
the provisions of the 2010 DREAM Act were more restrictive than the previ-
ously presented versions, the concepts of each version of the DREAM Act 
have remained, for the most part, constant since its creation in 2001.140  Each 
version of the DREAM Act has contained two essential parts that the activ-
ists of the DREAM Act have pushed for:  The first includes a pathway to 
citizenship for individuals who were illegally brought into the United States 
before the age of sixteen, and the second part consists of the receipt of public 
benefits that would have otherwise been unavailable to those individuals due 
to their lack of legal status in the United States.141
The first benefit provided for by the 2010 version of the DREAM Act is 
its pathway to citizenship for individuals who qualify.142  To qualify for the 
DREAM Act, an undocumented individual must have arrived in the United 
States prior to the age of sixteen and have remained in the United States for 
at least five consecutive years.143  The 2010 version of the DREAM Act also 
requires that the individual qualifying for the DREAM Act be no more than 
thirty years of age at the time of its enactment.144  Thus, an individual who is 
thirty-five and who arrived in the United States at the age of twelve would 
not qualify for citizenship under the DREAM Act.145  Additionally, to quali-
fy, an individual must demonstrate that he or she has been “admitted to an 
institution” of postsecondary education in the United States and must also 
show that he or she has received a high school diploma or a certificate of 
GED.146  However, it should be noted that while an individual may meet the 
above requirements for qualification of the DREAM Act, an individual may 
still be disqualified for a number of different reasons including having a 
criminal background,147 being a threat to the safety of the public, or a threat 
to the security of the nation.148  The last and most puzzling of the require-
ments necessary to qualify for the DREAM Act is the requirement that an 
individual must have “good moral character.”149  While no definition for 
 138. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 139. Id.
 140. See Barron, supra note 133, at 632–33. 
 141. Id. at 626. 
 142. Id.
 143. DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 4(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
 144. Id. § 4(a)(1)(F). 
 145. See id.
 146. Id. § 4(a)(1)(D); Barron, supra note 133, at 627. 
 147. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 148. Id. § 1227(a)(4). 
 149. Barron, supra note 133, at 628. 
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“good moral character” exists in any of the versions of the DREAM Act, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has provided a set list of activities 
which are to be used in determining whether an individual would qualify as 
having “good moral character” or not.150  Moreover, the INA states that this 
is not an exhaustive list and that other activities may disqualify an individual 
from having “good moral character.”151  More importantly, the decision is 
left to the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, who will make 
the determination as to whether an individual is of “good moral character” if 
he or she acts in a way not listed by the INA, but acts in a questionable man-
ner.152  Thus, if an individual is found to have violated any of the require-
ments of the DREAM Act, “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall ter-
minate the conditional nonimmigrant status,”153 by returning the individual to 
his previous status of undocumented alien.154
Once the individual is found to have met the requirements necessary to 
qualify for the DREAM Act, the individual must take steps outlined by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security as to the procedures for applying.155  Not 
only do these individuals have to qualify and apply for relief, they are also 
required to apply no later than one year from the date the individual was ad-
mitted to a postsecondary school in the United States,156 the date the individ-
ual received a high school diploma or GED in the United States,157 or the 
date of enactment of the DREAM Act,158 whichever is latest.159  Additionally, 
each individual is required to submit biometric and biographic data to rule 
out past criminal history.160  Moreover, the individual must undergo a medi-
 150. Id.
[T]he INA states that an individual shall not be found to have good moral character if he or 
she:  (1) is or was a habitual drunkard; (2) derives income principally from illegal gambling ac-
tivities; (3) has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses; (4) has given false testimo-
ny for the purpose of obtaining any benefit under the INA; (5) has been incarcerated for 180 
days or more as a result of conviction; or (6) has been convicted of an aggravated felony. 
Id.
 151. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2006). 
 152. Barron, supra note 133, at 628. 
 153. DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1) (2010).  “The term ‘conditional 
nonimmigrant’ means an alien who is granted conditional nonimmigrant status under this 
Act.”  Id. § 3(3)(A). 
 154. Id. § 5(c)(2). 
 155. See id. § 4(a)(3). 
 156. Id. § 4(a)(4)(A). 
 157. S. 3992 § 4(a)(4)(B). 
 158. Id. § 4(a)(4)(C). 
 159. Id. § 4(a)(4). 
 160. Id. § 4(a)(5)–(6).  Without an individual submitting both biometric and biographic 
data, “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may not cancel [or defer] the removal of an” 
individual who would otherwise qualify for relief under the 2010 DREAM Act.  Id. § 4(a)(5).  
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cal examination pursuant to the policies laid forth by the Secretary of Home-
land Security,161 and must “register[] under the Military Selective Service 
Act.”162  Once an individual has met all of the requirements and has qualified 
and applied for the DREAM Act, the individual may begin the pathway to 
citizenship promised by the Act itself.163
The 2010 bill presented to the 111th Congress required that an individ-
ual go through three stages before completing the pathway to citizenship 
with the minimum time frame being thirteen years.164  The first stage is a 
conditional ten-year period during which time the individual receives a 
“nonimmigrant status.”165  This status may be revoked at any time if the indi-
vidual is found to have violated certain restrictions.166  During this time, the 
individual is not required to complete “postsecondary education or military 
service.”167  Furthermore, the earliest an individual may request his or her 
status to change from “nonimmigrant” to “alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence,” the second stage of the DREAM Act, is in the ninth year 
of the first stage.168  Thus, if an individual applies for relief under the 
DREAM Act at the age of eighteen, he or she would not be able to request a 
status change until the age of twenty-seven.169  Up until that time, the indi-
vidual will be conditionally legal in the United States.170  Upon the individu-
al’s completion of the first stage, the individual’s status becomes “‘alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence.’”171  However, unlike the first stage, 
the second stage would require the individual to have completed at least two 
years of postsecondary education or military service.172  Moreover, an excep-
tion to the requirements necessary for the second stage exists.173  If an indi-
vidual can demonstrate that he or she had “compelling circumstances” that 
did not allow him or her to meet the requirement, and he or she can show 
unusual hardship, then the Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the 
Such data will then be used by the DHS to conduct background checks to determine whether 
an individual is harmful to the security of the public or the nation.  S. 3992 § 4(a)(6). 
 161. Id. § 4(a)(7). 
 162. Id. § 4(a)(8). 
 163. See id. § 6(k); see also Barron, supra note 133, at 626. 
 164. Barron, supra note 133, at 626. 
 165. Id.
 166. Id.
 167. Id.
 168. S. 3992 § 6(a), (c); Barron, supra note 133, at 626–27.
 169. See S. 3992 § 6(c).
 170. Id.
 171. Barron, supra note 133, at 626–27. 
 172. Id. at 627. 
 173. Id. at 630. 
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requirement pursuant to the right of prosecutorial discretion.174  The last 
stage “provides for naturalization175 upon compliance with all relevant provi-
sions of the INA, and after three years of residence in the United States as a 
legal permanent resident.”176  It should be noted that the three-year wait for 
application is different than the normal five-year wait required by those ap-
plying for legal residence in the United States.177  Aside from the benefit of 
possibly becoming a citizen of the United States, the DREAM Act would 
also provide for the receipt of limited public benefits to individuals who 
qualified.178  However, such benefits have been limited substantially in the 
2010 version of the DREAM Act compared to the DREAM Act presented in 
2001.179
B. Comparing and Contrasting the DREAM Act to the New Executive Im-
migration Policy 
The DREAM Act and the DHS’s new execution of prosecutorial discre-
tion would ultimately affect the same group of individuals.180  Although this 
is true, the two reliefs consist of very different outcomes for these individuals 
and ultimately determine the rights afforded to them in the long run.181  As 
previously stated, the DHS’s execution of prosecutorial discretion is not a 
pathway to citizenship and does not change the immigration status of the 
individuals that qualify for deferred action.182  Rather, these individuals are 
only given the peace of mind of not being deported for a period of two years, 
as well as the possibility of receiving work authorization upon proof of eco-
nomic necessity.183  On the other hand, the passing of the DREAM Act 
would provide these qualified individuals with both a pathway to citizenship 
and public benefits, which would otherwise only be accessible to legal resi-
dents and/or citizens of the United States.184  It is important to note that the 
 174. S. 3992 § 6(d)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii); Barron, supra note 133, at 630. 
 175. “The term ‘naturalization’ means the conferring of nationality of a state upon a per-
son after birth, by any means whatsoever.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (2006). 
 176. Barron, supra note 133, at 627. 
 177. Compare S. 3992 § 4(a)(1)(A), with id. § 6(k). 
 178. Barron, supra note 133, at 631; see also S. 3992 § 11. 
 179. Barron, supra note 133, at 631.  The 2010 Bill did not include the possibility for 
individuals who qualified to receive affirmative school grants, rather they would be able to 
receive student loans, which would have to be paid back.  Id.; see also S. 3992 § 11. 
 180. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 181. Compare id., with Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 2–4. 
 182. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3; President Barack Obama, 
supra note 2; see supra Part II.B. 
 183. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2–3; see supra Part II.A.3., 4. 
 184. Barron, supra note 133, at 632; see supra Part III.A. 
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DREAM Act would provide an individual with nonimmigrant status, which 
would enable the individual to work as well as the right to travel in and out 
of the United States without a visa.185  However, as Secretary Napolitano and 
the President have stated, the deferred action of these 800,000 individuals is 
not a legal status and will give no permanent relief.186  Thus, it would not 
permit the individual to travel in and out of the country nor allow the indi-
vidual to qualify for work authorization absent a showing of economic ne-
cessity.187
As a result of the 2010 failure of the DREAM Act, these undocumented 
individuals were afforded no relief and could be subject to deportation at any 
time,188 thus clouding the system with cases not worthy of deportation.189
Therefore, in order to use its resources wisely, the DHS, using its right to 
prosecutorial discretion, chose to defer the deportation or future deportation 
of individuals who for all intents and purposes posed no threat to national 
security or the public.190  The DHS and the President, without taking into 
account their views on the DREAM Act, used cost-effective tools to priori-
tize the individuals who will or will not be deported out of the country.191  By 
deferring the deportation proceedings of low-priority cases, the DHS will be 
able to focus on the deportation of high-priority cases such as drug dealers, 
criminals, terrorist, and other cases that may pose a threat to the public and 
society while giving temporary relief to individuals who have not purposely 
violated any of the immigration laws of the country.192  However, such action 
would afford only temporary relief, while still leaving the need for perma-
nent relief.193
IV. “THE RIGHT THING TO DO”
Although this execution of prosecutorial discretion is temporary relief 
for individuals who have not purposely violated the law, it is a form of relief 
 185. DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 5(a)–(b) (2010). 
 186. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also Memorandum from Janet Napoli-
tano, supra note 20, at 3; Kelly’s Court:  Is President Obama’s Immigration Move Legal?,
supra note 11, at 3:48. 
 187. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 3. 
 188. See Barron, supra note 133, at 623–24, 626. 
 189. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1. 
 190. Id.
 191. Id. at 2–3; see also President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 192. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–2; see also President 
Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 193. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, 
supra note 20, at 3. 
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that will allow qualified undocumented individuals to remain in the United 
States without the fear of possible deportation to estranged countries.194
More important is the fact that this action would allow the DHS to direct its 
limited funds at cases that pose a threat to the safety of the public and the 
nation.195  These individuals will be allowed to remain in the United States 
for a period of two years with the possibility of renewal,196 which will allow 
Congress to focus on the more important issue of actually passing the true 
goal, the DREAM Act.197  Such efforts will aid Congress in the future when 
passing the DREAM Act, which will provide these individuals—otherwise 
affected by DHS’s new immigration policy—with permanent relief through a 
pathway to citizenship.198  It is very important that these immigrants, who 
would have to meet a very stringent set of requirements to qualify for the 
DREAM Act,199 be able to receive some form of permanent relief, as living 
in two-year increments is not a positive way to live.200  There are, however, 
proponents of the DREAM Act, who are not on board with the DHS’s execu-
tion of prosecutorial discretion.201  Republican Senator of Florida, Marco 
Rubio, has stated that the recent Act by DHS “‘is a short-term answer to a 
long-term problem . . . . [T]his short term policy will make it harder to find a 
balanced and responsible long-term one.”202  It is important for both the 
Democratic and Republican parties to come to some form of agreement as to 
the DREAM Act so that these individuals are afforded the right to remain in 
the United States as citizens of the only country they know as home.  It needs 
to be remembered by those opposing the law that this country was founded 
by immigrants,203 and at one point there was no set of immigration laws to 
follow.204  Eligible immigrants were afforded the right to stay in this country 
and to beneficially contribute to the growth and prosperity of the United 
 194. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1–2; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
 195. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 1; President Barack Obama, 
supra note 2. 
 196. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2–3. 
 197. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 198. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 20, at 2–3; President Barack 
Obama, supra note 2. 
 199. See Barron, supra note 133, at 626–30; see also DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th 
Cong. §§ 4–5 (2010). 
 200. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 201. See Sanchez, supra note 5. 
 202. Id.
 203. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 204. See History of Immigration Laws in the U.S., EBSCOHOST CONNECTION,
http://connection.ebscohost.com/us/immigration-restrictions/history-immigration-laws-us (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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States.205  Therefore, it would only seem logical that immigrants who have 
not purposely violated any laws be allowed to remain in the United States 
given they demonstrate a commitment to becoming legal Americans and 
further abiding by the requirements necessary to qualify for a pathway to 
citizenship.  It is also noteworthy to point out that many of these individuals 
will or are already beneficially contributing to the country in numerous ways.  
One of the important ways in which these individuals are contributing is 
through the economy.206  As the President has stated to the people of the 
United States, “it [would] make[] no sense to expel talented young people . . 
. who want to staff our labs . . . start new businesses, or defend our country 
simply because of the actions of their parents.”207  President Obama is not the 
only one who believes the DREAM Act will add greatly to the economy of 
the United States, as many activists and politicians have stated time and time 
again that expelling young individuals who have done no wrong and are 
ready and willing to learn and contribute to society would greatly disad-
vantage the United States.208  Studies have demonstrated that, in the long run, 
the benefits of the DREAM Act are great.209  The Congressional Budget Of-
fice estimates that the DREAM Act, if passed, would increase revenue by 
more than two billion dollars, as well as reduce deficits by more than one 
billion dollars over a ten year period.210  What is brushed aside is the amount 
of money Americans have already invested in these qualified undocumented 
individuals.211  By not allowing them to directly contribute to the United 
States’ economy, the American public is essentially losing money.212  These 
are individuals who, for all intents and purposes, have lived and gone to 
school in the United States their entire lives, schools that Americans pay for 
through taxes.213  By passing the DREAM Act, these individuals would be 
allowed to continue their education and contribute to society and the econo-
 205. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2; Javier Palomarez, Make the DREAM Act 
a Reality, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Dec. 18, 2010, at A20; History of Immigration Laws in the 
U.S., supra note 204. 
 206. Palomarez, supra note 205. 
 207. President Barack Obama, supra note 2.
 208. Id.; Palomarez, supra note 205.  “[W]e [Americans] actually want well-educated kids 
in our country who are able to succeed and become part of this economy and part of the 
American dream.”  Barack Obama in 2008 Democratic Debate on the Eve of Super Tuesday,
ONTHEISSUES (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.onthissues.org/archive/2008_dems_super_ tues-
day_barack_obama.htm. 
 209. Palomarez, supra note 205. 
 210. Id.
 211. Id.; see Sanchez, supra note 5. 
 212. See Palomarez, supra note 205. 
 213. Id.
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my.214  Additionally, the DREAM Act will aide in the “nation’s efforts to 
have the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by 2020.”215
Seeing that many Americans are concerned that the DREAM Act will incen-
tivize the future illegal immigration of many undocumented individuals, it is 
important that the DREAM Act be passed as part of a larger comprehensive 
immigration plan to discontinue illegal immigration into the United States.216
Such a plan would prevent the future crossing of hundreds of thousands of 
undocumented individuals while still providing permanent relief to those 
individuals who have been paying the price of their parents’ mistakes.217
V. CONCLUSION
A better understanding of the actions of the government is the first step 
to a better immigration system in the United States.  The public’s awareness 
of the role the DHS plays in the expelling or non-expelling of individuals 
from our country is crucial in the support of legislation that will further bene-
fit the country as well as hundreds of thousands of worthy candidates.  The 
DHS and the President have not gone beyond their constitutional authority 
by using prosecutorial discretion in picking and choosing what cases to give 
high priority to, as the Supreme Court has consistently held that prosecutorial 
discretion is the sole right of the immigration agencies to conserve the lim-
ited resources available to them.218  It is important to note that the most re-
cent use of prosecutorial discretion by the DHS will affect the same group of 
individuals who would have otherwise qualified for the DREAM Act had it 
passed in the Senate in 2010.219  But it will by no means give the same result.  
Therefore, it is up to the American public to push the government and its 
politicians to pass the DREAM Act in order to give Annie and other similar 
individuals, who are living in and beneficially contributing to the United 
States, the protections afforded to Americans under the United States Consti-
tution.  “It is the right thing to do.”220
 214. Id.
 215. Id. 
 216. See Barron, supra note 133, at 648. 
 217. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
 218. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), superseded 
by statute, FED. R. EVID. 104 (a), as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 
(1987); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 
457 (1868)); see also Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 3. 
 219. Compare Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 72, at 7–8, with DREAM 
Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. § 4(a)(1)(A)–(F) (2010). 
 220. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
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BRIAN ROTH∗
I. INTRODUCTION
James Huberty drove to a McDonald’s restaurant “after announc-
ing casually to his wife, ‘I’m going to hunt humans.’”  Stepping 
into the restaurant with a 9-millimeter Browning automatic pistol 
in his belt and a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9-millimeter UZI semiau-
tomatic rifle slung over his shoulders, Huberty called out, “‘Eve-
rybody on the floor.’  About 45 patrons were present.  As they 
scrambled to comply, Huberty marched around the restaurant 
calmly spraying gunfire . . . . 
Maria Diaz ran out the side door in panic when the shooting start-
ed, then remembered that her two-year-old son was still inside.  
She crept back to a window and saw him sitting obediently in a 
booth.  She motioned him toward the door, nudged it open, and the 
boy toddled to safety.” 
Not everyone was so fortunate. 
After SWAT sharpshooters finally killed Huberty, “police and 
hospital workers moved in on the gruesome scene.  A mother and 
father lay sprawled across their baby, apparently in an attempt to 
shield it.  All three were dead.” 
The carnage was clearly far worse than it would have been had 
Huberty not been armed with semiautomatic weapons.  He fired 
hundreds of rounds.  “The gunfire was so heavy that police at first 
assumed that more than one gunman was inside.  A fire truck took 
six shots before reversing direction and backing off.  One fire 
fighter was grazed by a bullet that tore through the truck and then 
landed softly on his head.” 
∗. Brian Roth is a student at The John Marshall Law School, where he serves as editor-
in-chief of The John Marshall Law Review.  He will graduate in May 2013.  He wishes to 
thank his family for their love and support. 
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In all, of the 45 patrons in the restaurant, Huberty killed 21 and 
wounded 15 others.1
Unfortunately, this is just one of many instances where the use of as-
sault weapons has resulted in catastrophic tragedy.2  The shootings in Auro-
ra, Colorado,3 Oak Creek, Wisconsin,4 and Portland, Oregon5 are some of the 
most recent incidents involving assault weapons. 
On July 20, 2012, a gunman—James Eagan Holmes—entered a movie 
theater in Aurora, Colorado and opened fire.6  He first launched gas grenades 
and then began calmly and methodically shooting.7  One of the individuals 
present described the scene:  “‘He was sitting there like target practice.  He 
was trying to shoot as many people as he could.’”8  As another person ob-
served:  “‘There was gunfire, there were babies, there were kids, there was 
blood everywhere.’”9  The gunman killed twelve and wounded fifty-eight.10
Authorities speculated that the carnage would have been worse, but for the 
fact that the gunman’s assault weapon jammed.11
On August 5, 2012, Wade Michael Page killed six and wounded four at 
a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.12  Page was allegedly motivated by a 
 1. Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 587 (Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 2. See, e.g., Assault Weapons Policy Summary, L. CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE
(May 21, 2012), http://smartgunlaws.org/assault-weapons-policy-summary/.  Assault weapons 
have been the weapon of choice in many high-profile incidents, including the “1993 office 
shooting[s] at . . . 101 California Street . . . in San Francisco, [California],” the “1999 Colum-
bine High School massacre in [Columbine,] Colorado,” and the 2007 Westroads Mall shoot-
ing in Omaha, Nebraska.  Id.
 3. Jennifer Brown, Midnight Massacre:  Aurora Theater Shooting “Our Hearts are 
Broken,” DENVER POST, July 21, 2012, at A1. 
 4. Police Identify Army Veteran as Wisconsin Temple Shooting Gunman, CNN U.S. 
(Aug. 7, 2012, 7:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/06/us/wisconsin-temple-
shooting/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
 5. John Bacon, Oregon Mall Shooter, Victims Identified, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2012, 
6:51 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/11/oregon-mall-
shooting/1762473/. 
 6. See Brown, supra note 3. 
 7. Id.
 8. Id.
 9. Ed Pilkington & Matt Williams, Colorado Theater Shooting:  12 Shot Dead During 
The Dark Knight Rises Screening, THEGUARDIAN (July 20, 2012, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/20/colorado-theater-shooting-dark-knight. 
 10. Brown, supra note 3. 
 11. David A. Fahrenthold et al., A Day of Tears and Twists in Colorado, WASH. POST,
July 23, 2012, at A1. 
 12. Police Identify Army Veteran as Wisconsin Temple Shooting Gunman, supra note 4; 
see also Todd Richmond, Wade Michael Page, Sikh Temple Shooter, Acted Alone, FBI Says,
HUFF POST (Nov. 20, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/wade-
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fervent commitment to white supremacy causes.13  The deceased victims 
ranged in age from thirty-nine to eighty-four years old.14  Page was armed 
with a lawfully-purchased “Springfield Armory XDM 9-[millimeter] semiau-
tomatic pistol.”15
On December 11, 2012, Jacob Tyler Roberts entered a mall near Port-
land, Oregon with an AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle.16  On a busy holi-
day shopping day, Roberts killed two people and seriously injured a third 
person before turning the gun on himself.17  Clackamas County Sheriff, Craig 
Roberts, said “the death toll would have been higher had the shooter’s assault 
rifle not jammed and law enforcement not responded within minutes of the 
first shot.”18
The incidents in Aurora, Oak Creek, and Portland have undoubtedly in-
vigorated the gun control debate.19  This article argues that although the deci-
michael-page-acted-alone_n_2168229.html (reporting that the FBI concluded Page acted 
alone). 
 13. Miranda Leitsinger, Experts:  Alleged Temple Gunman Wade Michael Page Led Neo-
Nazi Band, Had Deep Extremist Ties, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:48 PM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/06/13147115-experts-alleged-temple-gunman-
wade-michael-page-led-neo-nazi-band-had-deep-extremist-ties. 
 14. Erica Goode & Serge F. Kovaleski, A Killer Who Fed and Was Fueled by Hate, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1. 
 15. Temple Shooter Bought Gun at Suburban Shop, CHANNEL3000.COM (Aug. 7, 2012, 
3:18 PM), http://www.channel3000.com/news/Temple-shooter-bought-gun-at-suburban-
shop/-/1648/16004660/-/eqy0rf/-/index.html (reporting that Page lawfully purchased the semi-
automatic weapon on July 28, and Page retrieved the firearm on July 30 after clearing a re-
quired background check); see also Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Kim Murphy, Sikh Temple 
Shooting:  Gun Shop Owner Says Wade Page Seemed Normal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012, 
4:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-sikh-shooting-guns-
20120807,0,7536671.story. 
 16. Bacon, supra note 5. 
 17. Rachel La Corte & Steven Dubois, Oregon Mall Shooting:  Gunman Opens Fire at 
Clackamas Town Center Mall in Portland, Kills 2, Self, HUFF POST (Dec. 12, 2012, 8:34 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/oregon-mall-shooting_n_2285243.html. 
 18. Bacon, supra note 5; see also Teresa Carson, Deadly Oregon Mall Shooting Ap-
peared to Be Lone, Random Rampage, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2012, 6:08 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-usa-shooting-oregon-
idUSBRE8BB01720121212 (stating that “carnage from the shooting likely was limited by the 
fact the gun jammed”); Kirk Johnson & Serge F. Kovaleski, Series of Turning Points Kept 
Mall Toll Lower than Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, at A20 (reporting that although the 
gunman’s assault rifle jammed, he was able to fire approximately sixty rounds); Police ID 
Suspect in Oregon Mall Shooting, Say Gun Jammed Possibly Preventing More Deaths,
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/12/gun-jammed-in-
oregon-mall-shooting-as-authorities-id-suspect/?test=latestnews (opining that the jamming 
likely prevented additional deaths). 
 19. See Jennifer Brown & Colleen O’Connor, Past Shooting Victims Unite in Urging 
Action, DENVER POST, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1; see also Rick Jervis & John McAuliff, Colo. 
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sion of the Supreme Court of the United States in District of Columbia v. 
Heller (Heller I)20 marks a high point in individual rights under the Second 
Amendment, assault weapons bans nevertheless fall outside of the Second 
Amendment’s scope.21  Further, this article proposes that Congress should 
promptly enact a law proscribing the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
assault weapons due to their propensity to inflict catastrophic violence.22
Part II of this article briefly explores the history of the Second Amend-
ment, including the various modes of its interpretation and the major Su-
preme Court cases in this area.23  This section also concisely defines assault 
weapons and discusses the prevalence of assault weapons bans throughout 
the United States.24
Part III analyzes how lower courts have dealt with challenges to their 
jurisdictions’ assault weapons bans after Heller I was decided.25
Part IV argues that some of these lower court decisions were correctly 
decided, and that Heller I’s holding does not bestow a constitutional right to 
keep and bear assault weapons for any purpose.26  This section also proposes 
a bill, drafted by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, on which Con-
gress should vote to criminalize the manufacture, sale, and possession of 
assault weapons.27
Rampage Adds Fuel to Gun-Control Debate, USA TODAY (July 24, 2012), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-24/aurora-gun-control-
debate/56465980/1.  Surprisingly, however, Americans’ views on gun control laws remain 
relatively unchanged.  THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., VIEWS ON GUNLAWS UNCHANGED AFTER 
AURORA SHOOTING 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/2012/07/30/views-
on-gun-laws-unchanged-after-aurora-shooting/ (stating that “[t]he issue remains a highly 
partisan one:  Republicans prioritize gun rights by a 71% to 26% margin, while Democrats 
prioritize gun control by a 72% to 21% margin”). 
 20. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.A–B; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 25. See discussion infra Part III; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577. 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625 (citing United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)). 
 27. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Second Amendment and Its Modes of Interpretation 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states:  “A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”28
The meaning of these twenty-seven words has been the source of 
marked contention.29  Broadly speaking, there are two primary theories of 
interpretation:  A collective people’s right and an individual’s right.30  Indi-
vidual’s right theorists believe that the Second Amendment right should not 
be interpreted differently from other constitutional provisions, which confer 
individual rights.31  Collective people’s right supporters contend that the 
founders’ concern regarding the Second Amendment primarily revolved 
around “the allocation of military power,” and as a result, the right conferred 
is a collective people’s right.32  “Each side of the debate claims that its view 
is in accord with the” framers’ intent.33  Each side also maintains that its in-
terpretation is in line with the original and plain meanings.34  To be sure, 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 29. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 26 (3d ed. 
2006) (referring to the Second Amendment as a source of “heated debate among scholars” and 
laymen alike). 
 30. See id.; see also Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 793, 793–94, 794 n.2, 810 (1998); David Yassky, The Second Amendment:  Structure, 
History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 613 (2000). 
 31. Volokh, supra note 30, at 794, 810 (stating that the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amend-
ments use the phrase “‘the right of the people’” and there is general agreement that those 
amendments confer individual rights; similarly, the Second Amendment confers such a right);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 32. See Yassky, supra note 30, at 598–99, 620–21 n.130 (stating that “the Second 
Amendment speaks only of ‘the people’ in their collective capacity as militiamen”); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 27.  Compare Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 
1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Second Amendment protects only a collective people’s 
right to keep and bear arms), abrogated in part by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008), with United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms). 
 34. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 16–17 (2009) (stating that individ-
ual right theorists maintain that “‘people’ is primarily [used] in the Bill of Rights when refer-
ring to the individual,” and consequently the Second Amendment protects individuals.  Col-
lective right theorists, on the other hand, contend “that because the militia was composed of a 
[group] of people . . . the ‘right to keep and bear arms’ can only be exercised by the collective 
people when . . . servi[ng] [in] the militia.”); see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’
SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 325 (2008) (examining the early 
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these modes of interpretation do not produce any satisfying answer to the 
question of which right the Second Amendment confers.  The case law, then, 
must be analyzed to address this issue. 
B. Major Supreme Court Decisions Pertaining to the Second Amendment 
1. United States v. Cruikshank:  The Second Amendment’s Inapplicability 
to the States 
United States v. Cruikshank35 was the first Supreme Court case that di-
rectly addressed the Second Amendment.36  In that case—which centered on 
the Colfax massacre in Louisiana—the defendants were charged with violat-
ing a federal statute prohibiting individuals from conspiring to deprive other 
individuals of their constitutionally-protected rights.37  A Second Amend-
ment issue arose—not because the defendants confiscated the black citizens’ 
firearms or prevented them from joining the state militia—but because the 
defendants prevented the black citizens from voting and thereby restricted 
them from bearing arms.38
In addressing the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim, the Court 
agreed with the plaintiffs that the Second Amendment declares that the right 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.39  The Court clarified, however, 
that this right “means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Con-
gress,” and as a result, the Second Amendment is not a restraint on state gov-
ernments or private individuals.40
dictionary definition of “‘people,’” which includes “‘persons in general’” and “‘the common-
alty [sic], as distinct from men of rank,’” and subsequently determining that “‘the people’” 
refers to individuals); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 168–211 (2002) (analyzing 
briefly the scholarly contributions of Sanford Levinson, Carl Bogus, William Van Alstyne, 
Akhil Reed Amar, and David Yassky, and determining that these learned authors support 
disparate views). 
 35. 92 U.S. 542 (1875), abrogated by McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 36. CHARLES, supra note 34, at 64 (stating that this case marked the first time that the 
Supreme Court gave “the Second Amendment any significant attention”); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. II. 
 37. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548; JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT 
MEMOIR 22–23 (2011) (describing the sociopolitical and legal circumstances surrounding the 
Colfax massacre). 
 38. CHARLES, supra note 34, at 64 (stating that the Second Amendment became an issue 
in addition to the right to peacefully assemble and the right to enjoy life and liberty); see
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 39. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 40. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553 (stating further that “[t]his is one of the amendments that 
has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government”); see also U.S.
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2. Presser v. Illinois:  A Narrow Second Amendment 
Just eleven years after Cruikshank came Presser v. lllinois,41 in which 
the plaintiff contested an Illinois law that made it unlawful for citizens to 
assemble and form a militia bearing arms without the express consent of the 
governor.42  The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the law violated the Second 
Amendment.43
The Court reaffirmed its core holding in Cruikshank and confirmed that 
the Second Amendment prohibits “only . . . the power[s] of Congress and the 
National [G]overnment.”44  The Second Amendment did not protect the 
plaintiff’s purported right to keep and bear arms because neither Congress 
nor the National Government enacted the law at issue and the state govern-
ment did not eliminate its militia.45  The Court further explained that al-
though states cannot enact laws that eviscerate the militia force, any law 
short of that would not be invalidated by the Second Amendment.46
3. United States v. Miller:  The “Well-Regulated Militia” Requirement 
United States v. Miller47 was perhaps the most important Supreme Court 
decision pertaining to the Second Amendment prior to 2008.48  In that case, 
the defendants were indicted for possessing a shotgun with “a barrel less than 
[eighteen] inches” in violation of a federal statute.49  The trial court quashed 
the indictment, holding that the law violated the defendants’ Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.50
CONST. amend. II; STEVENS, supra note 37, at 23 (stating that this “unfortunate decision paved 
the way for continued racial violence and the enactment of state laws throughout the South 
that deprived blacks of full citizenship for decades”). 
 41. 116 U.S. 252 (1886); see generally Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. 
 42. Presser, 116 U.S. at 262. 
 43. Id. at 264. 
 44. Id. at 265; see also Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
 45. Presser, 116 U.S. at 264–65. 
 46. Id. at 265. 
 47. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 48. With that said, however, Miller has also been heavily criticized by commentators due 
to its brevity and relatively simplistic analysis.  See, e.g., BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON 
TRIAL: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE OVER THE SECOND AMENDMENT 15 (2008) (“Mil-
ler is an unusual case on which to rest an entire edifice of constitutional interpretation.”); see
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 34, at 18–19 (characterizing Miller as “problematic from the 
standpoint of Second Amendment doctrine” because people arguing from each side of the 
aisle repeatedly “read the same language from the Miller opinion as confirming” its view). 
 49. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
 50. Id. at 177. 
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Hearing the case on direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court’s ruling, and issued the following, now famous, statement: 
 In the absence of any evidence tending to show that posses-
sion or use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen 
inches in length” at this time has some reasonable relationship to 
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot 
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and 
bear such an instrument.  Certainly it is not within judicial notice 
that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or 
that its use could contribute to the common defense.51
For many decades, Miller was understood to stand for the proposition 
that the Second Amendment conferred a right only in connection with militia 
service.52  That is to say that Miller turned on whether the weapon at issue 
was connected to the militia; it did not hinge on whether the individual was 
connected to the militia.53
C. How Do Assault Weapons Fit Into All of This? 
Assault weapons may be thought of as semiautomatic firearms that re-
quire an individual trigger pull to discharge each bullet.54  After one bullet is 
discharged, “the cartridge automatically reloads in preparation for the next 
shot.”55  Fully automatic firearms, in contrast, discharge bullets so long as the 
trigger is being pulled.56
In 1994, Congress passed a ten-year ban on assault weapons.57  The ban 
reached its sunset in 2004.58  The law “ban[ned] the manufacture, sale, and 
 51. Id. at 178 (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840)).  Interest-
ingly, the Court did not quickly conclude that the defendants were not members of a militia; to 
the contrary, it declared that all males are capable of constituting the militia, but, nevertheless, 
a sawed-off shotgun has no relation to any militia.  See DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 17. 
 52. Id.; see UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 34, at 18–19. 
 53. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 34, at 18–19; see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. 
 54. Daniel Abrams, Comment, Ending the Other Arms Race:  An Argument for a Ban on 
Assault Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 491 (1992). 
 55. Id.; see also Assault Weapons Policy Summary, supra note 2 (stating that these weap-
ons allow for “rapid and accurate spray firing”). 
 56. See Abrams, supra note 54, at 491–92 (analogizing fully automatic weapons with 
machine guns). 
 57. Assault Weapon Ban Expires, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/13/politics/main642984.shtml; David Johnston & 
Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Signs Crime Bill into Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 14, 
1994, at A8. 
 58. See Assault Weapon Ban Expires, supra note 57. 
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possession of 19 [specific] assault weapons.”59  The regulations promulgated 
under the assault weapons ban contained many definitions.60
First, the regulations listed the nineteen specific weapons by make and 
model number.61  Second, the regulations included in its definition semiau-
tomatic rifles that can accept detachable magazines and have at least two of 
the following:  “(1) A folding or telescoping stock, (2) [a] pistol grip that 
protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, (3) [a] bayonet 
mount, (4) [a] flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate a 
flash suppressor, and (5) [a] grenade launcher.”62  Third, the regulations in-
cluded in its definition semiautomatic pistols that can accept a detachable 
magazine and have at least two of the following: 
(1) An ammunition magazine that attaches to the pistol outside of 
the pistol grip, (2) [a] threaded barrel capable of acceptable a bar-
rel extender, flash suppressor, forward handgrip, or silencer, (3) [a] 
shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the 
barrel and that permits the shooter to hold the firearm with the 
nontrigger hand without being burned, (4) [a] manufactured weight 
of 50 ounces or more when the pistol is unloaded, and (5) [a] sem-
iautomatic version of an automatic firearm.63
Fourth, the regulations included in its definition semiautomatic shotguns that 
have at least two of the following:  “(1) A folding or telescoping stock, (2) 
[a] pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, 
(3) [a] fixed magazine capacity in excess of [five] rounds, and (4) [a]n ability 
to accept a detachable magazine.”64
These definitions are helpful when attempting to grasp the precise no-
tion of an assault weapon.65  For a simpler definition, it may be useful to con-
sider three factors in determining whether a particular firearm is an assault 
weapon:  (1) Military appearance, (2) likelihood and ease of transformation 
into a fully automatic weapon, and (3) cartridge size.66
Aside from the Federal Assault Weapons Ban of 1994, numerous state 
and municipal jurisdictions have implemented similar assault weapons bans 
 59. Johnston & Holmes, supra note 57. 
 60. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (2002). 
 61. Id. § 178.11, at 1139. 
 62. Id. § 178.11, at 1139–40. 
 63. Id. § 178.11, at 1140. 
 64. Id.
 65. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.11. 
 66. Abrams, supra note 54, at 492 (stating that these are the factors that the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms use in identifying weapons as assault weapons). 
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to thwart the dangerous propensity of these firearms.67  Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heller I, there was little doubt that assault weapons bans 
were constitutional and not in violation of the Second Amendment.  The 
question emerges then, whether Heller I changed the constitutional landscape 
of assault weapons bans.68
D. Heller I:  Shaking the Second Amendment Terrain 
In Heller I, the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amendment head-
on for the first time in nearly seven decades when it was called to decide 
whether a District of Columbia ban on handguns in the home is constitu-
tional.69  The District of Columbia criminalized the possession of an unregis-
tered handgun, and handgun registration was prohibited, thereby effectuating 
a handgun ban.70
The Court first thoroughly examined the meaning of the Second 
Amendment, and in particular, its linguistic components.71  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court that was split on ideological lines, analyzed the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause—“right of the people to keep and bear 
 67. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding Cali-
fornia’s assault weapons ban), abrogated in part by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008); Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 525–26, 539 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (citing Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 252 (6th Cir. 
1994)) (examining Columbus’s assault weapons ban); Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City 
of N.Y., 97 F.3d 681, 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding New York City’s assault weapons 
ban); Coal. of N.J. Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman, 44 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669, 693 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(upholding New Jersey’s assault weapons ban); Robertson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 874 
P.2d 325, 335–36 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (upholding Denver’s assault weapons ban); Benja-
min v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1228, 1242 (Conn. 1995) (upholding Connecticut’s assault 
weapons ban); City of Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ohio 2006) (upholding 
Cincinnati’s assault weapons ban); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166, 173, 
175 (Ohio 1993) (upholding Cleveland’s assault weapons ban).  Of course, those cases were 
all decided before Heller I. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 68. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 69. Id. at 573; DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 15.  As a background note, the idea to chal-
lenge the District of Columbia’s handgun ban was very well thought out and methodical.  See
DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 23 (crediting Robert Levy, a renowned libertarian, as the organ-
izer and financier of the effort). 
 70. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 574–75.  For the pertinent statutory provisions, please see sec-
tions 7-2501.01(10), (12), 7-2502.01, 7-2502.02, 7-2551.01, and 7-2551.02 of the District of 
Columbia Code. 
 71. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 579–99; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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[a]rms”—and its prefatory clause—“[a] well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State.”72
With regard to the operative clause, the Court determined that “the peo-
ple” could refer to only the individual, especially in light of the Fourth and 
Ninth Amendments’ use of “the people.”73  The Court also discovered that 
“[n]owhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ 
refer to anything other than an individual right.”74  The Court further stated 
that “the most natural reading of ‘keep [and bear] Arms’ . . . is to ‘have [and 
carry] weapons.’”75  This right applied to militiamen and ordinary citizens 
alike.76
With respect to the prefatory clause, the Court concluded that this lan-
guage merely “announces the purpose for which the right was codified:  [T]o 
prevent elimination of the militia.”77  Nothing in the prefatory clause indi-
cates that the sole reason that the right to keep and bear arms exists was to 
maintain the militia.78
After concluding this analysis, the Court then compared the Second 
Amendment to analogous state constitutional provisions enacted at the time 
of the Constitution’s ratification.79  Specifically, the Court referenced the 
constitutional provisions that confer the right to bear arms in Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, North Carolina, and Massachusetts:  “defence of themselves,” “de-
fence of the State,” and “the common defence,” respectively.80  The Court 
determined that the only logical conclusion was that these state constitutions 
“secured an individual[’s] right to [keep and] bear arms for [self-defense],” 
and consequently that was the original understanding of the federal constitu-
tional provision at the time.81
The Court turned next to the historical interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, including its own case law, from the amendment’s ratification 
up to the present case.82  The Court analyzed the post-ratification commen-
 72. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577, 579–98 (citations omitted); see also HALBROOK, supra note 
34, at 337 (stating that the founders intended the Constitution to be readable by any citizen, 
and that an “exhaustive textual analysis of the Second Amendment” became necessary only in 
the last half-century). 
 73. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 579 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV, IX). 
 74. Id. at 580. 
 75. Id. at 582 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II). 
 76. Id. at 583. 
 77. Id. at 599. 
 78. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 79. Id. at 600–03. 
 80. Id. at 601. 
 81. Id. at 602–03. 
 82. Id. at 605–26. 
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tary of St. George Tucker, William Rawle, and Joseph Story.83  It then con-
sidered relevant pre-Civil War case law,84 including Houston v. Moore,85
Nunn v. State,86 State v. Chandler,87 and Aymette v. State.88  After that, the 
Court examined the post-Civil War commentators and legislation.89  The 
Court also analyzed its own precedents in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller.90
After an extensive and exhaustive evaluation, the Court concluded that 
the “Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms,” 
and it rejected the argument that the amendment applies only in connection 
with militia service.91  As a result, the District of Columbia handgun ban was 
unconstitutional, because “the inherent right of self-defense has been central 
to the Second Amendment right.”92  The Court determined that the District of 
Columbia law prohibited an entire class of weapons that are most popular 
among American citizens for self-defense, and this ban extended to an indi-
vidual’s home where the need for self-defense is paramount.93  The District 
of Columbia handgun ban therefore failed to pass constitutional muster under 
any standard of scrutiny.94
E. McDonald v. City of Chicago:  The Incorporation of the Second 
Amendment to the States 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,95 just two years after Heller I, the 
Court evaluated Chicago and Oak Park laws that effectively amounted to 
handgun bans.96  The Court was faced with the important task of determining 
 83. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 606–10. 
 84. Id. at 610–14. 
 85. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
 86. 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 87. 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
 88. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). 
 89. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 614–19. 
 90. Id. at 619–25; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875), abro-
gated by McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 
264–65 (1886); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 182 (1939). 
 91. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 622. 
 92. Id. at 628. 
 93. Id. at 628–29. 
 94. Id.
 95. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 96. Id. at 3026.  The Chicago “ordinance [stated] that ‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . 
any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such fire-
arm.’”  Id. (second alteration in original).  In a separate provision, the Chicago Municipal 
Code prohibited most handgun registration, thereby “effectively banning handgun possession” 
within Chicago city limits.  Id.  Oak Park had a law that was similar to that of Chicago.  Id.
That law made it “‘unlawful for any person to possess . . . any firearm,’ a term that include[d] 
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whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.97  The Court noted that the 
majority of the Bill of Rights guarantees have been incorporated.98  Indeed, 
only a few of these guarantees have not been incorporated.99
The Court determined that neither Cruikshank nor Presser precluded it 
from considering whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the 
‘pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms . . . commonly known as handguns.’”  McDonald, 130 
S. Ct. at 3026. 
 97. Id. at 3028, 3031.  Heller I did not decide this issue because at issue in that case was 
a District of Columbia handgun ban—as opposed to a state handgun ban—and therefore the 
Court did not determine whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the states.  Heller I,
554 U.S. at 573. 
 98. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034; see also Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) 
(recognizing the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment right against excessive bail); Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 
(1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront an adverse witness); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (incorporating the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement), overruled on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279 (1991); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel), abrogated by Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 
(1979); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amend-
ment right against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 
(1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 278 
(1948) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the First 
Amendment right to freely assemble); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 
(1931) (incorporating the First Amendment right of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment right to freely speak); Chi., Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897) (incorporating the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 99. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034, 3035 & n.13.  The Bill of Rights guarantees that have 
not been fully incorporated are “the Third Amendment [right] against [the] quartering of sol-
diers,” the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury, “the Seventh Amendment 
right to a [trial by jury] in civil cases, and . . . the Eighth Amendment[] prohibition [against] 
excessive fines.”  Id. at 3035 n.13. 
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states.100  The Court reasoned that neither of those cases affected the present 
case because the “‘selective incorporation’” under the Due Process Clause 
had yet to begin at the time of those decisions.101  In considering whether the 
right to keep and bear arms is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,’” the Court pointed directly to Heller I itself for guidance.102
As expressed in Heller I, the right to self-defense is at the core of the 
Second Amendment.103  The McDonald Court echoed this sentiment and 
reasoned that, in the absence of stare decisis considerations, the Second 
Amendment is a fundamentally protected right, and it applies to state gov-
ernments with equal force as the federal government.104  Thus, the Court held 
“that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Second Amendment right [as defined] in Heller [I].”105
This begs the question, then, how does the Supreme Court’s Second 
Amendment jurisprudence affect state and local governments in promoting 
assault weapons bans?  Has anything changed since Heller I and McDonald
were decided?  For the following reasons, I argue that assault weapons bans 
remain constitutional. 
 100. Id. at 3031 (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 620 n.23); see also Presser v. Illinois, 116 
U.S. 252, 265 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875), abrograted by
McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 101. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031; see also DOHERTY, supra note 48, at 15 (noting that 
the conclusions in Cruikshank and Presser are outdated in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
trend in selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights). 
 102. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29). 
 103. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628 (categorizing the right to self-defense as “inherent” and 
“central to the Second Amendment right”). 
 104. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 & n.14 
(1968)). 
 105. Id.; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29.  The Court was not dissuaded by the gov-
ernments’ argument that there are strong, “controversial public safety implications” at stake.  
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045.  The majority simply pointed to other Bill of Rights guarantees 
that have been incorporated to the states despite the possibility of negative public safety im-
plications.  Id.; see, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2006) (quoting United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)) (reflecting on the immense social costs of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (recogniz-
ing the possibility of extremely harsh consequences resulting from the Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial). 
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III. ANALYSIS
Since the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Heller I, lower courts 
have been increasingly faced with interpreting the Court’s exact holding.106
One of the more difficult areas of interpretation, it seems, has been Heller I’s
applicability to assault weapons bans.107  This section analyzes Heller I’s
progeny in the lower courts with respect to assault weapons bans. 
A. Determining the Applicable Standard of Review 
First, it is useful to examine some of the levels of scrutiny that have 
been applied in Second Amendment cases.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court 
has never articulated the precise level of scrutiny implicated by the Second 
Amendment right.108  As a result, lower courts have struggled to settle on the 
proper standard.109
A minority of courts have applied strict scrutiny in purported accor-
dance with the majority opinion in Heller I, which states that the right to 
keep and bear arms is “pre-existing,” analogizes the right to keep and bear 
arms to other fundamental rights, and asserts “that the right to have arms was 
‘fundamental for English subjects’ at the time of the founding.”110  Strict 
scrutiny requires that a law “be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.”111  Strict scrutiny is not deferential toward government 
policy.112
 106. E.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252–53, 1256, 
1264–67 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 578–79, 584–86 (Ct. App. 
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010); Wilson v. Cnty. of Cook (Wilson II), 968 N.E.2d 
641, 655–56 (Ill. 2012). 
 107. See, e.g., James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 578–80, 585. 
 108. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (D.D.C. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 109. See id. at 184–88 (analyzing the variety of approaches applied by lower courts in the 
wake of Heller I).
 110. Id. at 185 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 592–93); see also United States v. Engstrum, 
609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2009) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 593–94) (applying 
strict scrutiny because Heller I defined the Second Amendment as “fundamental,” and made 
strong comparisons between the Second Amendment right and other fundamental rights that 
were reviewed under strict scrutiny). 
 111. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997). 
 112. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1267, 1269 
(2007) (stating that the strict scrutiny standard is often said to be “‘strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact’”).  But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Ful-
lilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (flatly rejecting that 
strict scrutiny is “‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” and strongly criticizing the phrase)). 
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Some courts have applied the “undue burden” test, which was first ar-
ticulated in the abortion realm.113  The “undue burden” test treats a law as 
constitutional so long as it does not place “a substantial obstacle in the path” 
of the person attempting to engage in constitutionally permissible conduct.114
The majority of courts, however, have concluded that Second Amend-
ment laws are subject to intermediate scrutiny.115  As a result, this Article 
argues through an intermediate scrutiny lens.  Intermediate scrutiny requires 
that a law “be substantially related to an important governmental” interest.116
B. People v. James
People v. James117 was one of the first and most influential cases to ad-
dress assault weapons bans following the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller 
I.  There, the appellate court reviewed the defendant’s conviction for unlaw-
ful possession of an assault weapon pursuant to the California Penal Code.118
The defendant argued that his conviction was contrary to his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.119
 113. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (citing Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th 
Cir.), vacated, reh’g granted, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3364 
(2013)); see People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 809 & n.5 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)) (analogizing the Second Amend-
ment right to the abortion right, and holding that a gun restriction will receive heightened 
scrutiny only where it poses an “undue burden” on an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, 
just as with restrictions on the abortion right). 
 114. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 115. Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that the intermediate 
scrutiny standard is appropriate because assault weapons bans “do not impose a substantial 
burden upon [the Second Amendment] right,” and for that same reason, strict scrutiny is not 
the proper standard of review); see United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (opining that intermediate scrutiny is proper in Second Amendment cases, 
and that just because the Supreme Court deemed the Second Amendment a “fundamental 
right,” does not necessarily mean that it is subject to strict scrutiny review because “[t]he 
Court has never purported to apply strict scrutiny in every provision of the Bill of Rights”), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamen-
tal Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 229 (2006) (noting that other rights are considered “‘far 
more fundamental’” than the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms). 
 116. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 117. 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 577.  For the pertinent statutory provisions, please see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
12275–90 (West 2009) (repealed 2010). 
 119. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 577. 
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In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Court of Appeal of California 
determined that possession of an assault weapon does not fall within the 
scope of the Second Amendment as defined in Heller I.120
The court first pointed to the legislative intent behind the assault weap-
ons ban.121  It found that the legislature was attempting to cure the gigantic 
threat that assault weapons pose to society.122  The legislature proscribed 
particular firearms based on their “high rate of fire and capacity for fire-
power that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure hu-
man beings.”123
With the legislative intent as a backdrop, the court found that Heller I
did not confer a right to possess any type of weapon.124  Although Heller I
does indeed stand for the proposition that an individual may possess a hand-
gun in his home for self-defense, nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion 
suggests that this protection extends to atypical weapons;125 the assault 
weapons classified by the California legislature were “weapons of war.”126
In concluding, the California court found that the assault weapons ban was 
constitutional and noted that the firearms at issue were “at least as dangerous 
and unusual” as the weapon at issue in Miller.127
 120. Id.
 121. Id. at 580–81; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275–90. 
 122. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580–81 (quoting Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 586 (Cal. 
2000)) (describing the widespread use of assault weapons as a “crisis”); see also CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 12275–90. 
 123. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275–90).  The legis-
lature commented that it was merely attempting to protect “the health, safety, and security” of 
California citizens, and it was not interested in legalizing firearms intended for “legitimate 
sports or recreational activities.”  Id. at 580–81 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275–90). 
 124. Id. at 585 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). 
 125. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626, 635. 
 126. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 586. 
 127. Id. (discussing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939)).  This is an interest-
ing conclusion by the California court, because although Heller I certainly did not overrule 
Miller, it did not speak very favorably of the opinion.  See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 623 (chiding 
Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissenting opinion, for placing too much reliance on Miller,
because “the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amend-
ment,” and for that reason it is especially incorrect “to read Miller for more than what it 
said”).  Even with that aside, the court in James repeatedly mentions that it is examining the 
Second Amendment right “as defined in Heller [I],” but then, rather abruptly, reverts back to 
Miller in the end.  James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 586. 
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C. Heller III 
One of the more comprehensive decisions to come down regarding Hel-
ler I’s effect on assault weapons bans is Heller v. District of Columbia (Hel-
ler III).128  Following the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Heller I, the Dis-
trict of Columbia enacted firearm regulations that it seemingly thought were 
constitutional.129  The plaintiffs challenged specific provisions of the District 
of Columbia’s gun laws, including the registration requirement and assault 
weapons prohibition.130
In evaluating the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge against assault 
weapons and large-capacity magazines, the court engaged in a two-part anal-
ysis.131  The court first noted that the record was devoid of any evidence indi-
cating that assault weapons bans are longstanding and thus entitled to a pre-
sumption of legal validity.132
The first part of the court’s analysis sought to answer the question of 
whether “the prohibitions impinge upon the Second Amendment right?”133
Surprisingly, the court stated that assault weapons are in “‘common use,’” as 
described in the majority opinion in Heller I.134  The court noted that al-
though that may be true, assault weapons—even if commonly used—are not 
necessarily used for self-defense.135  As a result, assault weapons bans likely 
do not impinge upon the Second Amendment right.136  The court did not de-
finitively answer the question, though, because it maintained that intermedi-
 128. 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 129. Id. at 1247. 
 130. Id.  The particular law was the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008, which 
amended the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975.  Id.; see also D.C. CODE §§ 7-
2502.01(a), .02(a)(6) (2012), invalidated by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008); Id. §§ 7-2502.03(a), (b), (d), (e), .04(c), .07a(a), (c), (d); Id. § 7-2506.01(b), invali-
dated in part by Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 131. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1260–64. 
 132. Id. at 1260–61. 
 133. Id.
 134. Id. at 1261 (predicating this determination on the fact that “[a]pproximately 1.6 mil-
lion AR-15s alone have been manufactured since 1986, and in 2007 this one popular model 
accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 percent of all rifles, produced in the U.S. 
for the domestic market”); Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).  The court also considered the 
fact that “fully 18 percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were equipped with mag-
azines holding more than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7 million more such magazines 
were imported into the United States between 1995 and 2000.”  Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
 135. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
 136. Id. at 1262. 
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ate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, and the assault weapons 
ban at issue did pass constitutional muster under this standard.137
The second part of the court’s analysis focused on whether the assault 
weapons ban survived intermediate scrutiny.138  The court issued a reminder 
that it is the government that carries the burden of proof under intermediate 
scrutiny.139  Consequently, the District of Columbia was responsible for 
demonstrating that its assault weapons ban bears a substantial relationship to 
its important government interest in crime control and prevention.140
The District of Columbia had no difficulty showing that assault weap-
ons are dangerous.141  It pointed to a series of empirical studies supporting 
the government’s contention that assault weapons are especially likely to 
result in danger for law enforcement personnel because of their “‘high fire-
power.’”142  The government seemingly placed heavy reliance on studies 
evaluating the federal assault weapons ban from 1994 to 2004.143
These studies suggest that assault weapons were “‘most commonly used 
in crime before the [federal assault weapons] ban,’” as opposed to other pur-
poses, such as for hunting or in self-defense.144  Moreover, one study found 
that assault weapons—like the ones at issue in Heller III—“‘account for a 
larger share of guns used in mass murders and murders of police, crimes for 
 137. Id. at 1261–62. 
 138. Id. at 1261–64.  In determining that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate, the court 
noted that the plaintiffs proffered no evidence supporting the assertion that assault weapons 
are encompassed within the core Second Amendment right, which would have heightened the 
level of scrutiny.  Id. at 1262–63.  The court provided an example of how the plaintiffs could 
have done this by pointing to several statistical conclusions from empirical studies.  Heller III,
670 F.3d at 1262 (citing DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STUDY ON THE SPORTING SUITABILITY OF 
MODIFIED SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT RIFLES 38 (1998), available at
http://www.atf.gov/firearms/industry/april-1998-sporting-suitability-of-modified-
semiautomatic-assault-rifles.pdf; Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime:  The 
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 185 
(1995)).  These statistics suggest that handguns are overwhelmingly used in self-defense, and 
that assault weapons are “‘not generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily 
adaptable to sporting purposes.’”  Id. (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra, at 38). 
 139. Id.
 140. Id.
 141. See Id. at 1262–64. 
 142. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263 (quoting BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
ASSAULT WEAPONS “MASS PRODUCED MAYHEM” 3 (2008)). 
 143. See id. (basing support for its conclusion on two empirical studies). 
 144. Id. at 1263 (quoting CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER WITH DANIEL J. WOODS & JEFFREY A.
ROTH, AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN 
MARKETS AND GUN VIOLENCE, 1994–2003, at 11 (2004), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204431.pdf). 
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which weapons with greater firepower would seem particularly useful.’”145
The same study concluded that crime decreased after the federal assault 
weapons ban was enacted, and for that reason, the District of Columbia ar-
gued that assault weapons bans significantly further its governmental interest 
in crime control and prevention.146
The D.C. Circuit found validity in the government’s argument and 
agreed that its assault weapons ban “promote[d] the [g]overnment’s interest 
in crime control in the densely populated urban area that is the District of 
Columbia.”147  The court concluded by determining that the District of Co-
lumbia “carried its burden of showing [that its law bears] a substantial rela-
tionship” to the important government interest in crime control and preven-
tion.148  Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment 
rights were not violated, and hence the government’s assault weapons ban 
was constitutional.149
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh maintained that the 
District of Columbia’s assault weapons ban was unconstitutional.150  In sup-
port of his position, he noted that “[t]he vast majority of handguns today are 
semi-automatic,” and thus no line can be easily drawn between handguns and 
assault weapons bans in accordance with a close and correct reading of Hel-
ler I.151  In sum, according to Judge Kavanaugh, there is simply no constitu-
tional distinction that can be logically drawn between the handgun ban at 
issue in Heller I and the assault weapons ban at issue in Heller III.152  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion may prove to be instrumental in subsequent 
cases that may ultimately reach the Supreme Court. 
 145. Id. (quoting KOPER WITH WOODS & ROTH, supra note 144, at 87). 
 146. Id. (citing KOPER WITH WOODS & ROTH, supra note 144, at 51). 
 147. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263. 
 148. Id. at 1264. 
 149. Id.
 150. Id. at 1269 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Judge Kavanaugh is generally viewed as a 
very conservative jurist.  Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at A1.  “[H]e was Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary to 
President [George W.] Bush.”  Brett M. Kavanaugh, U.S. CTS. OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+BMK (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2013).  He was also a law clerk for Justice Kennedy.  Id.  It may be safe to assume 
that Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion adequately represents at least one traditionally 
conservative perspective on the constitutionality of assault weapons bans.  See Heller III, 670 
F.3d at 1269–70. 
 151. Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1286. 
 152. Id. at 1289 (stating that “[t]he fundamental flaw in the majority opinion is that it 
cannot persuasively explain why semi-automatic handguns are constitutionally protected (as 
Heller [I] held) but semi-automatic rifles are not.”). 
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D. Wilson v. County of Cook (Wilson II)
In 1993, Cook County, Illinois enacted an ordinance that banned spe-
cific firearms defined as assault weapons.153  The Cook County Board of 
Commissioners determined that these particular weapons needed to be out-
lawed due to their uniquely dangerous attributes.154  Recently, a group of 
plaintiffs decided to challenge the ordinance’s constitutionality.155  “The trial 
court dismissed [the] plaintiffs’ first amended complaint,” determining that 
the ordinance did not violate the right to keep and bear arms under either the 
United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution.156  In what became a 
particularly interesting procedural history, the plaintiffs first appealed fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller I.157  The appellate court 
found in favor of Cook County, as it interpreted Heller I to extend only to 
federal laws.158  Immediately thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a petition for 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois; however during the time 
when the petition was pending, McDonald was decided.159  The Supreme 
Court of Illinois directed the appellate court to vacate its prior holding and 
reconsider its ruling in light of McDonald.160
The plaintiffs’ argument was that they possessed a Second Amendment 
right—as interpreted in Heller I and applied to the states in McDonald—to 
keep and bear arms, including the purported “assault weapons” prohibited by 
the ordinance.161  The plaintiffs further contended that many of the pro-
scribed firearms were actually commonly owned, and as such, they were well 
within the scope of Heller I.162  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling once again, holding “that the [S]econd [A]mendment right does not 
extend to assault weapons and that the [o]rdinance is substantially related to 
 153. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. 2012). 
 154. See id.  Among the commissioners’ findings were: 
1,000 of the 4,500 trauma cases handled by [the] Cook County Hospital that year were due to 
gunshot wounds; there were more federally licensed gun dealers in Cook County than gas sta-
tions; an estimated 1 in 20 high school students had carried a gun in the prior month; and as-
sault weapons [were] 20 times more likely to be used in the commission of a crime than other 
kinds of weapons. 
Wilson v. Cook Cnty. (Wilson I), 943 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted, 949 
N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). 
 155. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 646. 
 156. Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d at 770. 
 157. See Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 647. 
 158. Id.
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.
 161. Id. at 646–47. 
 162. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 656. 
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an important government[al] interest.”163  The plaintiffs appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Illinois.164
In reversing the trial court with regard to the plaintiffs’ Second 
Amendment claim, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the plaintiffs suf-
ficiently pleaded a cause of action for a constitutional violation.165  The court 
reasoned that, given the procedural posture of the case, it could not evaluate 
the nexus between the assault weapons ban and the interest sought to be pro-
tected.166  The court was not willing to determine that “no set of facts [could] 
be proved that would entitle plaintiffs to relief on” their Second Amendment 
claim.167  The court further stated: 
 Plaintiffs seek to present evidence to support their allegation 
that this particular Ordinance encompasses a myriad of weapons 
that are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses and fall outside the scope of the dangers sought to be pro-
tected under the Ordinance.  Without a national uniform definition 
of assault weapons from which to judge these weapons, it cannot 
be ascertained at this stage of the proceedings whether these arms 
with these particular attributes as defined in this Ordinance are 
well suited for self-defense or sport or would be outweighed com-
pletely by the collateral damage resulting from their use, making 
them “dangerous and unusual” as articulated in Heller [I].  This 
question requires us to engage in an empirical inquiry beyond the 
scope of the record and beyond the scope of judicial notice about 
the nature of the weapons that are banned under this Ordinance 
and the dangers of these particular weapons.168
In essence, the court refused to interpret McDonald and Heller I as categori-
cally permitting the proscription of assault weapons and it opted not to fol-
low James and Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II)169 on that score.170
 163. Id. at 647 (citing Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d 768, 780–81 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted,
949 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012)). 
 164. Id.
 165. Id. at 657. 
 166. Id.
 167. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 657. 
 168. Id. at 656. 
 169. 698 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 170. Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 656–57. 
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IV. PROPOSAL
I propose that Heller II and James were indeed correctly decided, and 
that assault weapons bans are constitutional, consistent with Heller I’s core 
holding. 
A. Assault Weapons Bans Do Not Implicate the Core Second Amendment 
Right, and Consequently These Bans Need Not Survive Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Heller I was very narrow:  “In sum, we 
hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the 
Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful 
firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”171
Self-defense is undoubtedly at the core of the Second Amendment right.172
Moreover, the Court’s decision expressly encompasses handguns in the 
home.173  Assault weapons, as previously articulated, are neither generally 
used in self-defense nor are they handguns, and for those two reasons, assault 
weapons fall outside of the scope of Heller I.174
 171. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 172. Id. at 628, 632 (stating that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the 
Second Amendment right” and that the historical underpinnings of this right support this 
conclusion). 
 173. Id. at 635.  But see Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1788, 2012 WL 6156062, at *9 (7th 
Cir. Dec. 11, 2012) (holding that Illinois’s ban on ready-to-use guns in public is unconstitu-
tional).  In Moore, the Seventh Circuit was charged with interpreting the holdings of McDon-
ald and Heller I. Id. at *3, *9.  Judge Posner, writing for the majority, stated: 
To confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the 
right of self-defense described in Heller [I] and McDonald.
 A gun is a potential danger to more people if carried in public than just kept in the home. 
. . . . 
 A blanket prohibition on carrying gun [sic] in public prevents a person from defending 
himself anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a curtailment of the right of 
armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might
benefit on balance from such a curtailment, though there is no proof it would. 
. . . . 
The Supreme Court has decided that the [Second A]mendment confers a right to bear arms for 
self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.  The theoretical and empirical 
evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is consistent with concluding that a right to carry fire-
arms in public may promote self-defense. 
Id. at *3–4, *7, *9. 
 174. See Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (expressing uncertainty as to 
“whether [assault] weapons are commonly used . . . for self-defense” purposes).  Heller III
also reflects on testimony put on by the government that supports the claim that, even if as-
sault weapons are sometimes used in self-defense, “‘the tendency is for defenders to keep 
firing until all bullets have been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the household, 
passersby, and bystanders.’”  Id. at 1263–64.  That is to say that there are other extrinsic re-
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller I conceded that the 
Second Amendment is not so robust that it evades all limitation.175  Indeed, 
the Court explicitly recognized that the “longstanding prohibitions” on cer-
tain types of weapons are not necessarily altered by its opinion in Heller I.176
Although Heller I lists only a few examples of longstanding prohibitions on 
the right to keep and bear arms, there is nothing in the opinion that suggests 
that this is an exclusive or exhaustive list.177  Thus, it can be convincingly 
said that our Nation’s longstanding prohibition on assault weapons need not 
be disturbed.178
Additional support for this proposition can be found later in the opin-
ion.179  The Court cited Miller favorably and mentioned that that decision 
protected only weapons “‘in common use at the time.’”180  The Court inter-
preted this as a prohibition against the possession of “‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons.’”181  Numerous authoritative studies support the contention that 
assault weapons are “‘dangerous and unusual’” weapons, and for that reason, 
they are unprotected by the Second Amendment.182  Certainly, if assault 
weapons were not considered “dangerous and unusual,” one would have a 
troublesome time imagining which weapons would qualify as such. 
For these reasons, it appears evident that assault weapons bans do not 
implicate the core Second Amendment right.183  Consequently, these bans 
percussions that must be considered in concluding that assault weapons are used in self-
defense. 
 175. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”). 
 176. Id. at 626–27 & n.26 (providing examples of classic firearm prohibitions, such as 
“possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing condi-
tions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”). 
 177. Id.
 178. See id.  Assault weapons are admittedly a relatively recent development.  Neverthe-
less—as aforementioned—governments have sought to control and ban assault weapons since 
their inception.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 179. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 180. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 181. Id.
 182. See Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 
at 627) (discussing several studies that describe assault weapons as tools that facilitate “‘mass 
produced mayhem’” and “‘are designed to enhance their capacity to shoot multiple human 
targets very rapidly’”).  In a society that values the sanctity of life, these weapons certainly 
can be thought of as “‘dangerous and unusual.’”  Id. at 1263 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 
627). 
 183. Id. at 1264. 
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need not be subjected to intermediate scrutiny and are therefore constitution-
ally consistent with Heller I.184
B. Even Assuming, Arguendo, that Assault Weapons Bans Do Implicate the 
Core Second Amendment Right, These Bans Nevertheless Pass Constitu-
tional Muster Under Intermediate Scrutiny 
Even assuming, arguendo, that assault weapons bans do implicate the 
core Second Amendment right—that is, assault weapons are found to be used 
in self-defense—these bans withstand the intermediate scrutiny analysis.185
1. Governments Have an Important Governmental Interest in Banning 
Assault Weapons 
Governments have an important governmental interest in banning as-
sault weapons, because these bans aid in crime control and prevention, and in 
that sense, they enhance safety.186  The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence 
concluded that assault weapons are unique firearms in that they are not used 
for “sport,” as are many other lawful firearms.187  To the contrary, assault 
weapons are strongly conducive to accurate and efficient spray firing.188  In 
other words, these firearms make it easier to kill.189  And, not only that, these 
guns make it easier to kill a larger number of individuals than more tradi-
tional classes of firearms.190  The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence found 
that assault weapons have been increasingly used against law enforcement 
agents; in particular, because assault weapons have proliferated within drug 
and gang communities.191
Courts have long recognized governments’ interest in preserving and 
enhancing public safety.192  In one heavily cited Supreme Court decision, 
Justice John Marshall Harlan said: 
 184. Id. app. at 1266. 
 185. See id. at 1263–64. 
 186. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263 (stating that “[i]n short, the evidence demonstrates a 
ban on assault weapons is likely to promote the Government’s interest in crime control”). 
 187. Assault Weapons Policy Summary, supra note 2; see also People v. James, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 576, 580–81 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010). 
 188. Assault Weapons Policy Summary, supra note 2. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id.
 191. Id.; see also Robertson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 333 (Colo. 1994) 
(en banc) (explaining that assault weapons are easily concealed and therefore are likely to be 
used to accomplish criminal objectives). 
 192. See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 263, 268–69 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(upholding a gun control ordinance that was expressly directed at preserving safety); Benja-
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There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily 
subject for the common good.  On any other basis organized soci-
ety could not exist with safety to its members.  Society based on 
the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be con-
fronted with disorder and anarchy.  Real liberty for all could not 
exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right 
of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his 
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to 
others.  This court has more than once recognized it as a funda-
mental principle that “persons and property are subjected to all 
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general com-
fort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right of the 
legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowl-
edged general principles ever can be made, so far as natural per-
sons are concerned.”193
This passage truly illuminates the rationale for why safety is an important 
governmental interest:  Safety, in certain circumstances, can actually pro-
mote the curtailment of certain rights.  In that sense, then, it can hardly be 
argued that safety is anything other than an important governmental interest 
if it has stood to restrict other fundamental rights.  Perhaps it is axiomatic to 
state that a democratic society values the safety of all of its citizens, and, 
without which, it would fail to operate effectively—or maybe even cease to 
operate at all. 
2.  Assault Weapons Bans Bear a Substantial Relationship to Governments’ 
Important Governmental Interest 
Assault weapons bans, like the ones in Heller III, James, and Wilson v. 
County of Cook (Wilson II),194 bear a substantial relationship to the govern-
ments’ important interests in crime control and prevention.195  The bans are 
min v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Conn. 1995) (arguing that states have traditionally been 
able “to protect the health, safety and morals of the citizenry”); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 
595, 597 (Neb. 1989) (quoting Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 351 
N.W.2d 701, 703 (Neb. 1984)) (asserting that the public safety and welfare are undoubtedly 
sound reasons to regulate the right to keep and bear arms). 
 193. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. 
Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 629 (1898); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877); Thorpe 
v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1855)). 
 194. 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). 
 195. See Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 576, 586 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1517 (2010); Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d at 
647 (citing Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d 768, 780–81 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted, 949 N.E.2d 1104 
(Ill. 2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012)). 
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incredibly specific and tightly worded to fit this objective, as the legislation 
at issue in these cases list specific brands and models that are proscribed.196
In these cases, the government proscribed particular assault weapons based 
on legislative findings that these weapons pose a direct and uncontroverted 
threat to society at large.197  While it is true that legislative bodies are not 
entirely insulated from judicial review, legislatures must be afforded “sub-
stantial deference” so long as their conclusions have been based on substan-
tial evidence.198
Furthermore, the assault weapons bans at issue in Heller III, James, and 
Wilson v. Cook County (Wilson I),199 do not criminalize the category of fire-
arms that is “overwhelmingly chosen by American society”—non-
semiautomatic handguns.200  Those bans target only weapons that are nar-
rowly defined as “assault weapons” in an effort to promote the important 
governmental interest in public safety and crime control and prevention.201
Most other types of firearms remain available for lawful use.202  Thus, it can-
not be credibly argued that similar assault weapons bans are not a substantial 
fit to further the government’s important governmental interest. 
 196. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1248–49; James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 579–80 nn.5–6; Wil-
son II, 968 N.E.2d at 648–49. 
 197. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261 (citing reports on the District of Columbia legislation 
that found that “assault weapons ‘have no legitimate use as self-defense weapons, and would 
in fact increase the danger to law-abiding users and innocent bystanders if kept in the home or 
used in self-defense situations’”); James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580 (recognizing the legislative 
intent behind the assault weapons ban at issue:  “‘The Legislature hereby finds and declares 
that the proliferation and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and 
security of all citizens of this state.  The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons speci-
fied in Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and 
capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill human beings’”); Wilson II, 968 
N.E.2d at 656 (stating that the ordinance at issue set forth numerous findings indicating that 
“‘there is no legitimate sporting purpose for the military style assault weapons now being used 
on our streets,’ and that ‘assault weapons are twenty times more likely to be used in the com-
mission of a crime than other kinds of weapons’”). 
 198. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994). 
 199. 943 N.E.2d 768 (Ill. App. Ct.), review granted, 949 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011), and aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). 
 200. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (stating that handguns constitute the most popular 
class of firearms for self-defense purposes); Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261–62; James, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 577, 579 n.5; Wilson I, 943 N.E.2d at 781. 
 201. See Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1249, 1262–63; James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580; Wilson I,
943 N.E.2d at 771. 
 202. See James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580–81. 
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C. There Is Strong Public Support in Favor of Banning Assault Weapons, 
and Therefore Congress Should Enact Legislation Criminalizing the Manu-
facture, Sale, and Possession of Assault Weapons 
Recent polls strongly suggest that the general public is in favor of re-
stricting the “manufacture, sale, and possession of . . . assault [weapons].”203
One poll reveals that approximately 62% of Americans are in favor of 
“ban[ning] the sale of semi-automatic assault weapons, [with a limited] ex-
cept[ion] for use by the military or police.”204  Another nationwide poll sug-
gests that 57% of Americans are in favor of banning the “manufacture, sale, 
and possession of [some] semi-automatic [weapons], such as . . . AK-
47[s].”205  Shockingly, “a majority of gun-owning households [support a na-
tionwide] ban on assault weapons, although by [an admittedly] smaller mar-
gin.”206
Also, in the aftermath of the expiration of the federal assault weapons 
ban in 2004, polls indicated that 61% of Americans were dissatisfied with its 
expiration, whereas only 12% were satisfied with its expiration.207  Addition-
ally, polls at the time suggest that Democrats, Republicans, and Independents 
alike favored extending the federal assault weapons ban, thereby indicating 
the support of assault weapons bans across the political spectrum.208  In other 
words, the issue seemingly transcends traditional political cleavages. 
Due to strong public support, Congress should once again enact legisla-
tion criminalizing the manufacture, sale, and possession of assault weap-
ons.209  The following is a proposed law drafted by the Law Center to Prevent 
 203. ORC INT’L, CNN/ORC POLL 3 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/08/09/rel7a.pdf; see, e.g., Frank James, Little Elec-
tion-Year Incentive for Obama or Romney to Join Gun Debate, NPR (July 23, 2012, 5:40 
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/23/157230177/little-election-year-
incentive-for-obama-or-romney-to-join-gun-debate (reporting a recent Time poll from June 
2011). 
 204. Guns (p. 2), POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 205. ORC INT’L, supra note 203, at 3. 
 206. CBS NEWS & NY TIMES, POLL: THE ECONOMY, THE BUDGET DEFICIT AND GUN
CONTROL (2011), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/Jan11_Econ.pdf?tag=contentMain;contentBody.  This 
poll also suggests that there has been an increase in overall public support for a nationwide 
assault weapons ban since 2009.  Id.
 207. Guns (p. 2), supra note 204 (referencing a poll conducted by NBC News and the 
Wall Street Journal in September 2004). 
 208. Id. (referencing a poll conducted by the Harris Poll in September 2004). 
 209. See id.  Indeed, some lawmakers, such as Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), have 
reportedly taken steps to reintroduce a federal assault weapons ban.  Ryan Keller, Senator 
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Gun Violence (formerly the Legal Community Against Violence), modified 
for adoption by Congress.210  The law encompasses ideas from the 1994 fed-
eral assault weapons ban and has many commonalities with the assault 
weapons bans at issue in Heller III, James, and Wilson II211:
1. Findings 
. . . . 
Whereas assault weapons are semi-automatic firearms designed 
with military features to allow rapid and accurate spray firing for 
the quick and efficient killing of humans; 
Whereas assault weapons have been the weapon of choice in many 
mass shootings of innocent civilians; 
Whereas assault weapon shootings are responsible for a significant 
percentage of the deaths of law enforcement officers killed in the 
line of duty; 
Whereas approximately [two] million assault weapons are already 
in circulation in the United States; 
Whereas the wide availability of assault weapons is a serious risk 
to public health and safety; 
Whereas most citizens—including most gun owners—support as-
sault weapons bans and believe that assault weapons should not be 
available for civilian use; 
Therefore, the [United States Congress] hereby adopts the follow-
ing: 
Feinstein Looking to Introduce New Assault Weapons Ban, EXAMINER.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/senator-feinstein-looking-to-introduce-new-assault-
weapons-ban. 
 210. See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS—A LEGAL 
PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION 58 (2004), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Banning_Assault_Weapons_A_Legal_Primer_8.05_entire.pdf. 
 211. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994); Heller III, 670 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 578–80 (Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1517 (2010); Wilson II, 968 N.E.2d 641, 648–49 (Ill. 2012). 
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2. Definitions 
(a) “Assault weapon” means any: 
(1)  Semi-automatic or pump-action rifle that has the capacity to 
accept  a detachable magazine and has one or more of the follow-
ing: 
(i) A pistol grip; 
(ii) Any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that 
can be held by the non-trigger hand; 
(iii) A folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; 
(iv) A shroud attached to the barrel, or that partially or  completely 
encircles the barrel, allowing the bearer to hold the firearm with 
the non-trigger hand without being burned, but excluding a slide 
that encloses the barrel; or 
(v) A muzzle brake or muzzle compensator. 
(2) Semi-automatic pistol, or any semi-automatic, centerfire rifle 
with a fixed magazine, that has the capacity to accept more than 
[ten] rounds of ammunition; 
(3) Semi-automatic pistol that has the capacity to accept a detach-
able magazine and has one or more of the following: 
(i) Any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that 
can be held by the non-trigger hand; 
(ii) A folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; 
(iii) A shroud attached to the barrel, or that partially or  completely 
encircles the barrel, allowing the bearer to hold the firearm with 
the non-trigger hand without being burned, but excluding a slide 
that encloses the barrel; 
(iv) A muzzle brake or muzzle compensator; or 
(v) The capacity to accept a detachable magazine at any    
 location outside of the pistol grip; 
205
: Nova Law Review 37, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
436 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
(4) Semi-automatic shotgun that has one or more of the following  
(i) A pistol grip; 
(ii) Any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that 
can be held by the non-trigger hand; 
(iii) A folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; 
(iv) A fixed magazine capacity in excess of 5 rounds; or 
(v) An ability to accept a detachable magazine; 
(5) Shotgun with a revolving cylinder; 
(6) Conversion kit, part, or combination of parts, from which an 
assault weapon can be assembled if those parts are in the posses-
sion or under the control of the same person[s]. 
(b) “Assault weapon” does not include any firearm that has been 
made permanently inoperable. 
. . . . 
(c) “Detachable magazine” means any ammunition feeding de-
vice, the function of which is to deliver one or more ammunition 
cartridges into the firing chamber, which can be removed from the 
firearm without the use of any tool, including a bullet or ammuni-
tion cartridge. 
(d) “Large capacity magazine” means any ammunition feeding 
device with  the capacity to accept more than [ten] rounds, but 
shall not be construed to include any of the following: 
(1) A feeding device that has been permanently altered so that it  
 cannot accommodate more than [ten] rounds. 
(2) A [twenty-two] caliber tube ammunition feeding device. 
(3) A tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action firearm. 
(e) “Muzzle brake” means a device attached to the muzzle of a 
weapon that utilizes escaping gas to reduce recoil. 
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(f) “Muzzle compensator” means a device attached to the muzzle 
of a weapon that utilizes escaping gas to control muzzle move-
ment. 
3. Prohibitions 
(a) No person, corporation or other entity in the [United States] 
may manufacture, import, possess, purchase, sell, or transfer any 
assault weapon or large capacity magazine. 
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to: 
(1) Any government officer, agent, or employee, member of the 
armed  forces of the United States, or peace officer, to the extent 
that such  person is otherwise authorized to acquire or possess an 
assault weapon and/or large capacity magazine, and does so while 
acting  within the scope of his or her duties; or 
(2) The manufacture, sale, or transfer of an assault weapon or 
large capacity ammunition feeding device by a firearms manufac-
turer or dealer that is properly licensed under federal, state, and lo-
cal laws to any branch of the armed forces of the United States, or 
to a law enforcement agency in [the United States] for use by that 
agency or its employees for law enforcement purposes. 
. . . . 
(c) Any person who, prior to the effective date of this law, was 
legally in possession of an assault weapon or large capacity maga-
zine shall have [ninety] days from such effective date to do any of 
the following without being subject to prosecution: 
(1) Remove the assault weapon or large capacity magazine from 
the [United States]; 
(2) Render the assault weapon permanently inoperable; or 
(3) Surrender the assault weapon or large capacity magazine to 
the appropriate law enforcement agency for destruction.212
 212. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 210, at 59–61.  Appendix G is part of a 
report, Banning Assault Weapons–A Legal Primer for State and Local Action, which is a 
publication of the Legal Community Against Violence (now known as the Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence).  Id. at 57; About Us, L. CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
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V. CONCLUSION
Although Heller I is widely viewed as a pro-guns-rights case, assault 
weapons bans remain constitutional under the Second Amendment.213  The 
Second Amendment is subject to limitations and regulations similar to other 
fundamental rights, and nothing in Heller I suggests anything to the con-
trary.214 Heller I’s narrow holding does not confer a right to keep and bear 
assault weapons, and consequently assault weapons bans are constitutionally 
permissible.215  Congress should promptly enact legislation criminalizing the 
manufacture, sale, and possession of assault weapons consistent with prevail-
ing public opinion, such as the law suggested by the Law Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence.  This measure can only aid in subsequent prevention of catas-
trophic violence, like that which occurred in Aurora, Colorado, Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin, and Portland, Oregon.
http://smartgunlaws.org/about-gun-laws (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).  The model law is modi-
fied for adoption by the United States Congress.  See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra
note 210, at v, 15.  Intentionally absent is a “penalty” or “punishment” section, as this article 
merely opines that assault weapons manufacture, sale, and possession should be subject to 
criminal liability and chooses to abstain from addressing the broader policy question of crimi-
nal punishment. 
 213. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2000); Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1263–64; see also
supra Part IV.A–B. 
 214. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 215. See id. at 627, 635; Heller III, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
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